gingerfold:
And this was one of the major differences in policy between AEC and Leyland, which caused so many problems between the two sets of heirarchy. AEC HAD identified Europe as the market to compete in for the future; Stokes and his acolytes at Leyland disagreed.
Stokes must have wielded uncommon influence to damp down the enthusiasm of Leyland’s engineers. I bet their reaction to the appearance of the new, big-cabbed long distance vehicles emerging from the factories of Europe in the 1950’s was, “Wow- look at that. Let’s do a bigger/faster/better one.” I can’t imagine anyone, who has embarked upon a career in design, thinking otherwise.
Coming back to Gardner, their piecemeal approach to Europe- a handful of manufacturing licenses and maybe a few sales- is (to me at least) less conveniently explained. They had one of the best engines in the world in the 1950s- why would they not want to sell it far and wide?
Carryfast:
Yeah right ‘excellent posts’ containing bs like the 350 Big Cam 1 ■■■■■■■ wasn’t available in the 1970’s
You stated that it was available in the early 1970s. One of the above contributors corrected you, with its actual launch date (1977). if you can’t even quote your own recent discussions accurately, how can anything you write about the events of 50 years ago be trusted?
Carryfast:
and blaming me for having a go at the Gardner family when I didn’t.
You have repeatedly directed the same childish, badly-researched insult at their work. You have ignored every other poster’s attempt to qualify your simplistic statements and returned to the same, one-dimensional taunts. Why do you continue, when it is blindingly obvious that you are getting up everyone’s f. nose?
Carryfast:
Not to mention the double standards of it being seen as ok to have a go at Stokes who actually cetainly did know
How do you know he knew?
Carryfast:
that there’s no way of running a successful truck manufacturing industry without being able to dominate the domestic market.
This is your opinion. You made it up. In this context, it is illogical, too: Leyland did dominate the GB market (and was doing very well in many other markets, including Continental ones), when Stokes decided to stop competing in Europe. Therefore, a lack of home sales was not what disbarred Leyland from its export successes- that was Stokes himself.
I’ve actually been making the case that there were 300 hp + 14 Litre turbocharged ■■■■■■■ engines available throughout most of the 1970’s.Which would obviously cover both small cam and big cam verions.I’ve also said that I’m no ■■■■■■■ expert because in my time I didn’t have a lot to do with them except (a few) of the 903 versions.It was cav who said that the 320 + big cam versions weren’t available until the 1980’s,if I’ve read it right , although that seems to be a one size fits all view based on some local issues which,as I’ve said,only applied within the British market because of it’s backward customer base.Which is my point.
I’m not researching anything it’s just based on memory from the time just like Saviem’s views.It’s just that my viewpoint is obviously from a different perspective to either yours ( which seems to be all about research that you’re getting from newspaper articles etc, concerning a long dead head of the Leyland group,who’s accurate ideas and view of the situation concerning the future direction of that group I’d trust over yours.I think you’ve forgotten the fact that Stokes’ job was to plan Leyland’s future not as things stood at the time he was planning it and he,rightly,foresaw the situation in which Leyland would no longer dominate anything because it didn’t have the rescources to develop the products to do it or the domestic customer base to buy those products if he had ),or Saviem’s who’s ideas seem to be based on some type of non truck factory shop floor environment at least during the 1970’s.The same applies in regards to nmm’s comments.
What gets up my nose is the continuous badly informed bs from those like you who don’t seem to have a clue as to the real world and the circumstances as they applied to the British truck manufacturing industry at the time or maybe even the British manufacturing industry in general as it stood then.
No,unlike you in the case of Stokes,I haven’t directed any childish insults,directed at anyone personally at all,just a reasonable view of the issue of keeping an obsolete product in production too long,based on the outdated demands of the British market.
gingerfold:
And this was one of the major differences in policy between AEC and Leyland, which caused so many problems between the two sets of heirarchy. AEC HAD identified Europe as the market to compete in for the future; Stokes and his acolytes at Leyland disagreed.
Stokes must have wielded uncommon influence to damp down the enthusiasm of Leyland’s engineers. I bet their reaction to the appearance of the new, big-cabbed long distance vehicles emerging from the factories of Europe in the 1950’s was, “Wow- look at that. Let’s do a bigger/faster/better one.” I can’t imagine anyone, who has embarked upon a career in design, thinking otherwise.
Coming back to Gardner, their piecemeal approach to Europe- a handful of manufacturing licenses and maybe a few sales- is (to me at least) less conveniently explained. They had one of the best engines in the world in the 1950s- why would they not want to sell it far and wide?
I think Valkyrie has answered the erroneous idea of Gardners being the best engines in the world in the 1950’s.
You can bet that those Leyland engineers were already well aware of bigger,faster,better trucks emerging from the factories in the States not Europe and like Stokes would have known that the British buyers would never buy them because like you they believed at the time,just as they did 20 years later,that the Gardner was the best engine in the world.
Saviem, patience is not really the word for it, disbelief is far more appropriate Having said that, I think that for all his madness Carryfast has made some interesting observations, not many, but they’re there. He has also provoked an interesting debate and many others have joined in with very interesting posts in response, for all the madness, he has helped this thread, like you, I also find him highly amusing and would love to spend an evening in his company, especially if I could bring a roll of gaffer tape and some cable ties
Carryfast, you have the answer to the whole Gardner conundrum, you have said it so many times on this thread, but I don’t believe you have seen it for yourself
The boys at Gardner did not bother going to Europe for one reason, they never needed to, every engine they made had a buyer waiting for it, some were prepared to wait a bloody long time too, for the same reasons they never bothered spending millions researching turbochargers, enough people were still buying their naturally aspirated models, so why bother
With the benefit of hindsight, we can all see that it was a mistake, but they had run a profitable business for over half a century, as far as they were concerned, it wasn’t broken, so why bother fixing it It is very easy to look back and point out that mistake, but all of us could do the same with our own lives and with the knowledge we all have now, we would all be multi millionaires, getting rich on our investments in Google or Apple
seem that NOKIA mobilephones did the Gardner misstake to, they had for long time a god naturaly asparating phone,then came samsung and i phone,nokia tryes whit turbo on old models,but fail,rest seem,s to be history ,cheers benkku
newmercman:
The boys at Gardner did not bother going to Europe for one reason, they never needed to, every engine they made had a buyer waiting for it, some were prepared to wait a bloody long time too, for the same reasons they never bothered spending millions researching turbochargers, enough people were still buying their naturally aspirated models, so why bother
With the benefit of hindsight, we can all see that it was a mistake, but they had run a profitable business for over half a century, as far as they were concerned, it wasn’t broken, so why bother fixing it It is very easy to look back and point out that mistake, but all of us could do the same with our own lives and with the knowledge we all have now, we would all be multi millionaires, getting rich on our investments in Google or Apple
The 240bhp question is: Why? The brains and enthusiasm that built Gardner up to this position- profit, customers gagging for the product- seemed to desert them, in the face of this bigger opportunity (expansion into Europe). Like every successful organisation, they started from nothing. Something gave that company the strength to gain an engineering lead, upon which the sales and the profits sat. Then, all of a sudden (mid-1950s), they embark on a strategy which was doomed to failure- that of allowing others to begin to take an engineering lead. Can you imagine what a pre-War Gardner would have done, when faced with the situation in the 1950s- upstarts like Volvo and Scania-Vabis developing 200bhp engines, for sale into a market ten times as big as the British one? Surely, they would have attacked it with relish. What changed?
newmercman:
Carryfast, you have the answer to the whole Gardner conundrum, you have said it so many times on this thread, but I don’t believe you have seen it for yourself
The boys at Gardner did not bother going to Europe for one reason, they never needed to, every engine they made had a buyer waiting for it, some were prepared to wait a bloody long time too, for the same reasons they never bothered spending millions researching turbochargers, enough people were still buying their naturally aspirated models, so why bother
I have seen it for myself because unlike everyone else I’m the only one who’s put the blame where it really belongs and that’s with the British customers of the time.The British manufacturers,like all the rest,were dependent first and foremost on the demands of the customers in their domestic markets.(Unless they happened to be fire truck manufacturers with around 90% of their products sold for export in markets that realised and understood the (massive) lead which the US truck manufacturers had over everyone else at least in engine and driveline technology ).
However Gardner was a special case in that not only were it’s products a reflection of the demands of that backward British customer base,at least from the start of WW2 on,it’s products also didn’t contain the potential needed,for the type of development required,to catch up with what the Americans were turning out,even if the British customers had been,by some fluke,as forward thinking as their North American and Colonial counterparts.
Saviem look on ME thread 166 and you ll see a pic of the Rolls Royce Scania were talking about earlier on this thread Paul should have quite a few more the traler headboard has apatch right in the centre of the sheet when i get round to writing my first big one i ll tell you how that happened regards Crow.
newmercman:
The boys at Gardner did not bother going to Europe for one reason, they never needed to, every engine they made had a buyer waiting for it, some were prepared to wait a bloody long time too, for the same reasons they never bothered spending millions researching turbochargers, enough people were still buying their naturally aspirated models, so why bother
With the benefit of hindsight, we can all see that it was a mistake, but they had run a profitable business for over half a century, as far as they were concerned, it wasn’t broken, so why bother fixing it It is very easy to look back and point out that mistake, but all of us could do the same with our own lives and with the knowledge we all have now, we would all be multi millionaires, getting rich on our investments in Google or Apple
The 240bhp question is: Why? The brains and enthusiasm that built Gardner up to this position- profit, customers gagging for the product- seemed to desert them, in the face of this bigger opportunity (expansion into Europe). Like every successful organisation, they started from nothing. Something gave that company the strength to gain an engineering lead, upon which the sales and the profits sat. Then, all of a sudden (mid-1950s), they embark on a strategy which was doomed to failure- that of allowing others to begin to take an engineering lead. Can you imagine what a pre-War Gardner would have done, when faced with the situation in the 1950s- upstarts like Volvo and Scania-Vabis developing 200bhp engines, for sale into a market ten times as big as the British one? Surely, they would have attacked it with relish. What changed?
Nothing changed.What was needed was reliable turbocharged 300 hp + engines instead of the 8LXB and customers in the domestic market who wanted them.They had neither.Unlike the Americans.
Carryfast:
I have seen it for myself because unlike everyone else I’m the only one who’s put the blame where it really belongs and that’s with the British customers of the time.
This is the central flaw in all of your arguments. All of the successful vehicle engineers in the 1950s treated the emerging European market as a priority while, at the same time, supplying their individual home market’s eclectic needs. If you apply your ■■■■-eyed logic to Sweden, they would have continued, exclusively, with their bonneted drawbar outfits and not bothered to develop and market the Tip Top or LB76. Then they could have conveniently “blamed” their home market for the resulting failure.
The reason you are the only one who thinks like that is that nobody else is as daft.
Carryfast:
I have seen it for myself because unlike everyone else I’m the only one who’s put the blame where it really belongs and that’s with the British customers of the time.
This is the central flaw in all of your arguments. All of the successful vehicle engineers in the 1950s treated the emerging European market as a priority while, at the same time, supplying their individual home market’s eclectic needs. If you apply your ■■■■-eyed logic to Sweden, they would have continued, exclusively, with their bonneted drawbar outfits and not bothered to develop and market the Tip Top or LB76. Then they could have conveniently “blamed” their home market for the resulting failure.
The reason you are the only one who thinks like that is that nobody else is as daft.
As I’ve said it was the American industry and market demands that we needed to be in step with.Tilt cabs no problem the US market was using them from at least the late 1950’s.
Carryfast:
I have seen it for myself because unlike everyone else I’m the only one who’s put the blame where it really belongs and that’s with the British customers of the time.
This is the central flaw in all of your arguments. All of the successful vehicle engineers in the 1950s treated the emerging European market as a priority while, at the same time, supplying their individual home market’s eclectic needs. If you apply your ■■■■-eyed logic to Sweden, they would have continued, exclusively, with their bonneted drawbar outfits and not bothered to develop and market the Tip Top or LB76. Then they could have conveniently “blamed” their home market for the resulting failure.
The reason you are the only one who thinks like that is that nobody else is as daft.
As I’ve said it was the American industry and market demands that we needed to be in step with.Tilt cabs no problem the US market was using them from at least the late 1950’s.
Foden had a tilt cab in the early 60s leyland from the mid 60s?. Why could the americans never crack any European market they did try?
Carryfast:
I have seen it for myself because unlike everyone else I’m the only one who’s put the blame where it really belongs and that’s with the British customers of the time.
This is the central flaw in all of your arguments. All of the successful vehicle engineers in the 1950s treated the emerging European market as a priority while, at the same time, supplying their individual home market’s eclectic needs. If you apply your ■■■■-eyed logic to Sweden, they would have continued, exclusively, with their bonneted drawbar outfits and not bothered to develop and market the Tip Top or LB76. Then they could have conveniently “blamed” their home market for the resulting failure.
The reason you are the only one who thinks like that is that nobody else is as daft.
As I’ve said it was the American industry and market demands that we needed to be in step with.Tilt cabs no problem the US market was using them from at least the late 1950’s.
Foden had a tilt cab in the early 60s leyland from the mid 60s?. Why could the americans never crack any European market they did try?
I can just imagine Bewick’s answer to the Kenworth UK saleseman in the 1970’s as he drove that 350 ■■■■■■■ powered Aerodyne demonstrator into the yard.It’s big,flash,overpowered in every sense and over here and what do you think will happen when I tell the drivers that I’ve only been prepared to buy two anyway,even if I did want any,and all the rest will have to keep their day cabbed Gardner powered Atkis. .
As for ze Germans all I know is they preferred to buy a Faun to a Pathfinder so nuf said in their case.
But seriously we’ve discussed before on here how the roads of Europe were dominated by the home manufacturers of each place and import exports were a relatively small sideshow,if at all, and that was a good thing not a bad one.No surprise though that if you read into Saviem’s comments it’s ■■■■■■■ that seems to be his preferred engine option not Gardner in just the same way that Willeme went across the Atlantic not across the Channel when they needed some serious (cheap) reliable power for their products.
Coming back to Gardner, their piecemeal approach to Europe- a handful of manufacturing licenses and maybe a few sales- is (to me at least) less conveniently explained. They had one of the best engines in the world in the 1950s- why would they not want to sell it far and wide?
The European Licensing agreement Gardner’s had brought them very small sums of money, something £25 per engine from memory. Gardner sold into over 40 countries, but theses were mainly marine and industrial engines, although many of these were LWs in various guises. Again, the stumbling block was manufacturing capacity, in its peak years Gardner employed over 2,000 people at Patricroft, but engine assembly was always done on the day shift. Don’t forget that Mack fitted Gardner 6LW and 8LW engines into some of its models for the American and Canadian markets.
I will keep this simple, after some 25 pages on this thread it makes my blood boil when i continually hear you rabble on with out respect about Gardner engines when they achieved so much more than you can ever dream of!
I could also babble on but i wont, as i have probably skidded more in reverse gear than you have driven in forward gears!
Well here is a man that speaks the truth the whole truth & nothing but the truth about Gardner Engines, & as for C/F, Well lets hope he takes note of whats being said on this thread, that is if he can ,perhaps he may have to go back to the earley learning center where perhaps he played truant from in his younger days, Regards Larry.
, although that seems to be a one size fits all view based on some local issues which,as I’ve said,only applied within the British market because of it’s backward customer base.Which is my point.
Having said that, I think that for all his madness Carryfast has made some interesting observations, not many, but they’re there. He has also provoked an interesting debate and many others have joined in with very interesting posts in response, for all the madness, he has helped this thread, like you, I also find him highly amusing and would love to spend an evening in his company, especially if I could bring a roll of gaffer tape and some cable ties 
).
