newmercman:
I disagree, at the end of the 60s both companies (Gardner and Foden) were on the downward spiral that would eventually lead to their demise Up until that point, you’re correct, they were successful businessmen, but the decisions they made in the early sixties were naive
Take it one step further and look at the arrogance of Gardner, they were notorious for long lead times, so their product was obviously in demand, but did they ramp up production or invest in more facilities so that they could upply the customer with the engines they so clearly wanted when they wanted them, no they never, the attitude was more like ‘You’ll get it when we want to give it to you’ and look where that got them
The same arrogance was responsible for their reluctance to move with the times and develop a turbocharged engine, they had the brains and their engineering ability was second to none, but they were just not interested, their belief was that turbocharging was unnecessary and that you would never need an engine with more than 250hp, this arrogance led to the end of the company, so if they were well informed, they didn’t listen
Err… I was referring to the 1950s in my previous posts, specifically with reference Valkyrie’s account of the success of the 8LW fodens in the Low Countries before 1958, then the apparent capitulation immediately thereafter. Your account of events following on from this is beyond dispute (to me, anyway, although it may encounter some resistance on a frosty evening on the Kingston bypass!).
Rather than arrogance, the British national trait which I would associate with Gardner, Foden and Leyland’s downward spiral is greed- our business community, compared to more productive nations, is accustomed to, or demands, a good short-term return on its investments. It is disinclined to compromise this position if longer term prosperity, or even survival, demands that big things are bought. Activities which require a long view are:
- Fast technological change. This needs an increase in the R&D budget.
- Expansion. This needs investment in buildings, machinery and personnel.
- New markets. Incentives for the new customers and service back-up will only show a return later on.
All of these things were going on in the European lorry industry in the 1950s. The fancy cabs, the rapid development of engines, the increase in demand for heavy, long-distance lorries, the opportunities to sell across the Continent. Faced with the choice of grasping this nettle, the owners of the British lorry-builders opted to carry on as before, feeding their existing markets with the existing product. Effectively standing still, while the Continentals marched forward. They chose to remain small, while the firms who survived all tried to get big, starting about that time. The Dutch 8LW Foden story just happens to illustrate this quite well (as does the craven mismanagement of Leyland by Mr. Stokes).