Why did British Leyland fail?

tomdhu · 1 January 2016 22:13

Carryfast:

Tomdhu:

Carryfast:
That seems to explain the reasoning for the architectural limitations contained in the obvious continuation of the 690’s in that regard under the heading of ‘production considerations’.

It doesn’t say or explain what the architectural limitations were. For my benefit you might have to elucidate further on this as I can’t quite see the point you are making.

I’m still struggling to understand your point. To assist, please explain further or identify your source of these “architectural limitations”. Thanks

zb_anorak · 1 January 2016 22:20

Tomdhu:
…
Sorry CF, but you just cannot ignore the “unknowns” just because you don’t know the “unknowns” that exist (or you chose to ignore they exist ), so that you arrive at your pet conviction that all engine output limitations can be solved by increasing the stroke. Engines are horrendously complex systems. I suggest you do a Google on “thesis diesel engine design” and read some of the results.

Hahaha- you have fallen into the Loon’s trap, Tomdhu- to understand his pronouncements, you must realise that the ability to turn a continuous coil of swarf off a billet of cottage cheese is the perfect substitute for an ordinary engineering education.

Regarding the design of engines in the 1960s and '70s, there were all sorts of designs, most successful and some not. The configuration of the engine was no indicator of its success in the market. There were naturally-aspirated engines, turbocharged engines, inline or vee, under- or over-square- there were good engines of all types, in that period.

carryfast · 1 January 2016 22:25

robert1952:
It should be remembered and acknowledged that many British trucks were fit for purpose in their day and were every bit as good as the competition. The assumption that the product was inferior rather than that people chose unwisely is simplistic in the extreme. Robert

I’ve often said that the domestic customer base was as erratic in its buying habits as any of the arguable engineering failures.However in this case the question is more one of TL12 v ■■■■■■■ or Rolls powered T45 and the easily identifiable engine superiority and the reasons for it of the latter two v the former.Or for that matter the choice between TL 12 powered T45 v DAF 2800/3300.Thereby effectively defeating the object of Leyland truck division’s status and business case as an in house manufacturer.Unlike the fortunes of DAF.

IE in this case it was probably more an issue of bad management decisions at the top like not cutting BMC loose from day 1 and investment and engineering failure.Than erratic customer buying habits.

robert1952 · 1 January 2016 22:34

Carryfast:

robert1952:
It should be remembered and acknowledged that many British trucks were fit for purpose in their day and were every bit as good as the competition. The assumption that the product was inferior rather than that people chose unwisely is simplistic in the extreme. Robert

I’ve often said that the domestic customer base was as erratic in its buying habits as any of the arguable engineering failures.However in this case the question is more one of TL12 v ■■■■■■■ or Rolls powered T45 and the easily identifiable engine superiority and the reasons for it of the latter two v the former.Or for that matter the choice between TL 12 powered T45 v DAF 2800/3300.Thereby effectively defeating the object of Leyland truck division’s status and business case as an in house manufacturer.Unlike the fortunes of DAF.

IE in this case it was probably more an issue of bad management decisions at the top like not cutting BMC loose from day 1 and investment and engineering failure.Than erratic customer buying habits.

Surely, the question is ‘Why did British Leyland fail?’, not ‘Why did the 14-litre ■■■■■■■ and Rolls Royce Eagle do better than the TL12 (if indeed it can be shown conclusively that they did)?’. Robert

carryfast · 1 January 2016 22:37

Tomdhu:
I’m still struggling to understand your point. To assist, please explain further or identify your source of these “architectural limitations”. Thanks

The ‘architectural limitations’ are simply the self explanatory question of if there were none what was actually stopping them doing what was needed in at least doing whatever it took in stroking the engine,as I’ve said just like the smaller scale example of the upgrade of the Triumph 2000 to 2.5.As for source the CM article in question seems to confirm the question while we can obviously only surmise what was meant in it by ‘production considerations’.The fact that the ‘architecture’ of the 760 seems to be nothing much more than an over bored 690 in that regard seeming to answer that.At least in my personal view.

cav551 · 1 January 2016 22:42

Tomdhu:

Carryfast:

Tomdhu:

Carryfast:

cav551:
That seems to explain the reasoning for the architectural limitations contained in the obvious continuation of the 690’s in that regard under the heading of ‘production considerations’.

It doesn’t say or explain what the architectural limitations were. For my benefit you might have to elucidate further on this as I can’t quite see the point you are making.
I’m still struggling to understand your point. To assist, please explain further or identify your source of these “architectural limitations”. Thanks
[/quote]
Not me… that’s Carryfast’s argument!

carryfast · 1 January 2016 22:42

robert1952:

Carryfast:

robert1952:
It should be remembered and acknowledged that many British trucks were fit for purpose in their day and were every bit as good as the competition. The assumption that the product was inferior rather than that people chose unwisely is simplistic in the extreme. Robert

I’ve often said that the domestic customer base was as erratic in its buying habits as any of the arguable engineering failures.However in this case the question is more one of TL12 v ■■■■■■■ or Rolls powered T45 and the easily identifiable engine superiority and the reasons for it of the latter two v the former.Or for that matter the choice between TL 12 powered T45 v DAF 2800/3300.Thereby effectively defeating the object of Leyland truck division’s status and business case as an in house manufacturer.Unlike the fortunes of DAF.

IE in this case it was probably more an issue of bad management decisions at the top like not cutting BMC loose from day 1 and investment and engineering failure.Than erratic customer buying habits.

Surely, the question is ‘Why did British Leyland fail?’, not ‘Why did the 14-litre ■■■■■■■ and Rolls Royce Eagle do better than the TL12 (if indeed it can be shown conclusively that they did)?’. Robert

I thought that was clear in the post. IE a combination of bad commercial management decisions like saving BMC instead of cutting it loose,poor investment and engineering failure like the over reliance on flawed AEC design thinking like the V8 and the 760.

robert1952 · 2 January 2016 01:19

Carryfast:

robert1952:

Carryfast:
I thought that was clear in the post. .

No worries. Point taken. My remarks about the fickle choosers of HGVs was not actually aimed at your arguments, but rather it was a general observation made to the ether. Perhaps I should have waited for a lull in the debate, but that’s never how TNUK works: we just chuck in our two pennyworth when the fancy takes us. And of course you’ll bear in mind that it is well-documented on these threads that I am, like you, an enormous fan of the 14-litre ■■■■■■■■ and have no problem with the Rolls Eagle either . You mention that you have little problem with my notion that buyers of HGVs can be fickle at times; and yes, I recall your arguments about die-hard operators sticking to Gardner 180s with day cabs when something a little more elaborate was called for on Continental work . Sometimes (and forgive me here and no offence whatsoever intended), I do misread your intended thrust of argument because in your haste to communicate, your sentences are very often filled with a multitude of subordinate clauses cluttered with endless asides (‘in that regard’ / ‘the inconvenient fact that’ / ‘the obvious fact that’ etc), and not always connected by punctuation; so I have to read it all through several times before I can get the drift. You have much to offer at times, CF, and plain English wouldn’t 'alf improve your chances of being understood! Gosh, I’d better get my hat. Robert

carryfast · 2 January 2016 03:39

robert1952:

Carryfast:

robert1952:

Carryfast:
I thought that was clear in the post. .

No worries. Point taken. My remarks about the fickle choosers of HGVs was not actually aimed at your arguments, but rather it was a general observation made to the ether. Perhaps I should have waited for a lull in the debate, but that’s never how TNUK works: we just chuck in our two pennyworth when the fancy takes us. And of course you’ll bear in mind that it is well-documented on these threads that I am, like you, an enormous fan of the 14-litre ■■■■■■■■ and have no problem with the Rolls Eagle either . You mention that you have little problem with my notion that buyers of HGVs can be fickle at times; and yes, I recall your arguments about die-hard operators sticking to Gardner 180s with day cabs when something a little more elaborate was called for on Continental work . Sometimes (and forgive me here and no offence whatsoever intended), I do misread your intended thrust of argument because in your haste to communicate, your sentences are very often filled with a multitude of subordinate clauses cluttered with endless asides (‘in that regard’ / ‘the inconvenient fact that’ / ‘the obvious fact that’ etc), and not always connected by punctuation; so I have to read it all through several times before I can get the drift. You have much to offer at times, CF, and plain English wouldn’t 'alf improve your chances of being understood! Gosh, I’d better get my hat. Robert

Thanks Robert I’ll try to change my posting habits to make things a bit clearer although I just thought that those ‘subordinate clauses’ might have helped with that rather than hindered it.

Getting back to that in house v outsourced components issue you’ll probably have seen that I’m also a big fan of the Detroit option in the day.Which ironically seems to make a full house of Scammell’s ideas.In which they seem to have noted the advantages in the piston getting a bite at the crank every revolution instead of just every other one combined with at least a 5 inch stroke.To the point where Tomdhu has made a reference to a Crusader’s small 9 litre V8 happily hauling a 45 t payload around. Try that with AEC’s effort at a V8 even with its 3 or 4 litres more capacity.

newmercman · 2 January 2016 07:45

The answer to the question is really quite simple, BL truck division failed because people stopped buying the products they produced. The reason they stopped buying them was because they were not as good as the competition.

Robert has mentioned the positive reports of BL trucks against the foreign competition, but these were ■■■■■■■ or RR powered trucks and the home grown assemblers could do a better job of wrapping up a ■■■■■■■ or RR engine than BL could, so even though BL finally had a truck capable of putting up a good fight, it was outclassed by ERF, Foden and SA, especially when it came to build quality.

However the most important factor was the fleets that ran BL trucks, think back to the big Leyland fleets, they were by and large nationalised companies, BRS being the main one and even they gave Leyland a wide berth, preferring the Guy Big J and latterly their ‘own’ Crusader, when the BRS became the NFC/Excel etc there was no requirement to buy British and they didn’t anymore for the most part. Of course there were other fleets that ran Leyland trucks, especially those engaged in work for BL, the oil companies mostly ran Leyland too, until ERF, Foden and SA got a foot in the door and then they pretty much all stopped buying Leyland until the T45 hit the roads.

In the van and light truck market the antiquated BL products were no match for competition, the Transit was unbeatable and in the 7.5t market the LN2 Mercedes Benz set a new standard and the Roadrunner didn’t do as well as it should have because of that, although the Roadrunner was a very good little lorry and one of the few success stories of BL.

In the middleweight division the lighter end of the market was dominated by Ford with the Cargo and after MB had revolutionised the heavier end with the 1617, the Volvo F6 and Scania 82 soon followed and there wasn’t a BL product that could compete with any of them.

Multi axle rigids were a strong point and the T45 range had a good product in every sub section, from lightweight 6 wheelers for mixers and aggregates up to heavy duty eight wheelers thanks to the Albion and Scammell DNA in the respective products, but even so they were hemorrhaging sales to the foreigners who had final got their heads around the UK multi axle rigid market and had products every bit as good, if not better than the BL offerings.

And that was that, not many people bought BL trucks through choice and those that were required to buy British had a little more choice and few chose BL trucks and who could blame them, after years of inadequate investment the trucks were not that good, the memory of the flawed engineering in the 500 series and the V8, terrible build quality and long lead times from an indifferent work and sales force had all taken its toll.

ramone · 2 January 2016 07:50

So who decided the AV760 was a flawed design ■■? and the TL12, that was a total disaster was it? ,on the road it was capable performer and I haven`t heard anyone on here saying it was unreliable ,in fact many who actually drove them were quite impressed

gingerfold · 2 January 2016 08:11

I think, that as usual, we have gone off at a tangent and got away from the original question. There was no single reason why British Leyland failed, nor did it happen overnight. It was a culmination of many reasons over a considerable time span of years. It certainly wasn’t because of the TL12 engine, nor in isolation the AEC V8-740/800. nor the fixed head 500 series. We ran over 60 TL12 powered Roadtrains at Spillers Milling in the 1980s on a variety of operating cycles ranging from single shifted, double shifted, local, distance, plus constant revving tanker blowing. At the time they were regarded very highly in all aspects of operating costs. I am reliably informed that an intercooled version was performing well in development trials at 320 to 330 bhp. Yes, that was probably the limit of its development potential and Leyland must have known this, so the decision to go down the bought-in engine route was probably influenced by that. Pat Kennet made the point in his World Trucks - “Leyland” book that the unit production costs of a TL12 engine was higher than a bought-in ■■■■■■■ or Rolls Royce. Leyland did not have the time or finances by the 1980s to design and develop a clean sheet replacement for the TL12, which had served 10 years from introduction in the Marathon to discontinuation, at the time an acceptable life span when higher power outputs were becoming the norm. Just a final comment, Leyland and AEC as separate entities did buy competitors’ engines for evaluation, and the combined company did the same, much to the amusement of Hugh Gardner. The Rolls Royce Eagle was the first half decent “modern” diesel unit made by Rolls Royce, designed by former AEC engineers,

gingerfold · 2 January 2016 08:23

Well summarised Newmercman. Also don’t forget the PSV market. The Leyland National was a disaster, no adequate development of the successful Atlantean was done, to the extent that acquired Leyland subsidiaries such as Daimler and Bristol with bought-in engines eventually provided the bulk of the requirements for such as LT. It was only customer loyalty that kept the AEC Reliance and Leyland Leopard in production as long as it did in the single deck coach market. Customer loyalty is a strange thing, it takes a lot for a dedicated buyer of one marque to eventually switch to another.

saviem · 2 January 2016 08:29

Morning all,

Happy new year to one and all! The old rain is thundering down here, and my heart goes out to those who are suffering the consequence of inept flood management by far too many of those tasked with preventing such disasters. This lethargy seems to be a negative trait running freely through the management, both public and private, of large organisations in Britain. Perhaps the mantra, “if you do not make a decision, then you cannot be criticised for making an incorrect decision” has for far too long been a prevelant feature throughout many industries. Perhaps within the Leyland of the 60s through to the `80s as well.

To be brief, for the demise of our own manufacturing base is a complex one, and although the engineering of the product is a major influence, the overall picture is far larger.

To make such a mess of European markets was a major mistake. Particularly as there were strong links established by group member AEC both in public transport, as well as road freight.

The subsidised onslaught on our domestic market by fellow EFTA members could have been checked had the case been made forcibly to the Government that the products offered did not meet domestic C&U regulation. This was never done!

The rise in the retail commercial vehicle sector of “new” dealers offering imported product, and more importantly far higher levels of service to their customers than that ever offered by traditional Leyland Group retail dealers was without doubt the key factor in the rise in penetration of the market by the “importers”.

The shorter management chains of the importers gave a far more rapid response to problems, and their rectification than Leyland was able to achieve with its own problems.

Senior Management of the Importers were by virtue of their shorter reporting chains, more active in the market place and known personally to their clients. This gave both confidence and strength in, and to the product that they were marketing.

The integration of other “brands” into a grouping is a complex question, do we keep them on? or do we kill them off, and hope that we can maintain sales?..The German manufacturers Mercedes and MAN, have both adopted a far more brutal strategy, than adopted by Leyland, both have prospered. Were they right? An interesting point to debate indeed.

Far more complex than debating the fundamentals of basic engine design!

Cheerio for now.

cav551 · 2 January 2016 08:55

Just briefly I can’t let the Roadrunner escape. It was like most Leyland products eventually made into a good vehicle; witness that you can still buy its great, great grandson today. However who on earth at BL decided that a deckchair was all that the driver needed to sit on? Some other clever ■■■■ decided that they would support the dealer network by devising a braking system dependent upon nitrogen accumulators which required special equipment to recharge. Next, I suppose it was par for the course, because just like their competitors’ alternative ideas, the vehicle was fitted with a fiendish rear braking system whose automatic adjustment feature gave up working on day 2 after leaving the factory.

Edit: sorry I forgot the dear old Bedford TK whose rear brakes actually did work.

tomdhu · 2 January 2016 09:16

]

Tomdhu:

Carryfast:

Tomdhu:

Carryfast:

cav551:
That seems to explain the reasoning for the architectural limitations contained in the obvious continuation of the 690’s in that regard under the heading of ‘production considerations’.

It doesn’t say or explain what the architectural limitations were. For my benefit you might have to elucidate further on this as I can’t quite see the point you are making.
I’m still struggling to understand your point. To assist, please explain further or identify your source of these “architectural limitations”. Thanks
[/quote]
Not me… that’s Carryfast’s argument!
[/quote]
Apologies CAV551, I didn’t quite sort out all the quotes and unquotes - I must have been confused by CF’s obfuscation on the point of “architectural limitations” which he mentioned but so far has declined to elucidate.
I’m still waiting to hear what these limitations were but I’m not holding my breath.

robert1952 · 2 January 2016 10:32

newmercman:
Robert has mentioned the positive reports of BL trucks against the foreign competition, but these were ■■■■■■■ or RR powered trucks and the home grown assemblers could do a better job of wrapping up a ■■■■■■■ or RR engine than BL could, so even though BL finally had a truck capable of putting up a good fight, it was outclassed by ERF, Foden and SA, especially when it came to build quality.

Yes, that’s almost exactly where I was coming from, but I would add that I have been very careful not to bad-mouth the TL engine, simply because I have no personal experience of it as a driver. I still have a sneaky feeling that I might well have enjoyed a Marathon 2 (BRS Iran version for example) or a Roadtrain both of them with a TL12 / 9-speed Fuller driveline. And Gingerfold testifies as to the reliability despite the bad press Marathon 2 got in Destination Doha and BRS Iran history! Like the ERF ‘European’, Leyland’s long-haul version of the Marathon 2 was no ‘gaffer’s motor’ but by repeating the mantra that it was, we run the risk of making it ‘true’ in the history books! I’m aware that you didn’t call it a gaffer’s motor, but I’m just making the wider point. Robert

ramone · 2 January 2016 12:04

robert1952:

newmercman:
Robert has mentioned the positive reports of BL trucks against the foreign competition, but these were ■■■■■■■ or RR powered trucks and the home grown assemblers could do a better job of wrapping up a ■■■■■■■ or RR engine than BL could, so even though BL finally had a truck capable of putting up a good fight, it was outclassed by ERF, Foden and SA, especially when it came to build quality.

Yes, that’s almost exactly where I was coming from, but I would add that I have been very careful not to bad-mouth the TL engine, simply because I have no personal experience of it as a driver. I still have a sneaky feeling that I might well have enjoyed a Marathon 2 (BRS Iran version for example) or a Roadtrain both of them with a TL12 / 9-speed Fuller driveline. And Gingerfold testifies as to the reliability despite the bad press Marathon 2 got in Destination Doha and BRS Iran history! Like the ERF ‘European’, Leyland’s long-haul version of the Marathon 2 was no ‘gaffer’s motor’ but by repeating the mantra that it was, we run the risk of making it ‘true’ in the history books! I’m aware that you didn’t call it a gaffer’s motor, but I’m just making the wider point. Robert

I think the BRS and the Destination Doha Marathons were the mk1 version , the Marathon 2 was introduced around late`77 and apparently were much improved. I personally think all the British made heavyweights were similar whether it was ERF , SA , Foden or Leyland not much between them

robert1952 · 2 January 2016 13:02

ramone:

robert1952:

newmercman:
Robert has mentioned the positive reports of BL trucks against the foreign competition, but these were ■■■■■■■ or RR powered trucks and the home grown assemblers could do a better job of wrapping up a ■■■■■■■ or RR engine than BL could, so even though BL finally had a truck capable of putting up a good fight, it was outclassed by ERF, Foden and SA, especially when it came to build quality.

Yes, that’s almost exactly where I was coming from, but I would add that I have been very careful not to bad-mouth the TL engine, simply because I have no personal experience of it as a driver. I still have a sneaky feeling that I might well have enjoyed a Marathon 2 (BRS Iran version for example) or a Roadtrain both of them with a TL12 / 9-speed Fuller driveline. And Gingerfold testifies as to the reliability despite the bad press Marathon 2 got in Destination Doha and BRS Iran history! Like the ERF ‘European’, Leyland’s long-haul version of the Marathon 2 was no ‘gaffer’s motor’ but by repeating the mantra that it was, we run the risk of making it ‘true’ in the history books! I’m aware that you didn’t call it a gaffer’s motor, but I’m just making the wider point. Robert

I think the BRS and the Destination Doha Marathons were the mk1 version , the Marathon 2 was introduced around late`77 and apparently were much improved. I personally think all the British made heavyweights were similar whether it was ERF , SA , Foden or Leyland not much between them

Yep: I’ve just checked and they were both mark 1s; but you get my drift. Robert

windrush · 2 January 2016 13:04

cav551:
Just briefly I can’t let the Roadrunner escape. It was like most Leyland products eventually made into a good vehicle; witness that you can still buy its great, great grandson today. However who on earth at BL decided that a deckchair was all that the driver needed to sit on? Some other clever ■■■■ decided that they would support the dealer network by devising a braking system dependent upon nitrogen accumulators which required special equipment to recharge. Next, I suppose it was par for the course, because just like their competitors’ alternative ideas, the vehicle was fitted with a fiendish rear braking system whose automatic adjustment feature gave up working on day 2 after leaving the factory.

Edit: sorry I forgot the dear old Bedford TK whose rear brakes actually did work.

It was the early versions of the Terrier that had the nitrogen powered braking system, we had all the equipment for recharging the accumulators and I ALMOST went on a course at Cowley to learn even more about them but left the company. It was soon replaced by a more conventional system in the later models though as the driver never knew in which direction the brakes would pull! They were powerfull though! Was it re-introduced for the Roadrunner range then, I had moved onto Foden’s by then so lost touch with BL trucks?

Pete.