Why did British Leyland fail?

Has Leyland Motors failed?who receives the rental income from the massive complex at Leyland and other sites,and from the sale of other patented parts etc, not to mention the sales of residual land and property.? :confused: :unamused: :frowning:

"Carryfastquote:
As Tomdhu rightly said any designer with any sense allows a decent margin ( redundancy ) for future development.Thatā€™s in order to save the crippling costs of having to go for totally clean sheet designs on a frequent basis.That plainly didnā€™t happen in the case of the 760 which clearly needed to be a clean sheet design far away from the 690/1 with that margin in mind.On that note no it wasnā€™t ā€˜fit for purposeā€™ in the way that the Rolls Eagle was or even the Leyland 680.The Rolls also being on the drawing board and put into production at more or less a similar point in time as the 760.Let alone the 14 litre ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā–  which was an even better example of allowing plenty of margin for future development.

In addition to the even madder thinking behind the V8 which was an obviously confused attempt to apply F1 race engine thinking to heavy truck engineering.IE a high revving short stroke V8 was fine in the case of the Cosworth DFV but not a 32 t truck. :open_mouth: :unamused:

As for Leyland Group the relevant period is 1960ā€™s to 1980ā€™s with 60ā€™s and early 70ā€™s being the make or break period that determined the fate of the Group and when it needed to be looking further ahead into the future not backwards to the obsolete environment of the 1950ā€™s.On that note,as Iā€™ve said,the bonkers thinking,which seemed to apply at AEC,canā€™t be underestimated in its contribution to the fall of Leyland Trucks Division. :bulb:

No one disputes that the engines within the Leyland group had reached the end of their development potential. However. I do not understand why you have such a ā€œdownā€ on everything thst AEC produced. I have posted previously the results published in 1979 by ā€˜Transport Engineerā€™ of its survey into the 16 most popular heavy truck engines fitted in 30/32 tons GVW vehicles. All engines had covered a minimum of 200,000 miles in service. The repair costs quoted exclude routine maintenance costs of filters, belts, alternators etc. In this survey the AEC AV760 was fourth lowest repair costs out of 16 at 0.452 pence per mile. The Leyland O.680 was 14 out of 16 at 1.494 pence per mile. Facts that are totally at odds with your statement of the AEC AV760 being not fit for purpose. Also the AEC was rated at 225 bhp, the Leyland at 205 bhp.

gingerfold:

"Carryfastquote:
As Tomdhu rightly said any designer with any sense allows a decent margin ( redundancy ) for future development.Thatā€™s in order to save the crippling costs of having to go for totally clean sheet designs on a frequent basis.That plainly didnā€™t happen in the case of the 760 which clearly needed to be a clean sheet design far away from the 690/1 with that margin in mind.On that note no it wasnā€™t ā€˜fit for purposeā€™ in the way that the Rolls Eagle was or even the Leyland 680.The Rolls also being on the drawing board and put into production at more or less a similar point in time as the 760.Let alone the 14 litre ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā–  which was an even better example of allowing plenty of margin for future development.

In addition to the even madder thinking behind the V8 which was an obviously confused attempt to apply F1 race engine thinking to heavy truck engineering.IE a high revving short stroke V8 was fine in the case of the Cosworth DFV but not a 32 t truck. :open_mouth: :unamused:

As for Leyland Group the relevant period is 1960ā€™s to 1980ā€™s with 60ā€™s and early 70ā€™s being the make or break period that determined the fate of the Group and when it needed to be looking further ahead into the future not backwards to the obsolete environment of the 1950ā€™s.On that note,as Iā€™ve said,the bonkers thinking,which seemed to apply at AEC,canā€™t be underestimated in its contribution to the fall of Leyland Trucks Division. :bulb:

No one disputes that the engines within the Leyland group had reached the end of their development potential. However. I do not understand why you have such a ā€œdownā€ on everything thst AEC produced. I have posted previously the results published in 1979 by ā€˜Transport Engineerā€™ of its survey into the 16 most popular heavy truck engines fitted in 30/32 tons GVW vehicles. All engines had covered a minimum of 200,000 miles in service. The repair costs quoted exclude routine maintenance costs of filters, belts, alternators etc. In this survey the AEC AV760 was fourth lowest repair costs out of 16 at 0.452 pence per mile. The Leyland O.680 was 14 out of 16 at 1.494 pence per mile. Facts that are totally at odds with your statement of the AEC AV760 being not fit for purpose. Also the AEC was rated at 225 bhp, the Leyland at 205 bhp.

[/quote]
The definition of ā€˜not fit for purposeā€™ in this case being that non existent development potential contained in at least the only realistic hope in the form of the 760.Being a retrograde design based on the environment applying in the 1950ā€™s/60ā€™s in the form of the 690 not the 70ā€™s and 80ā€™s in the form of the Rolls Eagle at least. :bulb:

Let alone all the cash wasted on the no hoper V8 which,as I said, ā€˜someoneā€™ at AEC decided should be built along the design lines of a race car motor not a heavy truck engine. :unamused:

Ok, I accept that definition and we are all agreed on that. With the failure of the 500 series and V8-800 it has been recorded by very senior Leyland and AEC management that given the financial constraints of the company then the only engine with some development potential as a stopgap was the AV760, which morphed into the TL12. The TL11, barely mentioned on this thread, was a lower horsepower (than the TL12) turbo-version of the O.680, and used the Buffalo etc. The TL12 development programme, such as it was, was carried out quickly and on a modest budget (Source: Pat Kennett). No doubt Leyland should have been developing an in-house engine for its needs of the 1980s onwards back in the '60s, as per the RR Eagle, but its development resources were, as you say, put into two flawed designs. Iā€™m sure that if the FINANCIAL circumstances had been different then Leyland, with its tradition and engineering resources would have come up with the right engine. We can only speculate however.

gingerfold:
Ok, I accept that definition and we are all agreed on that. With the failure of the 500 series and V8-800 it has been recorded by very senior Leyland and AEC management that given the financial constraints of the company then the only engine with some development potential as a stopgap was the AV760, which morphed into the TL12. The TL11, barely mentioned on this thread, was a lower horsepower (than the TL12) turbo-version of the O.680, and used the Buffalo etc. The TL12 development programme, such as it was, was carried out quickly and on a modest budget (Source: Pat Kennett). No doubt Leyland should have been developing an in-house engine for its needs of the 1980s onwards back in the '60s, as per the RR Eagle, but its development resources were, as you say, put into two flawed designs. Iā€™m sure that if the FINANCIAL circumstances had been different then Leyland, with its tradition and engineering resources would have come up with the right engine. We can only speculate however.

I think the divergence of the 760 v the Rolls Eagle is a crucial point in all that.In that firstly we know that the losses and financial drain on Leyland Group of BMC group werenā€™t an issue at that point in time.Because it pre dates the Leyland/BMH merger.While the Triumph 2000 and TR 4/5 were making good returns on investment and were then joined by the equal success of the Rover P6 a bit later with the takeover of Rover.

While we seem to have more than one of AECā€™s designers having jumped ship and then more than coincidentally getting together again at Rolls ?.With the Eagle v the 760 being the result.

The obvious question being did they jump because of an internal engineering argument or because of financial constraints on their ideas or possibly both ?.Bearing in mind the very close timeline between the 760 v the Eagle.

In which case is the financial constraints issue maybe being over stated and was it more a case of that engineering argument.In that maybe some at AEC were saying the 760 was up to the job of meeting all foreseeable production life expectations with others saying no chance and walking away because they knew better.The V8 fiasco added to that suggests the latter.

Iā€™d really like to know the answers to all those questions :smiley: because theyā€™d settle at least some of the reasons as to what went wrong,at least in the case of the Truck divisionā€™s fortunes. :bulb: :wink:

Carryfast:

gingerfold:
Ok, I accept that definition and we are all agreed on that. With the failure of the 500 series and V8-800 it has been recorded by very senior Leyland and AEC management that given the financial constraints of the company then the only engine with some development potential as a stopgap was the AV760, which morphed into the TL12. The TL11, barely mentioned on this thread, was a lower horsepower (than the TL12) turbo-version of the O.680, and used the Buffalo etc. The TL12 development programme, such as it was, was carried out quickly and on a modest budget (Source: Pat Kennett). No doubt Leyland should have been developing an in-house engine for its needs of the 1980s onwards back in the '60s, as per the RR Eagle, but its development resources were, as you say, put into two flawed designs. Iā€™m sure that if the FINANCIAL circumstances had been different then Leyland, with its tradition and engineering resources would have come up with the right engine. We can only speculate however.

I think the divergence of the 760 v the Rolls Eagle is a crucial point in all that.In that firstly we know that the losses and financial drain on Leyland Group of BMC group werenā€™t an issue at that point in time.Because it pre dates the Leyland/BMH merger.While the Triumph 2000 and TR 4/5 were making good returns on investment and were then joined by the equal success of the Rover P6 a bit later with the takeover of Rover.

While we seem to have more than one of AECā€™s designers having jumped ship and then more than coincidentally getting together again at Rolls ?.With the Eagle v the 760 being the result.

The obvious question being did they jump because of an internal engineering argument or because of financial constraints on their ideas or possibly both ?.Bearing in mind the very close timeline between the 760 v the Eagle.

In which case is the financial constraints issue maybe being over stated and was it more a case of that engineering argument.In that maybe some at AEC were saying the 760 was up to the job of meeting all foreseeable production life expectations with others saying no chance and walking away because they knew better.The V8 fiasco added to that suggests the latter.

Iā€™d really like to know the answers to all those questions :smiley: because theyā€™d settle at least some of the reasons as to what went wrong,at least in the case of the Truck divisionā€™s fortunes. :bulb: :wink:

It`s life Jim but not as we know it !

Iā€™d suggest that there are several reasons as to why engineers ā€œjumped shipā€ so to speak. When you have a merger, or takeover, (however you wish to define it) of two broadly similar companies in terms of tradition and product range then there will always be political in-house machinations in the scenario. There will be winners and losers. Others with ambitions for career progression would realise that they might do better and climb the ladder quicker elsewhere. For example if Leyland had say 10 development engineers and AEC also had 10, the new company grouping might only need 12, so 8 would look elsewhere. With the financial scenario from 1970 onwards and the drain on group revenue caused by the BMC side, everything on the profitable truck side was done on a shoestring of developoment to conserve money. (The Marathon being a prime example). AEC had invested in a new engine assembly line including tooling and machinery for the V8-800. Likewise Leyland for the 500 series. In effect two lots of capital investment that was wasted. In view of that there would have been reluctance by the board to sanction more expenditure on a completely new engine development programme that ultimately would have required future investment in new tooling and machinery. The TL12 could be built on what they had, although machinery and manufacture was later transferred from Southall to Leyland, where it was claimed higher standards of quality, and control, could be achieved. It was stated that Southall was having difficulty in recruiting suitably skilled workers because of its proximity to a rapidly expanding Heathrow Airport in the 1970s. Whether that was true, or just an excuse to start running down Southall for closure in 1979 I would be interested to learn.

gingerfold:
Iā€™d suggest that there are several reasons as to why engineers ā€œjumped shipā€ so to speak. When you have a merger, or takeover, (however you wish to define it) of two broadly similar companies in terms of tradition and product range then there will always be political in-house machinations in the scenario. There will be winners and losers. Others with ambitions for career progression would realise that they might do better and climb the ladder quicker elsewhere. For example if Leyland had say 10 development engineers and AEC also had 10, the new company grouping might only need 12, so 8 would look elsewhere. With the financial scenario from 1970 onwards and the drain on group revenue caused by the BMC side, everything on the profitable truck side was done on a shoestring of developoment to conserve money. (The Marathon being a prime example). AEC had invested in a new engine assembly line including tooling and machinery for the V8-800. Likewise Leyland for the 500 series. In effect two lots of capital investment that was wasted. In view of that there would have been reluctance by the board to sanction more expenditure on a completely new engine development programme that ultimately would have required future investment in new tooling and machinery. The TL12 could be built on what they had, although machinery and manufacture was later transferred from Southall to Leyland, where it was claimed higher standards of quality, and control, could be achieved. It was stated that Southall was having difficulty in recruiting suitably skilled workers because of its proximity to a rapidly expanding Heathrow Airport in the 1970s. Whether that was true, or just an excuse to start running down Southall for closure in 1979 I would be interested to learn.

Firstly,as I said,in the case of the question of the 760 BMCā€™s failings couldnā€™t possibly have been any drain on financial resources because they werenā€™t part of Leyland Group at that point in time.While as I said to Tomdhu a 136 x 152 + stroked and bored upgrade of the 691 instead of just bored in the case of the 760 wouldnā€™t necessarily have meant any changes to cylinder centre line spacing at least.With the resulting TL13 arguably being the difference between survival of the eventual T45 and failure.

As for competition among employers for skilled engineering workers in the area I can only go by my fatherā€™s example at the time.In which with a history of working for Napiers and then Vickers after the War and then having decided to leave the automotive/aero sector for better pay at a small engineering firm in Teddington,the issue of holding onto skilled staff,in the post war financially challenged major industrial sectors,would certainly have been a problem at least up to the early 1970ā€™s.

Although having said that at that point he was made redundant due to relocation of the firm to Sussex and decided to go self employed working for a friend in the used car trade as a mechanic rather than bother with the unstable erratic paying nature of the manufacturing industry locally.Only returning to the engineering sector for a short time some years later before finally walking away for a total change to the electronic fire protection service sector until retirement.Having ironically steered me into the same type of engineering sector as heā€™d walked away from,even more ironically with the vehicle manufacturing division of the same company,against my own wishes.In which driving trucks not making them was always going to be my first choice of career.

In all cases the airport was mainly an employer offering low skilled labouring service sector type work.With understandably relatively few opportunities in the specialist highly skilled aircraft maintenance sector,even for those like my father with a work history in the aero manufacturing sector.Although having had a late cousin whoā€™d worked there for many years under BOAC as an aircraft baggage handler etc the terms and conditions at least working for them would probably sometimes have been much better than working in the manufacturing industry locally.As his redundancy and pension provision after the BA takeover proved.At which point he moved to the local council until retirement.

What is certain is that AEC certainly didnā€™t have many/any job opportunities by the mid 1970ā€™s when I left school and were by then in terminal decline,much like most of the other big manufacturing employers in the area.

The smoking gun in this case seeming to be that,if Iā€™ve read it right,more than one of AECā€™s design team jumped ship and then all ended up together at Rolls Royce ? with the Eagle being the result.

All of which had to have happened well before 1967 and therefore under an,at that time,still lean and fit pre BMC era Leyland Group in which the Triumph then Rover car side was a net contributor as opposed to it being the post 1970 and BMC takeover liabilty.While at the same point in time all that AEC had to contribute and present to the world was the 760/TL12 let alone the V8. :bulb:

Did these design engineers jump ship, or was there more money on the table from a prospective employer keen to get a slice of the market? Was there any inducement to to leave and further enticement to persuade former colleagues to follow suit? Highly qualified engineers offered a project of their own and a sizable budget not at present being enjoyed, may well feel little loyalty when compared with niggles and petty grievances at their current employer.

Given that the T45 Roadtrain sold well and was successful on the Continent in its Euro-spec form (sleeper cab, Rolls Royce 350 / 9-speed Fuller and LHD), it surprises me that Leyland didnā€™t offer this version with the high Interstate cab. You could get the Interstate with a TL / Spicer RHD set-up, but thatā€™s probably not what people trying to complete with Volvo F12 Globetrotters needed. Robert

Maybe they jumped ship because they saw the writing on the wall after the 68 events of British Leyland being formed !!!!!!! , wasnt it mentioned that the Eagle was a similar design to the AV760 ā– ā– ? :wink:

From what Iā€™ve read about the time especaly by the time British Leyland come about Leyland was dominant in the board room so probaly got the balance of decisions go there way.
Things like the high datum ergomatic cab never been offered on AEC the Marathon been badged leyland despite been an AEC design.

ramone:
Maybe they jumped ship because they saw the writing on the wall after the 68 events of British Leyland being formed !!!!!!! , wasnt it mentioned that the Eagle was a similar design to the AV760 ā– ā– ? :wink:

How could they have jumped ship because of the events of 1968 and designed an engine for their new employer which was in production for 1967. :confused: :wink:

As for the Eagle what we do know is that they went for a longer 6 inch stroke to match the ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā–  but with less bore than the 760.

As Iā€™ve said what if theyā€™d have been convinced to stay and told to do whatever it takes,to provide the 760ā€™s bore with at least the ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā–  and Eagleā€™s stroke.

Going by the specific torque output of the Mk111 305 Eagle at the very least Leyland would have had a big cam 290 killer in its armoury as of the early/mid 1970ā€™s with the only way being up from there regards development potential.Also in time to meet the F12 head on and absolutely massacre it. :bulb: :frowning:

kr79:
From what Iā€™ve read about the time especaly by the time British Leyland come about Leyland was dominant in the board room so probaly got the balance of decisions go there way.

The reality was that AEC was part of the Leyland Group and needed to get its act together regarding its engineering design for the good of the Group.The flaws and failures of which canā€™t be put down to Leyland but only the thinking going on within its own doors.IE Leyland didnā€™t decide the architecture of the 690/1,or the 760,or the V8,at their respective design stage,AEC did.With information suggesting that part of its design team walked away and then designed and got into production more or less the engine that the 760 should/could have been at around a similar point in time. :bulb:

as a outsider ,after reading this and other treads in this subject,it,s very clear why all failed,there was two different wills ,but no winner in leadership so the product was not improved fast enohgt as the sweeds pulled the same way and progressed the trucks,just a tought from outside

bma.finland:
as a outsider ,after reading this and other treads in this subject,it,s very clear why all failed,there was two different wills ,but no winner in leadership so the product was not improved fast enohgt as the sweeds pulled the same way and progressed the trucks,just a tought from outside

To be fair the Swedes benefitted massively through the post war years from the economic advantages of having stayed out of WW2.

The wrong calls,regarding engineering choices at Leyland,only contributed to a failure in which financial issues played just as big a part just like most other sectors of British industry.The reality was/is it was going to take a miracle for us to ever make up for the financial costs of both World Wars even given the best case scenario of everyone at Leyland Group going by best engineering thinking.Bearing in mind that there are still people around who think that Issigonis was a car design genius.Just like some people think that the SAAB 92 was a better motor than a Volvo 122/144/164. :open_mouth: :laughing: The difference is that the Swedes had/have sufficient cash for their mistakes not to break them.Unlike Leyland Group. :bulb:

Carryfast:

ramone:
Maybe they jumped ship because they saw the writing on the wall after the 68 events of British Leyland being formed !!!!!!! , wasnt it mentioned that the Eagle was a similar design to the AV760 ā– ā– ? :wink:

How could they have jumped ship because of the events of 1968 and designed an engine for their new employer which was in production for 1967. :confused: :wink:

As for the Eagle what we do know is that they went for a longer 6 inch stroke to match the ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā–  but with less bore than the 760.

As Iā€™ve said what if theyā€™d have been convinced to stay and told to do whatever it takes,to provide the 760ā€™s bore with at least the ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā–  and Eagleā€™s stroke.

Going by the specific torque output of the Mk111 305 Eagle at the very least Leyland would have had a big cam 290 killer in its armoury as of the early/mid 1970ā€™s with the only way being up from there regards development potential.Also in time to meet the F12 head on and absolutely massacre it. :bulb: :frowning:

Because they had already committed to the ill fated V8 which had been commissioned in the early `60s then scrapped but then reborn on Leylands orders so they were hardly going to commission another completely new engine ,what with the V8 ,the 500 and the Gas turbine all being developed and later doomed

ramone:

Carryfast:

ramone:
Maybe they jumped ship because they saw the writing on the wall after the 68 events of British Leyland being formed !!!!!!! , wasnt it mentioned that the Eagle was a similar design to the AV760 ā– ā– ? :wink:

How could they have jumped ship because of the events of 1968 and designed an engine for their new employer which was in production for 1967. :confused: :wink:

As for the Eagle what we do know is that they went for a longer 6 inch stroke to match the ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā–  but with less bore than the 760.

As Iā€™ve said what if theyā€™d have been convinced to stay and told to do whatever it takes,to provide the 760ā€™s bore with at least the ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā– ā–  and Eagleā€™s stroke.

Going by the specific torque output of the Mk111 305 Eagle at the very least Leyland would have had a big cam 290 killer in its armoury as of the early/mid 1970ā€™s with the only way being up from there regards development potential.Also in time to meet the F12 head on and absolutely massacre it. :bulb: :frowning:

Because they had already committed to the ill fated V8 which had been commissioned in the early `60s then scrapped but then reborn on Leylands orders so they were hardly going to commission another completely new engine ,what with the V8 ,the 500 and the Gas turbine all being developed and later doomed

It would be interesting to find out if the timeline of the V8 being designed then ( rightly ) abandoned then ordered back into production matches all that having happened well before 1967.Or was the V8 being brought back a later desperate reaction to the realisation that even people like Scammell were showing a preference for the Rolls Eagle over the 760.As possibly suggested by a late 1960ā€™s/early 70ā€™s introuction date for the V8.In addition to the Eagleā€™s obvious development potential advantages v the 760ā€™s.

AEC always had a good reputation until the Leyland ā€œmergerā€ , the 11.3 was an excellent engine as was the 9.6 , the 12.47 was a natural progression from the 11.3 , i havent heard of any major problems from anyone on here ,in fact ive heard quite the opposite , Graham reports virtually no problems with the fleet of TL12s Spillers ran , i remember Saviem reporting how profitable the TL12s he leased out were and from a drivers point of view i know personally drivers who drove and rated them and drivers on here saying the same thing ,what i dont understand is your constant slating of either AEC or Gardner for that matter .Both were excellent engine manufacturers in their day ,unfortunately for whatever reasons they didn`t move forward with technology.

ramone:
AEC always had a good reputation until the Leyland ā€œmergerā€ , the 11.3 was an excellent engine as was the 9.6 , the 12.47 was a natural progression from the 11.3 , i havent heard of any major problems from anyone on here ,in fact ive heard quite the opposite , Graham reports virtually no problems with the fleet of TL12s Spillers ran , i remember Saviem reporting how profitable the TL12s he leased out were and from a drivers point of view i know personally drivers who drove and rated them and drivers on here saying the same thing ,what i dont understand is your constant slating of either AEC or Gardner for that matter .Both were excellent engine manufacturers in their day ,unfortunately for whatever reasons they didn`t move forward with technology.

The above is very accurate, we can all recall problems with all manufactures back in the 70ā€™s & 80ā€™s the swedes had there problems but the British knockers seem to have forgotten them, Now to Gardner, in itā€™s day which has now long passed was a high quality, fuel efficient engine & in my opinion if coupled with the correct gearbox was as good if not better as anything else available at the time.