What was it that finished off Gardner in the eyes of its customers?
Primarily it must have been the attitude of the company’s management. To have taken the stance: “customers must have what is on offer rather than what they want” - is suicide or rather ought to be, but regrettably even today, so few companies seem to take this into account. To have compounded this with what unfortunately became an expensive inferior product sealed their fate.
For a while some of the customers will put up with having to take a product which does not fulfill all their requirements. Some will put up with something they see as cheap and nasty, simply because it is cheap. But what very few will put up with is a product that not only does not meet their requirements, but has now become expensive and nasty. This is what Gardner’s management succeeded so well in doing.
What the strike was all about I can’t remember, but it and the consequences can’t all have been the union’s fault. The company had a highly skilled workforce; somehow the value of this must have been underestimated, consequent in the company’s long term demise.
What other factors led to the closure?
A much larger worldwide engine supplier, ■■■■■■■■ with an enormous potential home market behind it; who curiously had also experienced their own difficulties in supplying what the customer really wanted; not only got it right in terms of specification, but launched a very successful marketing campaign based on their ability to challenge and now beat Gardner in their own backyard, on the two bulwarks of Gardner’s renowned reputation: fuel economy and longevity. ■■■■■■■ were now offering an engine that continued in its tradition of producing more power, but furthermore could, for all intents and purposes, match it for economy, while at the same time exceeding Gardner’s 400,000 mile overhaul life by some 50%. All that remained to do was to ensure that the lorry manufacturers offered it for sale at a price which would attract orders. As things turned out they didn’t need to sell it cheap — Gardner did the job for them and demanded a premium for their engine. And just to make life easier for ■■■■■■■■ their own product didn’t last as long as it formerly had.
At the same time ■■■■■■■ launched a totally new engine aimed directly at Gardner’s one remaining strength — weight. The 10 litre LT10 was not only considerably smaller than Gardner’s big engine, but it was also the same weight and slightly smaller than Gardner’s product for its one remaining ■■■■■■■■■■ in the automotive market; the bus engine. With a bit more development ■■■■■■■ was able to challenge Gardner’s last gasp behemoth LYT for the maximum weight HGV with the same compact engine.
During all of this parliament finally listened to the haulage industry and increased dual carriageway speed limits to 50 mph. At a stroke, gone was Gardner’s one remaining trump card, its light load fuel economy; the one factor that the other manufacturers found so hard to factor into their equations.
The British manufacturers were very much of the same mindset as Gardner and refused to acknowledge the quality of their European based competitors’ products — a fact which eventually also saw ■■■■■■■ withdraw from Europe owing to lack of demand for their flagship product.
When about the same time, the maximum overall weight limit was increased to 38 tonnes, Gardner was left without a product ready for sale and so, almost, were the British commercial vehicle builders.
So why did Gardner lose its reputation?
With a product that could now be matched for economy, longevity was its one remaining strength. Now, on top of a woeful deterioration of quality control, to a certain extent fate turned against it. Fleets were now operating a variety of competing machines. Hauliers understood that the two stroke engines required different oil, but in many instances failed to ensure that the unblown Gardner also had its favourite monograde oil. It did not like anything else. At the same time the availability of mechanic’s training courses for Gardner engines was not on a par with that of ■■■■■■■ or anyone else, so the importance of some of Gardner’s idiosyncratic and time consuming requirements became more frequently overlooked.
At the same time the oil companies stopped providing diesel with a cetane value of 50 and then introduced low sulphur fuel; neither measure to the improvement of fuel economy or the life of fuel injection equipment. All the engine manufacturers suffered, but it was not such a pillar of reputation to all.
Just to help with the final nails, along came the environment lobby. The Gardner engine and its now essential Fuller gearbox were too noisy and the intended emission standards could not be met by a naturally aspirated engine. Even the bus market was now threatened.
The market for the engine and vehicle manufacturers was not the only one undergoing a transformation. Previous medium size family run haulage companies were being bought out by large conglomerates which were then becoming the dominant force along with their buying power. Haulage companies needed to operate maximum capacity vehicles, which required new larger yards. Those hauliers that remained needed to be nearer to the motorway network and away from their previous village locations. The volume users of transport were now able to flex their muscles to a greater extent than had previously been the case. Just-in-time and 24 hour deliveries became the norm. Encouraged by the planners and listening to public complaints about “juggernauts destroying villages”, ribbon development was encouraged alongside motorways.
The purchasing market was now in the hands of fewer, but larger companies who now employed fleet engineers to spec their vehicles. Proper qualifications in ‘logistics’ had now become recognised along with a requirement for “qualified” transport managers. Now it was no longer ‘the guv’nor who ran the show, but the accountant who said: “lease the vehicles”. What was now required was basically a “motorway charger” that was expected to operate 24/7 for three years rather than the 7 to 10 year life expected before. Vehicles were no longer overhauled for a second lease of life; they were thrown away in favour of the latest product.
Six cylinder vacuum cleaners were now the requirement. Only one engine remained for a short while true to its roots until it was replaced by Paccar — the DAF developed 680 which at least sounded like a diesel engine; but it didn’t scream like it used to any more!
Turn up the volume.
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