Why did British Leyland fail?

Carryfast:

Tomdhu:
I think we could all continue deliberating about bore and stroke dimensions and ratios until the Atki with the 6LW comes into the yard. But it is pure speculation unless we have access to more comprehensive information relative to the cylinder blocks, cylinder heads, crankcases and cranks.

Critically we need dimensions such as:-

  1. Bore spacing and distance from front to rear of the cylinder block.
  2. Distance from C/L crank to top of cylinder block,
  3. Clearance available in crank case to take a bigger swing,
  4. Distance from top of cylinder block down to bottom of bore (bore depth)

No.1 in my view is the most crucial as it affects:-
a) Bore and liner stability,
b) Coolant flow and oil circulation capacity through to the cylinder heads
c) Strength potential for anchoring the cylinder head studs.

Please step forward anyone who has access to either an o.680 or AV760 cylinder block.

All the above information would be most useful however the real “gold dust “ would be input from the actual engine designers who were involved but, as all this was 50+ years ago, then this becomes increasingly unlikely.

Which leaves the question was there actually anything really preventing the ability of the 760’s/TL12’s designers from calling for any changes required in the architecture of the engine to meet the required aims of at least matching the 6 inch stroke of the Eagle and 14 litre ■■■■■■■ in the upgrade of the 690 ?..

CF,

As to what prevented the engineers calling for changes, I would submit my views as follows:-

Having developed the AV760 from the AV691 in 1964, the AEC engineers probably held the view that this engine had reached the limit of its potential i.e. the physical dimensions of the block were inadequate to provide greater output without compromising the reliability/durability of the engine.

Bear in mind also that around 1961/2, AEC had embarked on their V8 design project. Consequently, these same engineers weren’t going to flog an old horse (the AV691) whilst they were nourishing their own new “clean sheet” V8 project. It was Bob Fryars’ baby and only he and his team, are the ones to elucidate meaningfully on this.

Don’t forget, a similar dilemma was encountered by BMC with their old 6 cylinder engine from the 1950’s. To get more power, BMC engineers decided to take the easiest course and increase the bore size to 100mm. They released the product on the market and it was an unmitigated disaster. There were many problems, not the least of which was instability of the bores together with the blocks warping. Add in cooling issues and in-production problems and it was a major calamity resulting in huge warranty claims and loss of market share.

Sometime after the merger with BMC in 1968, Leyland engineers studied the problem and eventually came up with a strategy. The main element of the strategy was to reduce the bore to 98mm and increase the stroke. They kept the swept volume at 5.7 litres. This restored structural integrity. The production issues were addressed also. In 1972 the revised design appeared and it was a success. That was a total of 10 years after the original problem emerged!

It proves conclusively that engines are very complex assemblies involving materials, tolerances, mechanical issues, thermo dynamics, thermal stress, coolant circulation, lubrication etc etc. Getting it right takes the right brains plus lots of money and time. Without researching further at this stage, I am sure many other engine manufacturers have over-stretched some of their best designs.

Whilst assessing an engine purely from a design perspective, we must always acknowledge that a business has to be run at a profit and directors make decisions primarily based on that. Directors continually have to consider a multitude of competing requests for expenditure. Do they approve investment in a new transfer CNC line for cylinder head manufacture, or development of a new 10 speed synchro splitter gearbox or a new induction furnace in the foundry etc etc? It is certainly not a simple question of do we increase the stroke or do we do another particular thing or not based on engineering logic.

Nobody prevented the engineers from calling for changes. It is up to them to create a business case for requesting investment funds – fully costed and fully justified with complete conviction on their part ie heads on the block commitment. Did they do that? Or did they keep their heads down and let things develop? The engineering director was on the board. It was up to him to make the case to his fellow directors. Did he do that?

Let’s assume he did then, never forget, directors perform a continual juggling act of priorities - whilst using finite resources be they financial, human or otherwise. The directors, as a board, decide.

Tomdhu:
…Nobody prevented the engineers from calling for changes. It is up to them to create a business case for requesting investment funds – fully costed and fully justified with complete conviction on their part ie heads on the block commitment…

They cannot be blamed for trying to engineer a way out of that situation.

A’l get me coat.

Tomdhu:

Carryfast:

Tomdhu:
I think we could all continue deliberating about bore and stroke dimensions and ratios until the Atki with the 6LW comes into the yard. But it is pure speculation unless we have access to more comprehensive information relative to the cylinder blocks, cylinder heads, crankcases and cranks.

Critically we need dimensions such as:-

  1. Bore spacing and distance from front to rear of the cylinder block.
  2. Distance from C/L crank to top of cylinder block,
  3. Clearance available in crank case to take a bigger swing,
  4. Distance from top of cylinder block down to bottom of bore (bore depth)

No.1 in my view is the most crucial as it affects:-
a) Bore and liner stability,
b) Coolant flow and oil circulation capacity through to the cylinder heads
c) Strength potential for anchoring the cylinder head studs.

Please step forward anyone who has access to either an o.680 or AV760 cylinder block.

All the above information would be most useful however the real “gold dust “ would be input from the actual engine designers who were involved but, as all this was 50+ years ago, then this becomes increasingly unlikely.

Which leaves the question was there actually anything really preventing the ability of the 760’s/TL12’s designers from calling for any changes required in the architecture of the engine to meet the required aims of at least matching the 6 inch stroke of the Eagle and 14 litre ■■■■■■■ in the upgrade of the 690 ?..

CF,

As to what prevented the engineers calling for changes, I would submit my views as follows:-

Having developed the AV760 from the AV691 in 1964, the AEC engineers probably held the view that this engine had reached the limit of its potential i.e. the physical dimensions of the block were inadequate to provide greater output without compromising the reliability/durability of the engine.

Bear in mind also that around 1961/2, AEC had embarked on their V8 design project. Consequently, these same engineers weren’t going to flog an old horse (the AV691) whilst they were nourishing their own new “clean sheet” V8 project. It was Bob Fryars’ baby and only he and his team, are the ones to elucidate meaningfully on this.

Don’t forget, a similar dilemma was encountered by BMC with their old reliable 5.7 litre engine from the 1950’s. To get more power, BMC engineers decided to take the easiest course and increase the bore size to 100mm. They released the product on the market and it was an unmitigated disaster. There were many problems, not the least of which was instability of the bores together with the blocks warping. Add in cooling issues and in-production problems and it was a major calamity resulting in huge warranty claims and loss of market share.

Sometime after the merger with BMC in 1968, Leyland engineers studied the problem and eventually came up with a strategy. The main element of the strategy was to reduce the bore to 98mm and increase the stroke. This restored structural integrity. The production issues were addressed also. In 1972 the revised design appeared and it was a success. That was a total of 10 years after the original problem emerged!

It proves conclusively that engines are very complex assemblies involving materials, tolerances, mechanical issues, thermo dynamics, thermal stress, coolant circulation, lubrication etc etc. Getting it right takes the right brains plus lots of money and time. Without researching further at this stage, I am sure many other engine manufacturers have over-stretched some of their best designs.

Whilst assessing an engine purely from a design perspective, we must always acknowledge that a business has to be run at a profit and directors make decisions primarily based on that. Directors continually have to consider a multitude of competing requests for expenditure. Do they approve investment in a new transfer CNC line for cylinder head manufacture, or development of a new 10 speed synchro splitter gearbox or a new induction furnace in the foundry etc etc? It is certainly not a simple question of do we increase the stroke or do we do another particular thing or not based on engineering logic.

Nobody prevented the engineers from calling for changes. It is up to them to create a business case for requesting investment funds – fully costed and fully justified with complete conviction on their part ie heads on the block commitment. Did they do that? Or did they keep their heads down and let things develop? The engineering director was on the board. It was up to him to make the case to his fellow directors. Did he do that?

Let’s assume he did then, never forget, directors perform a continual juggling act of priorities - whilst using finite resources be they financial, human or otherwise. The directors, as a board, decide.

That seems to be an accurate description of the dilemma which faced AEC/Leyland’s design team.Logically the issue must have gone along the lines of them informing the board that we don’t have a choice in this.We either produce a credible competitor to the Eagle and 14 litre ■■■■■■■ and with it the foreign onslaught facing us or we cease to be an in house major component manufacturer in the longer term.In this case in the form of the right engine for the job.To which the answer seems to have gone along the lines knowingly that the 760/TL12 was the end of the line regards Leyland’s engine development programme.At which point we’ll then rely on Rolls and ■■■■■■■ to provide the required kit.I’d guess that fateful decision,together with the best shot T45 cab development,let alone Marathon,sealed the fate of Leyland truck division. :bulb: :frowning:

After BL killed off Guy Motors someone in the company suddenly realised how popular the Big J had been with operators and presumably convinced the board that there was a substantial demand for proprietary engines in their chassis. From this the option of a Marathon powered by other than the TL12 came to be sold.

At a later date I will guess that possibly the following occurred. Sales figures for the Marathon option were examined and maybe found to exceed those of the TL12 version. A study was made of the expected life of the group’s foundry capacity and an evaluation made of the cost of updating the machine shops to produce a new in-house engine, or of further development of the TL12. Examining the popularity of proprietary engines in competitors product and a study of the percentage of TL12 engines in a breakdown of Marathon sales figures convinced the Board that the future really lay in proprietary engines. The cost of future engine development could be left to their suppliers and warranty claims related to engines would be falling at someone else’s door. In the meantime it was decided that money already spent on the TL12 could not be squandered and that it would still be offered in its latest upgrade in the coming Roadtrain chassis.

Having found that the TL12 in the Roadtrain was better than expected the decision could not be reversed. I can’t now recall which came first; the end of TL12 production, or the end of Leyland 420 production. One set a precedent for the other. Having finally got the troublesome 400 series engine through various developments (401, 402, 410 and 411) and finally got it right, production ceased. Maybe the same happened with the TL12, looking back through the AEC’s history of engine production, they too had finally got it right after years of tinkering with their troublesome monobloc engine.

cav551:
After BL killed off Guy Motors someone in the company suddenly realised how popular the Big J had been with operators and presumably convinced the board that there was a substantial demand for proprietary engines in their chassis. From this the option of a Marathon powered by other than the TL12 came to be sold.

At a later date I will guess that possibly the following occurred. Sales figures for the Marathon option were examined and maybe found to exceed those of the TL12 version. A study was made of the expected life of the group’s foundry capacity and an evaluation made of the cost of updating the machine shops to produce a new in-house engine, or of further development of the TL12. Examining the popularity of proprietary engines in competitors product and a study of the percentage of TL12 engines in a breakdown of Marathon sales figures convinced the Board that the future really lay in proprietary engines. The cost of future engine development could be left to their suppliers and warranty claims related to engines would be falling at someone else’s door. In the meantime it was decided that money already spent on the TL12 could not be squandered and that it would still be offered in its latest upgrade in the coming Roadtrain chassis.

Having found that the TL12 in the Roadtrain was better than expected the decision could not be reversed. I can’t now recall which came first; the end of TL12 production, or the end of Leyland 420 production. One set a precedent for the other. Having finally got the troublesome 400 series engine through various developments (401, 402, 410 and 411) and finally got it right, production ceased. Maybe the same happened with the TL12, looking back through the AEC’s history of engine production, they too had finally got it right after years of tinkering with their troublesome monobloc engine.

So if the Government had stepped in at that point and backed them we may well have still had a true lorry manufacturer from these shores . :wink:

cav551:
After BL killed off Guy Motors someone in the company suddenly realised how popular the Big J had been with operators and presumably convinced the board that there was a substantial demand for proprietary engines in their chassis. From this the option of a Marathon powered by other than the TL12 came to be sold.

At a later date I will guess that possibly the following occurred. Sales figures for the Marathon option were examined and maybe found to exceed those of the TL12 version. A study was made of the expected life of the group’s foundry capacity and an evaluation made of the cost of updating the machine shops to produce a new in-house engine, or of further development of the TL12. Examining the popularity of proprietary engines in competitors product and a study of the percentage of TL12 engines in a breakdown of Marathon sales figures convinced the Board that the future really lay in proprietary engines. The cost of future engine development could be left to their suppliers and warranty claims related to engines would be falling at someone else’s door. In the meantime it was decided that money already spent on the TL12 could not be squandered and that it would still be offered in its latest upgrade in the coming Roadtrain chassis.

Having found that the TL12 in the Roadtrain was better than expected the decision could not be reversed. I can’t now recall which came first; the end of TL12 production, or the end of Leyland 420 production. One set a precedent for the other. Having finally got the troublesome 400 series engine through various developments (401, 402, 410 and 411) and finally got it right, production ceased. Maybe the same happened with the TL12, looking back through the AEC’s history of engine production, they too had finally got it right after years of tinkering with their troublesome monobloc engine.

It would arguably be an exaggeration to suggest that the TL12 could ever be got ‘right’ for the reasons given of it being crippled by a relatively shorter stroke than its Rolls and ■■■■■■■ and to a lesser extent DAF competitors.On that note unsurprisingly it’s presence in the T45 seems to have been overshadowed by the Rolls and ■■■■■■■ powered options just as in the case of previous examples like the Crusader and Marathon.Bearing in mind that the TL12 predictably didn’t even reach,let alone break,the 300 hp barrier which both the Rolls and ■■■■■■■ and even the 11.6 DAF 680 development had all shown themselves more than capable of.

Which leaves the obvious question was the decision not to develop a credible in house competitor actually part of a pre determined plan to run down Leyland Group from that point.My view is that it was.IE Scammell’s and Guy’s use of outsourced engines was the message and Leyland chose to answer it in the negative with the ■■■■■■■ and Rolls powered Marathon and T45 both being part of a planned run down and exit strategy. :bulb:

How come DAF are still producing vehicles at the old Leyland site and :confused: :unamused: where are the engines for the current DAFs made,?

■■■■■■■ managed to break the 300 bhp barrier quite significantly without needing a 6" stoke with the L 10, M11, and ISM engines. They have even managed it with their smaller C and B series derived engines as well.

shirtbox2003:
How come DAF are still producing vehicles at the old Leyland site and :confused: :unamused: where are the engines for the current DAFs made,?

Leyland Trucks Ltd operates out of what was previously the Leyland Assembly Plant (LAP) which was built before by Leyland before DAF took over Leyland. When DAF went bust in 1993, the management of LAP bought the operation from the receivers. The previous Spurrier Works site is no longer part of this operation; likewise Farrington. Both are business parks. North and Southworks were demolished and are now housing estates.

In 1996 Paccar (producers of Kenworth and Peterbuilt) took over DAF. Then in 1998 Paccar bought out the management team at Leyland.

Leyland Trucks now build all DAF right hand drive trucks plus all the left hand drive light weight (LF range) trucks. It recently built its 400,000th truck.

The engines for the larger trucks come from DAF in Holland/Belgium and the smaller ones for the LF are made for Paccar by ■■■■■■■ and badged Paccar.

cav551:
■■■■■■■ managed to break the 300 bhp barrier quite significantly without needing a 6" stoke with the L 10, M11, and ISM engines. They have even managed it with their smaller C and B series derived engines as well.

That would probably only be the result of later improvements in technology allowing higher stress levels in which not surprisingly even then the L10 etc doesn’t seem to have matched the larger 14 litre for the combination of output and reliability ?.

At the end of the day there still isn’t any substitute for the idea of the bigger is better design philosophy in terms of producing as high power output as possible at as low engine speed as possible for both fuel efficiency and reliability.Hence most/all of the well known modern designs seem to have gone along the lines of the more stroke measurement the better whether its the DAF 11.6 to XF and MX 13 or the Volvo D13 or F16 or the Scania V8 among others.In which even the 6 inch stroke benchmark has long been passed to obviously maximise that advantage. :bulb:

they failed because they were a perfect example of british car industry mindset and workmanship…shoddy standards all round,antiquated designs and ideas with a union controlled workforce that was lazy and inneficient in every aspect.thankfully scania volvo daf and man moved in,showed what could be achieved as a reasonable alternative and finished them off down the pan,similar to what the nips did to the car division otherwise you would still be sitting in and driving scrap.thats what finished bl.from minis,rovers, right up to marathons,every engine they designed was a unreliable disaster compared to the alternatives.

dieseldog999:
similar to what the nips did to the car division otherwise you would still be sitting in and driving scrap.thats what finished bl.from minis,rovers, right up to marathons,every engine they designed was a unreliable disaster compared to the alternatives.

Great going by your advice my new year’s resolution will be to rush out and dump the 30 year old + V12 Jag and replace it with a zb ricer. :smiling_imp: :laughing: :laughing: :laughing:

As for Rover as I remember it they only went down the tubes when and because they ditched the idea of making proper rwd V8 engined cars in favour of zb badge engineered fwd Jap crap and in an attempt to use the Rover badge to give some credibility to BMC’s similar poverty spec junk.While I’m guessing that you never had to do a top end overhaul on the typically wrecked OHC/CIH valve train and/or cracked cylinder head of a BMW 6 or pay for the privilege.

No ricers even in the running here. :smiling_imp: :unamused:

youtube.com/watch?v=L_-ZCQ7WA0s

youtube.com/watch?v=Wvl3lLguUuY

Details of the TL12 Marathon engine and what substantial modifications had been made to the core AV760. Apart from the alterations to the cooling and the oiling systems, there has been an increase in head stud diameter. Most noticeable however is that this is not an intercooled engine nor does it have four valves per cylinder; both modifications which other manufacturers adopted in the quest for greater output.

archive.commercialmotor.com/arti … ne-leyland

archive.commercialmotor.com/page … st-1973/38

archive.commercialmotor.com/page … st-1973/39

archive.commercialmotor.com/page … st-1973/40

cav551:
Details of the TL12 Marathon engine and what substantial modifications had been made to the core AV760. Apart from the alterations to the cooling and the oiling systems, there has been an increase in head stud diameter. Most noticeable however is that this is not an intercooled engine nor does it have four valves per cylinder; both modifications which other manufacturers adopted in the quest for greater output.

archive.commercialmotor.com/arti … ne-leyland

archive.commercialmotor.com/page … st-1973/38

archive.commercialmotor.com/page … st-1973/39

archive.commercialmotor.com/page … st-1973/40

That seems to explain the reasoning for the architectural limitations contained in the obvious continuation of the 690’s in that regard under the heading of ‘production considerations’.While the reference to a low turbocharge boost design suggests that it was already at its limits in terms of cylinder pressures and resulting stresses in that chain.In which case trying to increase output by adding more to those pressures and stresses in whatever form wasn’t realistically an option.Which obviously just leaves the option of adding leverage at the crank in the form of the longer stroke that the the relevant competition like Rolls,■■■■■■■ and DAF enjoyed to more or less a degree.Even in that case the obvious inference being that all of those alternatives contained more capacity for the combination of both higher cylinder pressures ‘and’ had more leverage at the crank to exploit them. :bulb:

Carryfast:
That seems to explain the reasoning for the architectural limitations contained in the obvious continuation of the 690’s in that regard under the heading of ‘production considerations’.While the reference to a low turbocharge boost design suggests that it was already at its limits in terms of cylinder pressures and resulting stresses in that chain.In which case trying to increase output by adding more to those pressures and stresses in whatever form wasn’t realistically an option.Which obviously just leaves the option of adding leverage at the crank in the form of the longer stroke that the the relevant competition like Rolls,■■■■■■■ and DAF enjoyed to more or less a degree.Even in that case the obvious inference being that all of those alternatives contained more capacity for the combination of both higher cylinder pressures ‘and’ had more leverage at the crank to exploit them. :bulb:

That I suggest is conjecture.

This was 1973, there was a lot of turbocharger research to come. The article mentions moderate boost pressure not low pressure. 10 years later I recall carrying out turbo boost checks on E320 ■■■■■■■■ Rolls 290 and ■■■■■■■ LT 10 250 engines and being surprised at how little boost was recorded. The ■■■■■■■ would require fuel pressure checks as well. The exact figures from then escape me, but IIRC the E320 boost was somewhere between 10 and 20 psi maximum.

The ■■■■■■■ LT 10 was a clean sheet design which went through several developments from its initial 250 bhp rating, yet its stroke was actually shorter than that of the AV760. It did not morph into the longer stroke M11 until it had undergone several power increases brought about through turbocharger and intercooler changes, but even then it never reached the magic 152mm.

The possible reason? ■■■■■■■ was at the time aggressively seeking UK market penetration. Its 14 litre engine though powerful was simply too big and heavy for many operators. It was competing principally with Gardner and it had no product to offer the lucrative PSV market in which Gardner was almost dominant. It needed a substantially lighter and more compact package - in fact just the situation which confronted engine manufacturers back in 1930 when diesel engines were being trialed in UK buses. Several designs initially required dispensation to allow the vehicle to exceed the overall length regulations. Weight and size were of the utmost importance; the six cylinder Gardner causing particular problems only saved by its fuel economy, lightness and changes to Construction and Use regulations. To accommodate it when a lower bonnet line became fashionable in some cases required some chassis and mounting arrangement redesign.

As a matter of interest, it seems that on the Continent in general; and in France, in particular, the favoured version of the T45 Roadtrain seems to have been almost exclusively those with Rolls Royce 350 engines (coupled to 9-speed Fullers). I believe they were quite successful. Robert

Carryfast:

cav551:
That seems to explain the reasoning for the architectural limitations contained in the obvious continuation of the 690’s in that regard under the heading of ‘production considerations’.

It doesnt say or explain what the architectural limitations were. For my benefit you might have to elucidate further on this as I can’t quite see the point you are making.

As far as production considerations are concerned, this could involve a multitude of reasons. One reason could be the bore spacings on the cylinder borer machine ( one dedicated machine tool). This would have 6 spindles spaced to the exact bore spacings in the block. It could be any one of several really expensive machine tools or transfer lines.

Carryfast:
Which obviously just leaves the option of adding leverage at the crank in the form of the longer stroke that the the relevant competition like Rolls,■■■■■■■ and DAF enjoyed to more or less a degree.Even in that case the obvious inference being that all of those alternatives contained more capacity for the combination of both higher cylinder pressures ‘and’ had more leverage at the crank to exploit them. :bulb:

Sorry CF, but you just cannot ignore the “unknowns” just because you don’t know the “unknowns” that exist (or you chose to ignore they exist ), so that you arrive at your pet conviction that all engine output limitations can be solved by increasing the stroke. Engines are horrendously complex systems. I suggest you do a Google on “thesis diesel engine design” and read some of the results.

cav551:

Carryfast:
That seems to explain the reasoning for the architectural limitations contained in the obvious continuation of the 690’s in that regard under the heading of ‘production considerations’.While the reference to a low turbocharge boost design suggests that it was already at its limits in terms of cylinder pressures and resulting stresses in that chain.In which case trying to increase output by adding more to those pressures and stresses in whatever form wasn’t realistically an option.Which obviously just leaves the option of adding leverage at the crank in the form of the longer stroke that the the relevant competition like Rolls,■■■■■■■ and DAF enjoyed to more or less a degree.Even in that case the obvious inference being that all of those alternatives contained more capacity for the combination of both higher cylinder pressures ‘and’ had more leverage at the crank to exploit them. :bulb:

That I suggest is conjecture.

This was 1973, there was a lot of turbocharger research to come. The article mentions moderate boost pressure not low pressure. 10 years later I recall carrying out turbo boost checks on E320 ■■■■■■■■ Rolls 290 and ■■■■■■■ LT 10 250 engines and being surprised at how little boost was recorded. The ■■■■■■■ would require fuel pressure checks as well. The exact figures from then escape me, but IIRC the E320 boost was somewhere between 10 and 20 psi maximum.

The ■■■■■■■ LT 10 was a clean sheet design which went through several developments from its initial 250 bhp rating, yet its stroke was actually shorter than that of the AV760. It did not morph into the longer stroke M11 until it had undergone several power increases brought about through turbocharger and intercooler changes, but even then it never reached the magic 152mm.

The possible reason? ■■■■■■■ was at the time aggressively seeking UK market penetration. Its 14 litre engine though powerful was simply too big and heavy for many operators. It was competing principally with Gardner and it had no product to offer the lucrative PSV market in which Gardner was almost dominant. It needed a substantially lighter and more compact package - in fact just the situation which confronted engine manufacturers back in 1930 when diesel engines were being trialed in UK buses. Several designs initially required dispensation to allow the vehicle to exceed the overall length regulations. Weight and size were of the utmost importance; the six cylinder Gardner causing particular problems only saved by its fuel economy, lightness and changes to Construction and Use regulations. To accommodate it when a lower bonnet line became fashionable in some cases required some chassis and mounting arrangement redesign.

Which leaves the obvious question ‘if’ the TL12 had more potential regards output,by way of more stress,in the form of higher cylinder pressures in whatever form,why did it still seem to be stuck at well under the 300 hp mark in the case of the T45 ?.In addition to the fact that the TL12 was actually then dropped in that application in favour of either just the ■■■■■■■ or Rolls options.Thereby resulting in the obvious inference that those were the superior product both in terms of an engineering solution and customer acceptance ?.

While as shown in most recent heavy truck applications engine development usually means a lot of attention given to maximising stroke measurements.To provide the essential leverage at the crank needed to maximise the exploitation of cylinder pressures and/or avoid the need to compromise them beyond manageable limits.Which certainly seems to be the design logic of DAF since firstly the choice of the 680 compared to the 760 then leading to the XF and MX13.In addition to other manufacturers like Volvo,Scania and ■■■■■■■ and Detroit/Daimler.All having passed that 152 mm threshold to a lesser or often considerable degree.

Tomdhu:

Carryfast:

cav551:
That seems to explain the reasoning for the architectural limitations contained in the obvious continuation of the 690’s in that regard under the heading of ‘production considerations’.

It doesnt say or explain what the architectural limitations were. For my benefit you might have to elucidate further on this as I can’t quite see the point you are making.

As far as production considerations are concerned, this could involve a multitude of reasons. One reason could be the bore spacings on the cylinder borer machine ( one dedicated machine tool). This would have 6 spindles spaced to the exact bore spacings in the block. It could be any one of several really expensive machine tools or transfer lines.

Carryfast:
Which obviously just leaves the option of adding leverage at the crank in the form of the longer stroke that the the relevant competition like Rolls,■■■■■■■ and DAF enjoyed to more or less a degree.Even in that case the obvious inference being that all of those alternatives contained more capacity for the combination of both higher cylinder pressures ‘and’ had more leverage at the crank to exploit them. :bulb:

Sorry CF, but you just cannot ignore the “unknowns” just because you don’t know the “unknowns” that exist (or you chose to ignore they exist ), so that you arrive at your pet conviction that all engine output limitations can be solved by increasing the stroke. Engines are horrendously complex systems. I suggest you do a Google on “thesis diesel engine design” and read some of the results.

That’s fair enough Tomdhu.But what we do know is that there seems to be an unarguable,understandable,direct link between accepted successful truck engine design/development and the maximisation of the stroke measurement regards same and vice versa in the case of AEC’s failures.Which certainly seems to be confirmed by the relative merits of ■■■■■■■ and Rolls powered Leyland products v AEC derived engined ones.While having said that we do know that the 2.5 litre stroked development of the Triumph 2000 engine involved block and head architectural change/s.But with the advantage that cylinder boring centre lines remained unchanged.

While I’m also obviously suggesting that a decent overall capacity is also part of that equation which also in large part explains the failure of the Leyland 500 design.Notwithstanding the quirks contained in the fixed head design. :bulb:

This thread is an echo of the wider question: why did the British truck industry fail?

I’m not entirely convinced that the British truck industry simply failed. Yes, it suffered from dire industrial relations problems, but the better products were good at the time. In Lorries of Arabia I made the point that lorries like the ERF NGC, for example, may have been marginalised by the fashion-consciousness of drivers and operators. I made the point that drivers were certainly wooed by competitors’ synchromesh gearboxes and slightly plusher cabs, but that more significantly, they were also wooed by the badge on the radiator. After all, I concluded, Scania, Volvo and Mercedes Benz were seen as the Nike, Gucci and Rolex of the day. These were all excellent trucks, but so were the competitors; as some of TRUCK magazine’s Euro-tests verified.

The crowd can be very fickle, and will think nothing of ‘dumbing down’ (as the Americans say) their purchasing habits in pursuit of the most recent or popular. In fact, the American language is a classic example. In a very few years hence, American will be the world language, if it isn’t already. The great unwashed British public is embracing it as is if there were no tomorrow; ready at the drop of a hat to discard a cohesive, structured, nuanced language in favour of a confusing, chaotic ambiguous one in which communication is ‘dumbed down’ to a terrifying degree. People will ask: why did English (language) fail? But the answer cannot be: because American is a better product. It will that the ability of people to choose wisely failed, in my opinion.

It should be remembered and acknowledged that many British trucks were fit for purpose in their day and were every bit as good as the competition. The assumption that the product was inferior rather than that people chose unwisely is simplistic in the extreme. Robert