They did. All the BMC fwd designs made little money
gingerfold:
Wasn’t it Ford that when the Mini was introduced in 1959 dissected one down to the last nut and bolt and concluded that BMC could never make a profit with the Mini model at the price it was on sale? Slightly off-topic I know but relevant if the BMH formation is brought into the topic.
It was on the Clarkson docu on BL they made a loss on everyone they made to start with
I remember taking a load of filters in stillages from Automotive Products in Bolton (before the factory burned down) to BMC in Cowley. It was either 1970 or 1971. It was a good and quick tip at Cowley in fact, but the fork truck driver was supervised in unloading me by a bloke with a clipboard, supposedly a “checker”, then when the fork truck went into the store there was another “checker” to make sure the filters went into the correct part of the stores. Over-manning was very apparent. I then went up to get a backload from BRS who had a panic on, so I helped them out by doing a quick load of clutches from AP at Banbury back into Cowley. I went off to the canteen whilst I was being unloaded and when I came back to the lorry (an AEC ERGO Mercury) it had been re-loaded, unasked by me, with empty stillages back to Bolton. It was the only time I ever went into Cowley, twice in one day. I believe that the haulage rates for AP / BMC work were excellent, and it was subbed from BRS. Ray Holden reckoned that it was one of the best days earnings he’d ever had, but he didn’t pay me any bonus. I did the whole lot of work in a day incidentally, but the Mercury would cruise at 70 mph, fitted with a Reliance coach diff. 
gingerfold:
Wasn’t it Ford that when the Mini was introduced in 1959 dissected one down to the last nut and bolt and concluded that BMC could never make a profit with the Mini model at the price it was on sale? Slightly off-topic I know but relevant if the BMH formation is brought into the topic.
Yes, this is “true”, at least in that it has become part of folklore. What the quoters do not say is what sort of loss it was. If it was a gross loss, IE the variable costs of building the things exceeded the factory gate price, then it is remarkable. I would hazard a guess that the gross profit simply did not cover the fixed costs and overheads, leaving a net loss- a far less serious ■■■■-up, a consequence of the risk of bringing a radical design to production. A company in this situation would stand the losses, until the demand eventually took off. Then sales volumes would rise, and the opportunity to increase the price would present itself. Considering the popularity of the Mini by the mid-1960s, it appears that that is what happened.
Hey Ramone,
What was the opinion in Belgium of ergos Eric were they better or worse than the other vehicles of the time?
[/quote]
Sorry for to be a bit outside this thead but some do so too 
.
Leyland was only very strong at buses and coaches,till they were AGAIN sidetracked by DAF.
I think helping an other marque is never good and especially Leyland gave everyone help and kept producing and selling and never develped or improved further as the licensees did it,and so threw them out.
The Ergo cab here was mostly used on middle weight rigids as 16 tonner or drawbar light weights,which was the UK gross weight of a two axle rigid we had 19 tons.
Before the vista vue was more sold for heavy work,but the Ergo sold but wasn’t a topper.For a midweight it was a nice cab as a tilt cab,not a full ( because as the drivers place was fixed) but was better as a whole fixed cab so service friendly.But at the time the Ergo cab arrived we were already in the power race and so it couldn’t measure up with the powerfull.
For Leyland there was still an other problem,mostly they were sold alone a car dealer of a BLMC product or several more.
And the back up was never that,and becoming the lorries bigger servicing most done outside. A bit like at the Transconti’s and no one want that. The good the truck is back up is the most importent thing to keep customers.
Ergo’s at AEC sold well in the midrange as AEC at that time was a bestseller. But for the big ones we had the own Bollekens cab and the Ergo wasn’t much chosen,but after the closure of Bollekens they used the Ergo but after a while AEC Antwep ceased too and were Leyland badged with the second cab model .Short after came the Marathon which helped Leyland completly down.
A bit of AEC 
, they lost ground to Volvo and Scania in the power race time ( beginning and mid '60’s) and in comfort too because Bollekens never updated too, and fleet owners went AGAIN to DAF. It was not difficult to change to a nose Scania because we were not a cabover country it only changed after the need of '40 feet’ers,where it became a bit difficult for the Sweeds and DAF gained a bit but were soon as possible dropped after the Sweeds delivered cabovers too (but the LB76 was never appreciated) only Volvo was strong. Because of the lack of power at DAF for the power racers. A weak point for AEC too was a small dealer network,and for parts you had to go to fleet owners who had a stock of parts for their own fleet and worked as parts points for AEC,and no one want to go to the competitor.
Everything here was a bit against the British 
,as a second hand country we couldn’t buy them. Not up to the gross weight and no a left ■■■■■■, no use of metric,no comfort as we wanted.But the Germans looked further,first it gave gross weight problems. But they soon came aware of it and bought 19/38 ton chassis. And only put smaller tyres on it,so selling them became easy and not a problem as they used rigids most were converted here.A work I loved to do as a young boy,you learnt much about construction work which was always useful for later,as converting artics for tipping gear,aircompressors or big fuel tanks.
Cheers Eric,
That is some very good information and insight Eric, thank you. First-hand information is always superior to second-hand conjecture.
The AEC / Bollekens cab relationship has always interested me. Can you provide any more information please?
Super post tiptop.
I found this in the CM archives:
The second(?) version of the Bollekens cab was launched within two months of the Ergo, almost as if AEC (or its customers in Belgium) were indifferent to Leyland’s development work on the Ergo. They simply ploughed on anyway.
This is a later version, with the Ergo front panel added. It looks considerably different to the 1964 version:
When was this one launched onto the market?
Hi,
We may not always blame the British. The German marque Henschel was in the same boat,kept selling and updated too late for us.
It was a counterpart of AEC but for the nose fanatics their competition was very hard in the '50’s and beginning '60’s and plummeded on the same weakness.
First direct injection was a flop at that time the Sweeds were becoming strong and more powerful. Even when they mounted Turbo’s it was not that and unreliable again.(in those days a difference of about 20 to 40 HP was a bigger point as now a difference of 100HP,because you needed every horse for pulling and speeding.
Now overloading and speeding is nipped in the bud ( because who works earns money and you only can rob working people is the norm here).A policy against the indispensable deliver object.
Back to the power race no one of the Germans could offer a good powerful enough Turbo engine MB never tryed it till the '80’s. MAN tryed it a lot of times even before Scania and offered with the same HP a turbo or non turbo high volume engine,but managed as first a good turbo engine with it’s 321 the 280 wasn’t up to date but acceptable.And so became a best seller and gained lots of old customers back afer loosing them to other marques.And it came at a good time when Volvo was suffering with it’s first F10/12’s,lucky Volvo worked oneself to death keeping their customers pleased. What is not to say about Scania NOT that I’m a Scannie hater but only speaks from my own experience.
Cheers Eric,
tiptop495:
Hey Ramone,What was the opinion in Belgium of ergos Eric were they better or worse than the other vehicles of the time?
[/quote]Sorry for to be a bit outside this thead but some do so too
Leyland was only very strong at buses and coaches,till they were AGAIN sidetracked by DAF.
I think helping an other marque is never good and especially Leyland gave everyone help and kept producing and selling and never develped or improved further as the licensees did it,and so threw them out.
The Ergo cab here was mostly used on middle weight rigids as 16 tonner or drawbar light weights,which was the UK gross weight of a two axle rigid we had 19 tons.
Before the vista vue was more sold for heavy work,but the Ergo sold but wasn’t a topper.For a midweight it was a nice cab as a tilt cab,not a full ( because as the drivers place was fixed) but was better as a whole fixed cab so service friendly.But at the time the Ergo cab arrived we were already in the power race and so it couldn’t measure up with the powerfull.
For Leyland there was still an other problem,mostly they were sold alone a car dealer of a BLMC product or several more.
And the back up was never that,and becoming the lorries bigger servicing most done outside. A bit like at the Transconti’s and no one want that. The good the truck is back up is the most importent thing to keep customers.
Ergo’s at AEC sold well in the midrange as AEC at that time was a bestseller. But for the big ones we had the own Bollekens cab and the Ergo wasn’t much chosen,but after the closure of Bollekens they used the Ergo but after a while AEC Antwep ceased too and were Leyland badged with the second cab model .Short after came the Marathon which helped Leyland completly down.A bit of AEC
Everything here was a bit against the British
Cheers Eric,
I think that confirms much of what I’ve said both on this topic and others.The question is if the metric issue was such an issue to British exports to metric countries there’s no reason that the same issue wouldn’t have acted as a protective barrier to our own industry in the case of domestic and our colonial market sales.That’s assuming we’d have kept products like the conventional cabbed Hippo design going in conjunction with development of products like the 3 GTV using the full range of US engine options.Instead of Leyland going down the blind alley of developing the ERGO and limiting itself to use of low powered in house engines.I think in that case maybe the imperial metric issue might have been overlooked anyway in those metric markets in many cases.If not it seems obvious that the Brits needed protection from foreign competition in the form of trade barriers.
tiptop495:
Hey Ramone,What was the opinion in Belgium of ergos Eric were they better or worse than the other vehicles of the time?
[/quote]Sorry for to be a bit outside this thead but some do so too
Leyland was only very strong at buses and coaches,till they were AGAIN sidetracked by DAF.
I think helping an other marque is never good and especially Leyland gave everyone help and kept producing and selling and never develped or improved further as the licensees did it,and so threw them out.
The Ergo cab here was mostly used on middle weight rigids as 16 tonner or drawbar light weights,which was the UK gross weight of a two axle rigid we had 19 tons.
Before the vista vue was more sold for heavy work,but the Ergo sold but wasn’t a topper.For a midweight it was a nice cab as a tilt cab,not a full ( because as the drivers place was fixed) but was better as a whole fixed cab so service friendly.But at the time the Ergo cab arrived we were already in the power race and so it couldn’t measure up with the powerfull.
For Leyland there was still an other problem,mostly they were sold alone a car dealer of a BLMC product or several more.
And the back up was never that,and becoming the lorries bigger servicing most done outside. A bit like at the Transconti’s and no one want that. The good the truck is back up is the most importent thing to keep customers.
Ergo’s at AEC sold well in the midrange as AEC at that time was a bestseller. But for the big ones we had the own Bollekens cab and the Ergo wasn’t much chosen,but after the closure of Bollekens they used the Ergo but after a while AEC Antwep ceased too and were Leyland badged with the second cab model .Short after came the Marathon which helped Leyland completly down.A bit of AEC
Everything here was a bit against the British
Cheers Eric,
Thanks for that Eric,you say at 1 point AEC were a top seller ,was that a top british seller, or they were selling on par with european manufacturers?
Best Ergomatic Cabbed-Lorry Model? PART 8.Page 15.TRUCKNETUK
MORRIS MINI MINOR,MORRIS 1100,BMC AND FORD.
The following is some of what the Leyland Motor Corporation were up against before and after
it had taken over British Motor Holdings - BMH/British Motor Corporation - BMC:-
BMC Profits and Losses.
1960.
Sales:£346 million.Profit:£27 million.
1967.
Sales:£467 million.Loss:£3 million.
The BMC motorcar pricing policy was wrong:According to former Ford UK finance director,John
Barber,and who later became a managing director of British Leyland,BMC should have priced
their motorcars against the competition - priced at what the market could stand.The Morris
Mini Minor,introduced in August 1959,should have been priced at least £100 more than what it was actually priced at!
The cheapest version of the Morris Mini Minor was £496,it was only £77 dearer than the Ford
Popular - it’s basic design went back to the 1930s! - and £93 cheaper than the new Ford Anglia
105E.
The Morris Mini Minor’s small,compact and front wheel drive design was a landmark design,it was a big hit in the motorcar market and became an icon of The Swinging 1960s 
,and,as other other TRUCKNETUK members have already stated,Ford stripped down a Mini,priced at £496,costed all it’s parts and concluded that BMC was losing around £30 on every Mini built! 
And,according to John Barber,even when British Leyland was running the show and had put up the price of the Mini,it still didn’t make a profit,apart from it’s spare parts!
BMC believed that the Mini had to be the cheapest in order for it to sell
With the introducton of the Morris Mini Minor,BMC was on it’s way to bankruptcy,and gave rise to the famous saying:“Mini cars make mini profits”
MORRIS 1100.
The Morris 1100 family motorcar of 1962,like the Mini,was another sophisticated design and became the market leader,but again,like the Mini,it was underpriced! This caused Ford to adjust the
price of the rival Ford Cortina motorcar,and they also investigated the finances of BMC.
The Ford Motor Company realised that BMC was going to go bankrupt! ,and the head of Ford,Sir
Patrick Hennessy,informed the chief of BMC,Sir George Harriman of it’s findings.Alas,BMC’s
prices were kept as they were
I AM NOT INTERESTED IN WHAT FORD IS DOING.
The head of BMC,George Harriman,was hapless,hopeless and ineffectual There was,and still is,an
agreement among motorcar manufactureres that each company can appraise each other’s motorcar
models.Ford offered BMC a chance to appraise the Ford Cortina.But BMC turned down the offer and informed Ford that George Harriman was not interested in what Ford was doing
To be seemingly not interested in what your competitors are doing is really asking for trouble!
You should always watch what they are doing because,if you do not,you’ll probably be left behind
Which is obviously what happened to BMC
BMC WERE CHARGED HIGHER FOR THE SAME COMPONENTS THAN THE JAGUAR GROUP.
When BMC and the Jaguar group merged to form BMH - British Motor Holdings in 1966,component
makers made frantic phone calls to Arthur Whittaker,the purchasing manager of Jaguar,imploring
him not reveal to BMC the prices Jaguar was being charged for components - the same components
were dearer for BMC!!! 
SOME BMC MOTORCARS WERE VERY NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE.
According to Donald Stokes,not much thought was given to how at least some BMC motorcars were
made,they had around three times the number of body pressings that they should have been and
were nearly impossible to make This all added to the cost of producing these motorcars of course,which no doubt cut down on profts
THE LEYLAND BMH “MERGER” - READ THIS AS LEYLAND TAKEOVER OF BMH! - WAS ANYTHING BUT A “HAPPY
MERGER”!
On Wednesday,17th January,1968,it was announced that the Leyland Motor Corporation and
British Motor Holdings were to merge and form a new corporation:British Leyland Motor
Corporation.But in reality,behind all the smiles,congratulations,accolades,etc,there had been
months of uncertainy,on-off “merger agreements”,Leyland threats to takeover BMH,threats to
cancel the whole process and so on
It was NOT a “happy merger” - In fact,it wasn’t a merger at all! After the above announcement,including the phoney “Happy Merger” statement,things got much WORSE!
The BMC side thought that they were the underdogs,and that the Government was on Leyland’s
side and wanted Donald Stokes to be the boss of British Leyland.There were further meetings -
some of which were bad tempered - between Leyland and BMH directors;there was a lot of bitterness
on the BMH side,and at least some of the BMH directors,including Joe Edwards,were jealous to death of the success of Donald Stokes and the Leyland Motor Corporation In fact,during one of these meetings,Edwards called Donald “a bloody fool” and said many BMH directors hated the sight of Donald.Edwards later said that he was prepared to work alongside Donald as an equal,but not under him
It was at this time that Leyland discovered that BMH was falling in to serious problems ,as a
result of making losses 
.Donald and his fellow Leyland directors could no longer recommend this
merger to the Leyland board at Leyland’s annual general meeting on the 20th of February.
Donald Stokes nearly backed out of the whole deal,considered making a takeover bid for BMH and then,after some talks,which continued in to the early hours of the morning, with the head of the government’s Industrial Reorganisation Corporation,Frank Kearton,head of Leyland’s merchant bank,Siegmund Warburg and the BMH financial adviser from Schroder Wagg,Michael Verey,they concluded that Harriman would have to go,if not,Leyland would make a takeover bid.
After further meetings on the 15th February and 16th February,it was decided on the Leyland
side that if Harriman didn’t resign,then the merger should be called off.
LEYLAND TAKES FULL CONTROL.
Donald Stokes and his directors were under pressure and in a race against time:It was now
Friday 16th February and they wanted a conclusion on the matter before the Leyland general and
shareholders meeting on Tuesday 20th February.Leyland went all out to get what it wanted:To
have full control of BMH.Leyland director,Jack Plane,had a masterplan:By getting rid of Harriman
it would be a Leyland takeover of BMH without costing any more money,so he had a meeting with
Sir George Harriman and the head of Jaguar,Sir William Lyons,and proceeded to play a game of
psychological warfare on Harriman! Jack used some pretty strong language and virtually told
off Harriman for the worsening figures of BMH.He advised Harriman to “get the hell out of it”,
and if the merger was to go ahead,Harriman must resign now.
Jack Plane’s blitz on Harriman worked:Harriman resigned,was given the facesaving title of Honorary President of British Leyland,and played no further part in the running of the corporation.Joe Edwards resigned and said “It’s all yours now,Donald,the bloody lot”
Donald Stokes became Chairman and Manging Director of the British Leyland Motor Corporation
Understandably,morale on the BMH side was low,which must have had a damaging effect on the
running of British Leyland.
MORRIS Motors Marque badge:The City of Oxford Ox fording the River Isis (1913):-
BMC-British Motor Corporation badge (1952):-
LEYLAND Motor Corporation Catherine Wheel badge (1963):-
JAGUAR DAMILER GUY Group (1964):-
BMH-British Motor Holdings badge (1966):-
Sir George Harriman,who was hopeless as a managing director,and Lord Donald Stokes,who was
charismatic and played a major part in making Leyland big,smile and shake hands on the
so-called “agreement” to supposedly “merge” BMH and Leyland to form British Leyland -
Harriman even objected to the British Leyland name! :-
BRITISH LEYLAND Motor Corporation Catherine Wheel badge (1968):-
BMH-BRITISH MOTOR HOLDINGS - A DISASTER AREA.
In it’s hell-bent ambition to take full control of BMH,Leyland couldn’t see the wood for
the trees:Leyland entered the disaster area of BMH ,which eventually turned the whole of
British Leyland in to a disaster ,complete with bankruptcy,death and oblivion …
Bankruptcy,death and oblivion awaited British Leyland and most of it’s parts,including
Austin,Guy,Wolseley,Riley,Thornycroft,Bristol,Daimler,AEC,Scammell and,of course,Leyland itself :-
DEATH-THE GRIM REAPER-THE ANGEL OF DEATH:-
As Donald Stokes said,Leyland ought to have waited for BMH to go bust,and then bought the
profitable parts
VALKYRIE
[zb]
anorak:
Super post tiptop.I found this in the CM archives:
The second(?) version of the Bollekens cab was launched within two months of the Ergo, almost as if AEC (or its customers in Belgium) were indifferent to Leyland’s development work on the Ergo. They simply ploughed on anyway.
This is a later version, with the Ergo front panel added. It looks considerably different to the 1964 version:
When was this one launched onto the market?
Hey Anorak, That red one was the last version and came around 1970,but still a fixed cab and little improvements, But my question had always been why was AEC Belgium never allowed to go more alone and let them developing. AEC was in Leyland hands from about '62 at that time they must have seen that it was time to give AEC a try,and they could gain a profit of it. And about a cab we had builders enough in those days.
But about me our market was too small to develop it and it was a lorry built only for Belguim. But we can think and dream for ever.
About metrics Volvo and Scania used the UNF/ Whitworth too but the valves were German made,and we were more common to Bosch, Knorr and so on. Like the French we had problems too with marques of valves and electrics. Everywhere you find Bosch servicing points.
There always was and maybe nowadays still a problem with Vanhool buses for exchange parts, because it is a marque not only a coachworks. And they used what was the cheapest, for example a frontaxle and anyone knew from where it came. So you was obliged to buy parts at them at their price,and if you lived on the other side of the country you could travel over 200km.
If you are obliged to buy all parts at the dealers than you are throwing you profit through the windows.
Cheers Eric,
The BL badge may have been called a catherine wheel but to everyone else it was a plug hole and that was the only place it was ever going.
ramone:
tiptop495:
Hey Ramone,Hey Ramone, AEC was nearly a decade the most sold and lots of fleet owners had them too. Who could touch them in those days, who had nearly 200 real pulling HP ( most had only 200 pony’s in it if…) were reliable, had a good cold start and you got value for money. Of course most of the best were a bit close in selling numbers AND we had nearly every marque what you could think.
Of course some can say lots of Lancia’s drove here too,but let’s think the nearly only purpose furniture trailer builder sold them.Thereafter
all drove Pegaso why they sold them after Lancia. But most Lancia’s got an other engine AND ofter an AEC or Leyland but Henschel’s too.
These three marques offered of course easy build in parts to fit it.Cheers Eric,
VALKYRIE:
Best Ergomatic Cabbed-Lorry Model? PART 8.Page 15.TRUCKNETUKMORRIS MINI MINOR,MORRIS 1100,BMC AND FORD.
The following is some of what the Leyland Motor Corporation were up against before and after
it had taken over British Motor Holdings - BMH/British Motor Corporation - BMC:-BMC Profits and Losses.
1960.
Sales:£346 million.Profit:£27 million.
1967.
Sales:£467 million.Loss:£3 million.The BMC motorcar pricing policy was wrong:According to former Ford UK finance director,John
Barber,and who later became a managing director of British Leyland,BMC should have priced
their motorcars against the competition - priced at what the market could stand.The Morris
Mini Minor,introduced in August 1959,should have been priced at least £100 more than what it was actually priced at!
The cheapest version of the Morris Mini Minor was £496,it was only £77 dearer than the Ford
Popular - it’s basic design went back to the 1930s!
105E.
The Morris Mini Minor’s small,compact and front wheel drive design was a landmark design,it was a big hit in the motorcar market and became an icon of The Swinging 1960s
And,according to John Barber,even when British Leyland was running the show and had put up the price of the Mini,it still didn’t make a profit,apart from it’s spare parts!
BMC believed that the Mini had to be the cheapest in order for it to sellWith the introducton of the Morris Mini Minor,BMC was on it’s way to bankruptcy,and gave rise to the famous saying:“Mini cars make mini profits”
MORRIS 1100.
The Morris 1100 family motorcar of 1962,like the Mini,was another sophisticated design and became the market leader,but again,like the Mini,it was underpriced!
price of the rival Ford Cortina motorcar,and they also investigated the finances of BMC.
The Ford Motor Company realised that BMC was going to go bankrupt!
Patrick Hennessy,informed the chief of BMC,Sir George Harriman of it’s findings.Alas,BMC’s
prices were kept as they wereI AM NOT INTERESTED IN WHAT FORD IS DOING.
The head of BMC,George Harriman,was hapless,hopeless and ineffectual
agreement among motorcar manufactureres that each company can appraise each other’s motorcar
models.Ford offered BMC a chance to appraise the Ford Cortina.But BMC turned down the offer and informed Ford that George Harriman was not interested in what Ford was doing
To be seemingly not interested in what your competitors are doing is really asking for trouble!
You should always watch what they are doing because,if you do not,you’ll probably be left behind
Which is obviously what happened to BMC
I think those who supported the idea of BMC’s change in production policy to it’s small front wheel drive models were deluded in thinking that it was a landmark design.From a driver’s and a mechanic’s point of view it was a flawed compromised idea because cars aren’t meant to steer and drive using the same wheels and accessability suffered equally.The pricing policy was actually one of trying to give buyers who knew better an incentive to buy the things both new and in the used market.It was no surprise that BMC’s customers often walked away to the nearest Ford dealership and bought a Cortina or used Zephyr/Zodiac instead unless the dealer could offer either a suicidal discount on the front wheel drive heap or even better a used Westminster with a manual box and overdrive.
Which just leaves the question of the alternative ending.What if Jaguar had convinced BMC to cancel production of all it’s front wheel drive models and turn it’s production capacity over to more Jaguar production and used the economies of scale to cut Jaguar prices even more so the Mk 2 and S type model prices could be reduced even further closer to those of the Zodiac.Or if Stokes had closed down BMC as soon as the takeover of BMH had taken place.In all cases,as I’ve said,much of Leyland Group’s problems were the result of the fateful decision of changing BMC’s policy to one of making front wheel drive products.In all cases there really wasn’t any point in trying to compete with Ford in the Cortina sector of the market anyway being that the Cortina was about as good,as the combination of price and decent rear wheel drive saloon,which the market ( rightly ) preferred,could get at the time.The fact is changing production policy from making rear wheel drive cars to front wheel cars was always going to end in tears for BMC just as it did later for Rover and the idea eventually contributed to dragging the whole Leyland Group down with it.While no surprise while BMC was busy committing commercial suicide BMW was just starting out on the road to success no surprise without a front wheel drive car even being considered as part of the plan.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Mo … ngs#Jaguar
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BMW_New_Class
Then cancel development and production of the ERGO and concentrate on development of the Crusader and AEC 3 GVT with the full range of ■■■■■■■ etc engine options in which case the small cam could have provided 300 hp + capability in the 1960’s using all the combined prduction capacity of all the Leyland Group truck plants. 
In Danmark , only left hookers ergos and special Danish models , the Beaver sleeper was a power truck , fun in Germany to pass all the flatGerman out of breath lorries ,Leyland last a long time and not as much trouble as some Scania-Vabis DS11 motors or the first Scania V8 LB/LBS 140 thatblew upp wid its gearbox ! , by mid 1970s Leyland 500 high super-comet only models selling well , many old LAD still hard at work then (many left hook sleeper), great value for Kronor worth , AEC not wanted , too high on fuel , only Volvo could be better than Leyland /Albion wid fuel , Leyland good honest truck in 1960s, no point in AEC or Scammell models in 1970s , Leyland coulds have made T45 roadtrain in place of Marathon and been great , but it was 10 years late, should have developed the old Leyland engines like DAF did and not just speed them upp ect , its funny when its claimed Scania used Leyland or AEC engines er no , In Sweden an old driver says he had a secret bak load from Germany of German V8 engines to Scania -Vabis Sodertalje so they could short -cut copy design … 
but Scania used Leyland help back in 1940s 50s .
Thank you Valkyrie for the time and effort that you have put into reasearching the Leyland Motors / BMH merger-takeover fiasco. It’s a very comprehensive post.
Whatever the merits or not of frontwheel drive cars Carryfast, in 1968 the Labour Government would never have sanctioned the closure of any large BMC factories and placing 1000’s of workers into the unemployment queue.
Best Ergomatic Cabbed-Lorry Model? PART 9.Page 15.TRUCKNETUK
Carryfast wrote:-
I think those who supported the idea of BMC’s change in production policy to it’s small front wheel drive models were deluded in thinking that it was a landmark design.From a driver’s and a mechanic’s point of view it was a flawed compromised idea because cars aren’t meant to steer and drive using the same wheels and accessability suffered equally
Gingerfold wrote:-
Thank you Valkyrie for the time and effort that you have put into reasearching the Leyland Motors / BMH merger-takeover fiasco. It’s a very comprehensive post.
Whatever the merits or not of frontwheel drive cars Carryfast, in 1968 the Labour Government would never have sanctioned the closure of any large BMC factories and placing 1000’s of workers into the unemployment queue.
VALKYRIE replies::-
THE LEGENDARY AND INFLUENTIAL MORRIS MINI MINOR MOTORCAR.
With respect,A,The Morris Mini Minor front wheel drive motorcar is generally recognized as a landmark design by automotive designers,motoring historians and writers and it’s status is legendary!
B,Furthermore,there is no law which says a motorcar,or any other type of motor vehicle,cannot be both driven and steered via the front wheels In fact most of todays motorcars are front wheel drive,and the BMC front wheel drive motorcars played a major part in the swing from conventional rear wheel drive motorcars to front wheel drive motorcars. I would say that front wheel drive has become the norm today,and rear wheel drive motorcars are in the minority.
C,I would say that front wheel drive motorcars are better roadholders,because the steering is more positive by virtue of the fact that power is transmitted to these front wheels in whatever direction that these wheels are steered. The power in a rear wheel drive motorcar travels in one direction only,giving the motorcar a tendency to travel in one direction only - on a 6x4 tractive unit it’s even more so.
D,In some respects,the engines are more accessiable in certain front wheel drive motorcars - of course transmissions and gearboxes can be hard to get at on at least some front wheel drive motorcars.But on the legendary and hugely successful Citroen Traction Avant (1934-1957),you could unbolt the engine -transmission unit from the front bulkhead to obtain great access!
BMC-BMH-BRITISH LEYLAND MOTORCAR SALES.
BMC-BMH-British Leyland produced the market leading and best selling motorcars in the United Kingdom!
The Mini was a runaway success,the BMC 1100/1300 was the nation’s best selling motorcar from 1965-1966,and 1968-1971,the Ford Cortina was the bestseller in 1967 but BMC-BMH-British Leyland stayed ahead of Ford overall until 1977. So BMC’s decision to market advanced front wheel drive motorcars was correct!
JAGUAR AND BMC.
If Donald Stokes had attempted to close down BMC,which would have been totally un-realistic,they would have been major rioting in this country,the country’s economy would have been severely damaged - and Donald would have lost his job!
Furthermore,it was not just realistic to move Jaguar down market so it could compete with Ford?! 
Huh Seriously,Carryfast,are you trying to wind me up? Jaguar was and is an up market motorcar marque - and Sir William Lyons would NEVER have allowed Jaguar to compete down market! And,as I have shown,BMC-BMH-British Leyland motorcars were best sellers
ERGOMATIC CAB,AEC 3VTG AND SCAMMELL CRUSADER.
According to the vast majority of TRUCKNETUK members who have posted on this thread,many of whom have driven Ergomatic -cabbed AEC,Leyland and Albion lorries in their careers as lorry drivers,the Ergomatic WAS a GOOD cab. But I do agree with you that a tilt-cabbed version of the Scammell Crusader ought to have been produced,and the AEC Super Mandator 3VTG also ought to have been produced
And they are the objective facts
VALKYRIE
Christ carfyfast do you not realide not everyone is a petrolhead who wants to drive a big sports saloon.
People stopped buying bmc and bl cars because they were crap and in a few cases were dog ugly.
And today its pretty much only bmw and mb that offer rwd cars