Reliability didn’t really improve but later variants were slightly better. Just as the ERGO cab was a universal design for a range of models, so the 500 series concept was a universal engine for numerous applications, some 30 power and application variants were planned from the outset, viz automotive, stationery, marine, clockwise rotation, anti-clockwise rotation and so on. The 500 series was never intended as a premium truck specification engine for ultra long haul work, that was to have been the AEC V8, so Leyland found itself with two disastrous engine project failures. Hence the quickly introduced TL11, which was developed from the Leyland O.600 / O.680, which itself dated back to the mid-1940s (automotive use, but development began in 1942 for military applications).The AEC AV760 based TL12 was also developed for higher power outputs than the TL11 to replace the V8
Did the problems lie with the manufacturing tolerances, or was it the Unions again 
That may seem a silly question, but there was a serious lack of development testing in the BL Group, a lot of components had to be re engineered, but this was only discovered after the vehicles had been delivered to the customer. Then the issue of piece work came into play. The assembley line workers would want more money for each new process they had to undertake, so if a particular part was found lacking and, for example, needed another hole drilled into it, the labour rate had to be renogotiated and that meant a load of back and forth arguing between management and shop stewards. To the point that in a 12month period in 1971/2 there were 5,000,000 man hours lost through piece work pay negotiations and all the while these were taking place the inferior parts were still being produced and sold to the end user 
This situation was not unique to BL, outside component suppliers were having the same difficulties, Ergo cab builder GKN-Sankey being one of them 
newmercman:
Did the problems lie with the manufacturing tolerances, or was it the Unions againThis situation was not unique to BL, outside component suppliers were having the same difficulties, Ergo cab builder GKN-Sankey being one of them
I’ve never worked under the piecework system although my dad did during a lot of his time in manufacturing both during and post war.In most cases the unions were always about getting rid of the outdated system which in most cases was just used by the accountants to reduce labour rates not improve them.Piecework disputes were usually about rates and production amounts not the quality of the job.In the case which you seem to be describing that would have meant that the rate for the job would have needed to be changed to reflect the extra work involved.Which logically would simply have been a case of asking the union how much extra was needed to be added to the rate to take account of the extra work.It’s obvious in that case that any ‘issues’ or ‘arguments’ raised about the new rate at that stage would have been on the accountants side not the union’s or the management’s. 
In the case of components being made outside tolerance limits on drawings that would have been a totally different issue of disciplinary action concerning competence which the unions in general wouldn’t defend anyway being that the level of proof,if found correct,would have been indisputable.That level of proof of course would have have needed to be sufficient to clear the machinery being used for the job and the calibration of the measuring equipment used by the operative etc etc.
In general engineers skilled in machining work weren’t/aren’t idiots and could/can prove their skills and references at the recruitment stage regardless of their union activeties or otherwise and I don’t think that a firm like Leyland would have been employing engineers to machine components without having a reasonable idea of their abilities before letting them loose on the job. 
Best Ergomatic Cabbed-Lorry Model? PART 10.Page 19.TRUCKNETUK
LEYLAND 500-SERIES HEADLESS WONDER DIESEL ENGINE.
The Leyland Group had cylinder head gasket problems with some of it’s AEC and Leyland
engines,but,although these blown gasket problems were largely cured,it was our old friend
Dr.Albert Fogg 
that came up with the idea of using a fixed cylinder head for the new engine range.There would be no longer any blown gasket problems,and the engines would have better
cooling.The fixed cylinder head idea was not new: It goes back to the early days of motor vehicles in the 1900s,'teens,'20s and even '30s of the 20th Century when a substantial number
of motorcycles,motorcars,lorries and buses had fixed cylinder head engines,which were really
regarded as being primitve compared to engines with detachable cylinder heads! 
THE LEYLAND 500-SERIES ENGINE WAS ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO BE THE LEYLAND 700-SERIES ENGINE.
The new engine had an overhead camshaft from the start,very durable Stellite valves and was
to be produced as an 11.4-litre - 700 cubic inch displacement engine with slim and compact
dimensions - several prototypes were built.
At a critical stage,the decision was made to reduce the cubic capacity down to 8.2 litres -
500 cid ,one of the reasons was to get the engine’s weight down below 1000 kg.Leyland wanted to
offer a better power to weight ratio - the 700-Series was too heavy.Because of this interference
from Leyland management in regard to the engine capacity ,the development engineer walked out!!! 
The 500-Series engine was developed to power the new mass-produced Leyland National Single
Decker Bus,certain other bus models and Leyland’s standard medium and heavy lorry range.
COST CUTTING AND WARRANTY COSTS.
A projected military version of the 500-Series,using two cylinder blocks and one crankshaft
to create a V12 engine! ,never went ahead.
Power output range of the 500-Series was from 150 BHP to 220 BHP,but there was a plan to produce
a turbocharged 260 BHP version
The development of the 500-Series engine suffered a double blow! :-Insufficient development
funds,and,because of the late decision to reduce the cubic capacity of this engine,quality
control was relaxed - it became a skimpey and slipshod rush job Hence production tooling
quality fluctuated,which resulted in some good engines,but most were bad - according to the
late great Pat Kennett,around 60 percent were faulty!
These faulty 500-Series engines cost Leyland dearly in warranty payouts
LEYLAND 500-SERIES ENGINE MUSIC.
So,alright,the Leyland National Mk1 sounded a bit clattery,but it could sound nice,but the best
500-Series Engine music was that produced in the Leyland Lynx,Bison and Buffalo lorry models
LEYLAND 500 SYSTEM PHOTOGRAPHS:-
Leyland National Mk1 Single Decker Omnibus,EEL 893V,First Bus Hampshire No.400.Preserved.Many Leyland National Mk1’s were re-engined,in this case with a Volvo THD100 engine:-
Leyland 500-Series 510 Turbocharged Diesel Engine advertisement:-
Leyland Buffalo 500-System 4x2 Boxvan-bodied Articulated Lorry,DAR 667K,Leyland 500-System advertisement.
The Leyland 500-Series engine in the Leyland Buffalo 500-System lorries produced some great music! :-
VALKYRIE
Leyland Bison of S W Brisbane of Knighton which was driven by John Cross whose son Malcolm is sat in the cab with his wife in the Vauxhall Victor 101 and daughter leaning against the lorry.
Pic courtesy of John Cross.
Acording to the book nmm is quoting from ford and vauxhall moved away from the piecework system in the 60s to a day rate system plus bonuses if certain targets were met and passed but it was union resistance that stopped it within the bl group and it literally boiled down to strikes over who done up what screw.
Also as an example of bls lack of testing when Renault launched its 16 model which was a fwd hatchback they had over 100 pre production models on the road been tested. Bl had two pre production maxis on the road and there were numerous examples of this
VALKYRIE:
Best Ergomatic Cabbed-Lorry Model? PART 10.Page 19.TRUCKNETUKLEYLAND 500-SERIES HEADLESS WONDER DIESEL ENGINE.
The Leyland Group had cylinder head gasket problems with some of it’s AEC and Leyland
engines,but,although these blown gasket problems were largely cured,it was our old friend
Dr.Albert Fogg
cooling.THE LEYLAND 500-SERIES ENGINE WAS ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO BE THE LEYLAND 700-SERIES ENGINE.
The new engine had an overhead camshaft from the start,very durable Stellite valves and was
to be produced as an 11.4-litre - 700 cubic inch displacement engine with slim and compact
dimensions - several prototypes were built.
At a critical stage,the decision was made to reduce the cubic capacity down to 8.2 litres -
500 cid
offer a better power to weight ratio - the 700-Series was too heavy.Because of this interference
from Leyland management in regard to the engine capacity
The story gets better and better as it goes on.So we’ve got what seems like a promising idea based on an AEC design not Leyland.Then just when things might have started getting somewhere,depending on the output and reliability test results of the prototype 700,Leyland’s German engine ‘advisor’ says let’s reduce the capacity of the thing to 500 and make everything possible metric and then to add insult to injury it gets made on dodgy production machinery which can’t hold design tolerances.If only we had the dyno results of the prototype 700 and the reasoning of the AEC development engineer,who obviously seems to have had the sense to walk out and let ze Germans get on with finishing off the Leyland competition. 
Although having said that it’s difficult to see where the advantage,if any,over the TL12 would have been.
kr79:
Acording to the book nmm is quoting from ford and vauxhall moved away from the piecework system in the 60s to a day rate system plus bonuses if certain targets were met and passed but it was union resistance that stopped it within the bl group and it literally boiled down to strikes over who done up what screw.
Also as an example of bls lack of testing when Renault launched its 16 model which was a fwd hatchback they had over 100 pre production models on the road been tested. Bl had two pre production maxis on the road and there were numerous examples of this
I think by the time the Maxi was introduced Leyland’s management already knew the writing was on the wall for the BMC division.It was just a case of how much and/or when it would take the rest of the firm down with it.
Strikes over who done what would have been more about demarcation,not piecework which would have been more about rates paid for the job and output quotas.
Carryfast:
kr79:
Acording to the book nmm is quoting from ford and vauxhall moved away from the piecework system in the 60s to a day rate system plus bonuses if certain targets were met and passed but it was union resistance that stopped it within the bl group and it literally boiled down to strikes over who done up what screw.
Also as an example of bls lack of testing when Renault launched its 16 model which was a fwd hatchback they had over 100 pre production models on the road been tested. Bl had two pre production maxis on the road and there were numerous examples of thisI think by the time the Maxi was introduced Leyland’s management already knew the writing was on the wall for the BMC division.It was just a case of how much and/or when it would take the rest of the firm down with it.
Strikes over who done what would have been more about demarcation,not piecework which would have been more about rates paid for the job and output quotas.
As Kevin said, the book mentions the Union’s reluctance to abandon the piecework deals. There was a famous example at Triumph over two screws that the assembly line workers refused to tighten because they had been added once finished examples of the car had hit the roads, it wasn’t in the agreement for the build of the car, so nobody would do it until someone got paid for the job
There was also the union led wage parity demands, the workers in Lancs wanted the same rates as those in Longbridge, who were, because of the walkouts, on higher pay levels than anybody else in the group, as it was the only way they could get them to do any work
The impact all this termoil had on the BL Group is very relevant to the Ergo cab and subsequent BL Truck Division products, so much money and market share had been lost, it was a downhill run to extinction from there, the ship was sinking and it took the figurehead down with it 
newmercman:
Carryfast:
kr79:
Acording to the book nmm is quoting from ford and vauxhall moved away from the piecework system in the 60s to a day rate system plus bonuses if certain targets were met and passed but it was union resistance that stopped it within the bl group and it literally boiled down to strikes over who done up what screw.
Also as an example of bls lack of testing when Renault launched its 16 model which was a fwd hatchback they had over 100 pre production models on the road been tested. Bl had two pre production maxis on the road and there were numerous examples of thisI think by the time the Maxi was introduced Leyland’s management already knew the writing was on the wall for the BMC division.It was just a case of how much and/or when it would take the rest of the firm down with it.
Strikes over who done what would have been more about demarcation,not piecework which would have been more about rates paid for the job and output quotas.
As Kevin said, the book mentions the Union’s reluctance to abandon the piecework deals. There was a famous example at Triumph over two screws that the assembly line workers refused to tighten because they had been added once finished examples of the car had hit the roads, it wasn’t in the agreement for the build of the car, so nobody would do it until someone got paid for the job
There was also the union led wage parity demands, the workers in Lancs wanted the same rates as those in Longbridge, who were, because of the walkouts, on higher pay levels than anybody else in the group, as it was the only way they could get them to do any work
The impact all this termoil had on the BL Group is very relevant to the Ergo cab and subsequent BL Truck Division products, so much money and market share had been lost, it was a downhill run to extinction from there, the ship was sinking and it took the figurehead down with it
It’s ironic that in other parts and sectors of the British manufacturing industry,and probably the automotive sector was no different,there were numerous disputes going on concerning the issue of the unions wanting to get rid of the piecework system and change to an hourly based wage rate instead but long before the issue seems to have still been in existence at Leyland.
It seems obvious that the only reason for that would have been that in those cases it was in the company’s accountants’ interests to keep it while in the case of Leyland it was a case of the opposite in being in the company’s interests to get rid of it.IE employers very rarely did anything that would improve wages for their workers but they were always looking for ways to do the opposite in getting more production for the same amount of wages.The key thing is to seperate the ideas of the accountants,that were causing the problems, from the management who just wanted to get the job done just like their employees without being ripped off doing it.
To see it from those workers point of view we’re not talking about adding the tightening of a couple of screws to the job we’re talking about adding loads of those extra operations over the course of a day and that applies wether you’re being paid by the hour or not.However the principle applies regardless of the amount of extra work IE if a rate is agreed for a set amount of work then that’s the amount of work that gets done.If someone then wants to add to that then the wage level needs to rise to reflect that.In just the same way that you expect to be paid for every mile that you run.IE if you run an extra mile you expect to be paid the extra cents for doing that extra mile and if the guvnor changed your method of payment from mileage to hourly you wouldn’t expect to lose out by the deal in being expected to run more miles for the same amount of money or run the same amount of miles for less money.
Wage parity and differentials is another totally baffling issue that at the end of the day needs to be there.Such as in my case,as I’ve said,in which I left the hell of working in the factory making trucks,to the heaven of getting out on the road driving them instead,and got paid more for doing it. If that wasn’t a case of needing pay differentials sorting out then nothing was.Although saying that it seems obvious that,just like today,AEC workers and Scammell workers should have been paid more than those working in the Northern Leyland Group plants considering the differences in the cost of living dan saf compared to up Norf.But you’ll never find even one of Thatcher’s most loyal followers ( even wheelnut probably ) who’d accept it let alone union members especially the norvern ones who’d obviously have to accept less to do the same job as their suvvern counterparts which would be justice.
It looks as if Leyland Motors was doomed, even before it was saddled with a loss-making car division or a poisoned shopfloor. The decision to wind down sales efforts in the European market, coupled with a tardiness in employing properly-qualified personnel in the engineering offices, was already bearing fruit with the undersized Ergo, Power Plus unreliability and badly-executed 500 series. If anything, its management in the 1970s and '80s deserves some credit for keeping it going as long as it did. Against this backdrop of 25 years of incompetence and sabotage, to replace the Ergo range with something as competitive as the T45 seems miraculous.
[zb]
anorak:
It looks as if Leyland Motors was doomed, even before it was saddled with a loss-making car division or a poisoned shopfloor. The decision to wind down sales efforts in the European market, coupled with a tardiness in employing properly-qualified personnel in the engineering offices, was already bearing fruit with the undersized Ergo, Power Plus unreliability and badly-executed 500 series. If anything, its management in the 1970s and '80s deserves some credit for keeping it going as long as it did. Against this backdrop of 25 years of incompetence and sabotage, to replace the Ergo range with something as competitive as the T45 seems miraculous.
I said it a few pages ago, with all that was going on it was a wonder that they managed to keep the company afloat as long as they did
newmercman:
[zb]
anorak:
It looks as if Leyland Motors was doomed, even before it was saddled with a loss-making car division or a poisoned shopfloor. The decision to wind down sales efforts in the European market, coupled with a tardiness in employing properly-qualified personnel in the engineering offices, was already bearing fruit with the undersized Ergo, Power Plus unreliability and badly-executed 500 series. If anything, its management in the 1970s and '80s deserves some credit for keeping it going as long as it did. Against this backdrop of 25 years of incompetence and sabotage, to replace the Ergo range with something as competitive as the T45 seems miraculous.I said it a few pages ago, with all that was going on it was a wonder that they managed to keep the company afloat as long as they did
Yes a fascinating period to look back on. Just by considering what has been contributed on this thread it is a miracle that anything got produced at all that even worked!!
I think that there was an OHC fixed head engine produced by Leyland in the 1930s, so as Valkyrie states the idea was not new. What was new about the 500 series was that the gear train for the camshaft etc. was at the flywheel end of the engine instead of the front of the engine, something to do with fewer “nodal stresses” (whatever they are?). This is now common practice on modern engine designs.
gingerfold:
newmercman:
[zb]
anorak:
It looks as if Leyland Motors was doomed, even before it was saddled with a loss-making car division or a poisoned shopfloor. The decision to wind down sales efforts in the European market, coupled with a tardiness in employing properly-qualified personnel in the engineering offices, was already bearing fruit with the undersized Ergo, Power Plus unreliability and badly-executed 500 series. If anything, its management in the 1970s and '80s deserves some credit for keeping it going as long as it did. Against this backdrop of 25 years of incompetence and sabotage, to replace the Ergo range with something as competitive as the T45 seems miraculous.I said it a few pages ago, with all that was going on it was a wonder that they managed to keep the company afloat as long as they did
Yes a fascinating period to look back on. Just by considering what has been contributed on this thread it is a miracle that anything got produced at all that even worked!!
That seems like an exaggeration based on the unfortunate but inevitable combination of circumstances ( mostly if not all financial ),that came together to cause the downfall of the group as a whole.But things probably look a bit different and didn’t fit that description if you just concentrate on Scammell’s products in which some independent thinking outside of being tied to the group’s in house engine design at least brought arguably some of the best true Brit combinations of Scammell chassis design know how together with Rolls power in everything from the Crusader to the Commander.In which case the MOD obviously didn’t agree with that outlook.The example of the Commander at least proving as usual that British engineering was/is as good,if not better,as could/can be found anywhere given the money to do the job.
So what would your thoughts be on the Routeman CF it had a choice of in house or out sourced engines and a cab that likw the ergo dates from the early sixtys would you have enjoyed trunking in one of those?
If you look at Scammell in the overall Leyland Group picture then it was always a specialised division with high cost / high value chassis that served a relatively small market sector in terms of overall sales. Its production and assembly facilities at Watford were relatively small and cramped and it could never have been a high volume assembler in terms of annual chassis output. Even though Scammell outlived AEC and Guy I undestand that its factory was quite outdated and was also starved of investment. After Southall was closed Marathon assembly was transferred to Scammell until the T45 was introduced. Thereafter multi-axle T45 models were assembled at Scammell.
gingerfold:
If you look at Scammell in the overall Leyland Group picture then it was always a specialised division with high cost / high value chassis that served a relatively small market sector in terms of overall sales. Its production and assembly facilities at Watford were relatively small and cramped and it could never have been a high volume assembler in terms of annual chassis output. Even though Scammell outlived AEC and Guy I undestand that its factory was quite outdated and was also starved of investment. After Southall was closed Marathon assembly was transferred to Scammell until the T45 was introduced. Thereafter multi-axle T45 models were assembled at Scammell.
All of the above seems to fit in with my previous comments in that the ‘issues’ concerning the group as a whole were all financial regardless of volume or specialist production.Which obviously had an effect on every aspect of the running of the operation from wages to product development.As we’ve seen although the Group was one of the worlds’ largest truck manufacturers,with the exception of the Crusader,it effectively had no real ongoing product development plan,to compete in the long haul premium sector,at whichever point in time,with the T45 being the final effort which as we’ve seen was/is limited to the DAF CF level at least in terms of living space.
As I’ve said I think that the Commander shows that none of those issues were related to the abilities of those on the shop floor to turn out the goods which at the end of the day were all just a reflection of the amount of investment that went into the product at the design,development and production stage and the ability of the end user/customer to pay for it,which of course meant that the whole operation from drawing board to finished product was mostly dependent on the amount of money provided by the group’s bankers and investors and company accountants and last but not least the end user/customer’s ability to pay for it.
While the workers at shop floor level could just produce whatever was shown on the drawings they were given to work to.Therefore as I’ve said the Commander was probably the final statement which said it all about the Leyland Group and the British manufacturing industry in general.Which went along the lines,at least at shop floor level,of -
We the willing.Led by the unknowing.Are doing the impossible for the ungrateful.We have been doing so much,with so little,for so long,that we are now qualified to do anything with nothing.For nothing.
Hi folks,
Without re-reading all the previous pages to avoid photographic repitition on this debate , heres a photo and basic details of the (in)famous Fixed Head 500 engine ,- and to fuel` further discussion.
Taken from an early 1969 Leyland Motors`s . advertisment.
Cheers, cattle wagon man.
cattle wagon man:
Hi folks,
Without re-reading all the previous pages to avoid photographic repitition on thisdebate, heres a photo and basic details of the (in)famous Fixed Head 500 engine ,- and tofuel`Taken from an early 1969 Leyland Motors`s . advertisment.
Cheers, cattle wagon man.
Carryfast:
cattle wagon man:
Hi folks,
Without re-reading all the previous pages to avoid photographic repitition on thisdebate, heres a photo and basic details of the (in)famous Fixed Head 500 engine ,- and tofuel`Taken from an early 1969 Leyland Motors`s . advertisment.
Cheers, cattle wagon man.
put it in a lorry then