[zb]
anorak:
cargo:
Getting fixated on bore/stroke ratio is a useless exercise.
Rod length plays a huge part in engine design as does piston pin height.
From my observations, the short rod length was yet another compromise to physically fit an engine within the confines of chassis rails and the Ergo cab.
The whole dreadful tale, as related by the Gingerfold epistles, is an engineering disgrace.
The fixation does seem to have been on package size, as discussed earlier in this thread. The suggestion that some combinations of dimensions were protected by patents seems like a smokescreen to cover up that mistake. I say “seems”- without reading the patents, we can only guess.
The ‘mistake’ that’s trying to be ‘covered up’ seems to be to be a simple case,of the worst of all worlds situation,of people who should have known better,trying to transfer high revving small capacity race car engineering thinking and practice,to heavy truck design. 
Carryfast:
Leave it out.You can count the number of truly ‘respected’ V8 truck diesels on one hand and they all had a 5 inch + stroke measurement.While like the AEC and ■■■■■■■ range,the Perkins wasn’t one of them.Although having said that putting the thing in something like a 16 tonner,as opposed to a max weight artic,will obviously mask any inherent torque deficit.
The Perkins was an 8 litre engine, so 16-24 tons was its target market, in which it was successful. It was produced for many years. You said, "… it’s all about the actual stroke ‘measurement’… " Those are your words, nonsense as usual.
Continuing the sorry tale…
From here onwards Bob Fryars can only assume what Donald Stokes was thinking, as despite his seniority within the Leyland organisation Mr. Fryars was not party to any discussions between Stokes and Dr. Fogg before he went to Leyland in 1966, and when he was there no one would discuss it with him anyway. On transferring to Leyland Mr. Fryars was instructed to have nothing more to do with AEC, where he had worked boy and man. Meanwhile, back at AEC Southall, the engineering department had to take the dormant V8 engine off the shelf, dust it down, get it performing satisfactorily, and put into a walk through floor Ergomatic cab. And a nice job they did of it as well, it was a very well engineered engine into chassis installation.From his knowledge of both Stokes and Dr. Fogg Bob Fryars assumes that when Fogg told Stokes that his Leyland 700 project was dead in the water and that as a consequence the old O.400 would have to continue in production for smaller trucks then Stokes would demand that Fogg came up with a solution. Fogg would suggest turbo-charging the new 500 engine, but because of inherent suspicion of turbo-charging at Leyland Stokes would think it to be a risky policy. Fogg would then suggest using the AEC V8 as a naturally aspirated replacement for the 700. AEC V8 production could then be transferred to the new engine plant white elephant at Leyland. Stokes agreed and then instructed Southall to get on with installing it under the Ergomatic cab. When turbo-charging the 500 engine for more power showed promise Fogg would then ask Stokes what was to be done about the V8, who decided that AEC would put it into production themselves to replace the 760. Remember that the 760 was Stanley Markland’s baby, so Stokes would want to get rid of it. He also stopped all further development on the AEC 760 and 505 engines where turbo-charging trials were also looking very promising. When asked what was to be done with the useless 700 prototype Stokes was heard to say “give it to ENASA” (in Spain). When later Stokes was forced to pull the plug on the 400 hp gas-turbine project Dr. Fogg proposed turbo-charging the larger bore AEC V8-810 to 350 bhp. The development team at Southall made good progress with that, then Dr. Fogg retired, and pan-EU agreements on gross weights made the AEC 770 engine, the turbo-charged development of the 760 that had itself been shelved, was deemed ideal at 280 bhp. This became the TL12, and reluctantly Bob Fryars had to recommend this in-line engine instead of the V8. Mr. Fryars records that his recommendation almost cost him his job. Mr. Fryars concludes his article by saying that it was, and is, his belief that the AEC V8 only ever came into production as a second-string solution to the aftermath of the Leyland 700 engine shambles. It was rushed into production but Bob Fryars has always been proud of how well AEC people reacted and how they designed, and developed it, and the walkthru Ergomatic cab. He still feels that in many ways it was a far superior chassis / cab concept. Finally he states that an over-square V8 diesel was never going to be capable of meeting noise and exhaust emission regulations. On both counts diesel engine bore-stroke ratios would always have to optimise at very conventional ratios for all vehicle applications.
So ends the account of this enigmatic engine that has fascinated people for almost 50 years. Can it rest in peace now?
[zb]
anorak:
Carryfast:
Leave it out.You can count the number of truly ‘respected’ V8 truck diesels on one hand and they all had a 5 inch + stroke measurement.While like the AEC and ■■■■■■■ range,the Perkins wasn’t one of them.Although having said that putting the thing in something like a 16 tonner,as opposed to a max weight artic,will obviously mask any inherent torque deficit.
The Perkins was an 8 litre engine, so 16-24 tons was its target market, in which it was successful. It was produced for many years. You said, "… it’s all about the actual stroke ‘measurement’… " Those are your words, nonsense as usual.
The problem in this case being what inevitably and predictably happens when you try to transfer a marginal design idea, ( short stroke V8 ) ,which,as I said,might just work in a 16 tonner for obvious reasons,to a max weight artics or even 24 tonners.As for the Perkins V8 being considered as ‘successful’ or ‘respected’ not as I remember it especially in that 24 tonner sector.
While yes,as Scania’s engineers have proven with the 730,it’s all about the stroke measurement.
gingerfold:
Continuing the sorry tale…
From here onwards Bob Fryars can only assume what Donald Stokes was thinking, as despite his seniority within the Leyland organisation Mr. Fryars was not party to any discussions between Stokes and Dr. Fogg before he went to Leyland in 1966, and when he was there no one would discuss it with him anyway. On transferring to Leyland Mr. Fryars was instructed to have nothing more to do with AEC, where he had worked boy and man. Meanwhile, back at AEC Southall, the engineering department had to take the dormant V8 engine off the shelf, dust it down, get it performing satisfactorily, and put into a walk through floor Ergomatic cab. And a nice job they did of it as well, it was a very well engineered engine into chassis installation.From his knowledge of both Stokes and Dr. Fogg Bob Fryars assumes that when Fogg told Stokes that his Leyland 700 project was dead in the water and that as a consequence the old O.400 would have to continue in production for smaller trucks then Stokes would demand that Fogg came up with a solution. Fogg would suggest turbo-charging the new 500 engine, but because of inherent suspicion of turbo-charging at Leyland Stokes would think it to be a risky policy. Fogg would then suggest using the AEC V8 as a naturally aspirated replacement for the 700. AEC V8 production could then be transferred to the new engine plant white elephant at Leyland. Stokes agreed and then instructed Southall to get on with installing it under the Ergomatic cab. When turbo-charging the 500 engine for more power showed promise Fogg would then ask Stokes what was to be done about the V8, who decided that AEC would put it into production themselves to replace the 760. Remember that the 760 was Stanley Markland’s baby, so Stokes would want to get rid of it. He also stopped all further development on the AEC 760 and 505 engines where turbo-charging trials were also looking very promising. When asked what was to be done with the useless 700 prototype Stokes was heard to say “give it to ENASA” (in Spain). When later Stokes was forced to pull the plug on the 400 hp gas-turbine project Dr. Fogg proposed turbo-charging the larger bore AEC V8-810 to 350 bhp. The development team at Southall made good progress with that, then Dr. Fogg retired, and pan-EU agreements on gross weights made the AEC 770 engine, the turbo-charged development of the 760 that had itself been shelved, was deemed ideal at 280 bhp. This became the TL12, and reluctantly Bob Fryars had to recommend this in-line engine instead of the V8. Mr. Fryars records that his recommendation almost cost him his job. Mr. Fryars concludes his article by saying that it was, and is, his belief that the AEC V8 only ever came into production as a second-string solution to the aftermath of the Leyland 700 engine shambles. It was rushed into production but Bob Fryars has always been proud of how well AEC people reacted and how they designed, and developed it, and the walkthru Ergomatic cab. He still feels that in many ways it was a far superior chassis / cab concept. Finally he states that an over-square V8 diesel was never going to be capable of meeting noise and exhaust emission regulations. On both counts diesel engine bore-stroke ratios would always have to optimise at very conventional ratios for all vehicle applications.
So ends the account of this enigmatic engine that has fascinated people for almost 50 years. Can it rest in peace now?
If I’ve read it right it’s a case of ‘certain’ engineers working under Stokes thinking that ■■■■■■■■ ideas of how to make a V8 truck engine,in regards to bore and stroke measurements,were supposedly ‘optimum’. Then with hindsight realising that the short stroke V8 formula won’t work but still even then having left out one of the main reasons being lack of torque.While at the same time not realising that it’s more about the actual stroke measurement not the bore/stroke relationship.IE it’s obvious that the AEC V8 would have worked ‘if’ it had been made a square engine by increasing it’s stroke measurement to that of it’s bore,or at least ( a lot ) less over square,or even under square by transposing the measurements.All based on the fact that it would have totally changed the torque characteristics of the engine. Which suggests that the problems were in the thinking of those design engineers not Stokes who was just in overall charge of the operation.Which leaves the obvious question as to why so much scarce cash and resources were wasted on the short stroke V8 and the 500 projects.When it’s obvious that putting all those resources into developing the TL12 was the only real way forward.Ironically that flawed thinking still seems to exist amongst ‘certain’ poster/s here to date.
Evening Gentlemen, may I echo ZBs, Roberts, and no doubt many others unwritten congratulatory gratitude to gingerfold, for giving us all the chance to enjoy Bob Fryars erudite piece on “how industry actually works”. Thank you.
Stupid, inane “politicking” has never been confined to the shores of Great Britain, but in our industry, and particularly with reference to Leyland, never has it had a more devastating effect. That in the UK, the lack of effective Board restraint over senior executives “megalomania” led to the eventual devastation of the lorry, motor cycle, and car major groupings cannot be denied…some of us are old enough to remember the Dockers Gold plated Daimler…And just how much this detachment from the “real market place” led to the growth of “luddite” workforce attitudes, would be an interesting study for some bright young MBA candidate to write a paper on, and what an interesting “read” that would be!
I really must make an effort, (post Harvest), to get all my papers collected, (by fair means, and less so), into some chronological order, and perhaps get them out into the world. For there is quite a bit of history concerning many manufacturers, and none more so than the Willeme documents, concerning AEC/BMC…and perhaps what could have been a great success…Strange, but true, Leylands success with the TL12 Marathon in France, was to ex Willeme operators…over 87%
gingerfold, thank you…
I shall raise my glass of Bollinger in your direction,
(Le Tour has gone back home now),
Cheerio for now.
Saviem:
Evening Gentlemen, may I echo ZBs, Roberts, and no doubt many others unwritten congratulatory gratitude to gingerfold, for giving us all the chance to enjoy Bob Fryars erudite piece on “how industry actually works”. Thank you.
Stupid, inane “politicking” has never been confined to the shores of Great Britain, but in our industry, and particularly with reference to Leyland, never has it had a more devastating effect. That in the UK, the lack of effective Board restraint over senior executives “megalomania” led to the eventual devastation of the lorry, motor cycle, and car major groupings cannot be denied…some of us are old enough to remember the Dockers Gold plated Daimler…And just how much this detachment from the “real market place” led to the growth of “luddite” workforce attitudes, would be an interesting study for some bright young MBA candidate to write a paper on, and what an interesting “read” that would be!
Ironically in ‘this’ case I’d suggest that the problem had nothing to do with ‘senior executives’ or any so called ‘Luddites’ amongst the workforce.The blame seems to sit on the shoulders of those AEC engine designers who firstly seemed to buy into the flawed idea,as I said,of applying small capacity race car engine thinking,to heavy truck design.An idea which ironically seemed to have it’s origins amongst that so called bastion of engineering excellence the Germans and ■■■■■■■■ designers bought into the same flawed thinking.IE the clue is contained in Fryar’s own words which state that,contrary to being hostile to it,AEC’s designers obviously actually coveted the flawed short stroke V8 idea which had firstly been taken up,mistakenly,by ■■■■■■■■
In this specific case as it relates to the V8 there’s no way that you can blame Leyland’s senior management or AEC’s workforce for the mistakes of the firm’s obviously out of touch designers at the time when the project was started.While then compounding that situation by failing to inform people like Stokes that the design wouldn’t work at least so long as it remained based on that flawed concept.
While ironically Scammell’s management and designers all deserve credit for seeing the flaws in AEC’s engineering design policies by shifting much of it’s engine component supply requirements to Rolls and Detroit.While also seeing the flaws in the restrictive installation issues caused by the Ergo cab. 
Completing a summary of the entire sorry saga of the AEC V8 from its inception in 1961 to final withdrawl a decade later in 1971 I believe that these are the valid points considering both the engine itself and the company politics and policies that engulfed it: -
- The V8 came into being to provide AEC with a comprehensive range of motors to enable it to compete in the “loose engine” market which was assuming a greater importance to the company. With or without the V8 AEC actually did do well in this market.
- Once the proposed merger with BMC was finally called-off the V8 was effectively shelved, presumably because AEC decided firstly that there were shortcomings in the engine design, and secondly that it actually had no need for the engine because of its successful introduction of its in-line six 760 unit.
- Considering the proposed merger with BMC. History tells us that even if this had happened it would almost certainly still have led to the demise of AEC because AEC had no track record at all in mass production car manufacturing. It is unlikely that AEC could have turned the entire BMC group around. The only remotely successful possible outcome would have been a complete light, medium, and heavyweight commercial vehicle company without any car making divisions.
4.In the early '60s The AEC Board seemed very uncertain of the company’s own destiny and future and believed that AEC could only prosper as part of a larger grouping. The reasons for that train of thought were probably based on the Routemaster bus contract being fulfilled in the not too distant future and the effect that would have on sales. Lorry sales had grown to the point that they exceeded bus sales,and in the premium priced heavy market they were second only to Leyland in annual chassis numbers produced, but AEC was still very much entrenched in its bus making past. It would appear that once the BMC merger plans were dropped AEC pursued Leyland with little thought to the potential outcome.
- The “merger” with Leyland was the worst possible outcome. Leyland was in serious trouble long before it became embroiled with BMC in 1968. A series of bad management decisions compounded mistake after mistake. A dominant personality such as Donald Stokes can be a force for great good within an organisation, but they can also be an unmitigated disaster if they are promoted beyond their capability. Sadly, Donald Stokes was from the second category.
gingerfold:
Completing a summary of the entire sorry saga of the AEC V8 from its inception in 1961 to final withdrawl a decade later in 1971 I believe that these are the valid points considering both the engine itself and the company politics and policies that engulfed it: -
- The V8 came into being to provide AEC with a comprehensive range of motors to enable it to compete in the “loose engine” market which was assuming a greater importance to the company. With or without the V8 AEC actually did do well in this market.
- Once the proposed merger with BMC was finally called-off the V8 was effectively shelved, presumably because AEC decided firstly that there were shortcomings in the engine design, and secondly that it actually had no need for the engine because of its successful introduction of its in-line six 760 unit.
- Considering the proposed merger with BMC. History tells us that even if this had happened it would almost certainly still have led to the demise of AEC because AEC had no track record at all in mass production car manufacturing. It is unlikely that AEC could have turned the entire BMC group around. The only remotely successful possible outcome would have been a complete light, medium, and heavyweight commercial vehicle company without any car making divisions.
4.In the early '60s The AEC Board seemed very uncertain of the company’s own destiny and future and believed that AEC could only prosper as part of a larger grouping. The reasons for that train of thought were probably based on the Routemaster bus contract being fulfilled in the not too distant future and the effect that would have on sales. Lorry sales had grown to the point that they exceeded bus sales,and in the premium priced heavy market they were second only to Leyland in annual chassis numbers produced, but AEC was still very much entrenched in its bus making past. It would appear that once the BMC merger plans were dropped AEC pursued Leyland with little thought to the potential outcome.
- The “merger” with Leyland was the worst possible outcome. Leyland was in serious trouble long before it became embroiled with BMC in 1968. A series of bad management decisions compounded mistake after mistake. A dominant personality such as Donald Stokes can be a force for great good within an organisation, but they can also be an unmitigated disaster if they are promoted beyond their capability. Sadly, Donald Stokes was from the second category.
Regardless of the arguable issues contained in 5 the fact is in ‘this’ specific case it was all about the issues contained in 2 together with the question of when it was shelved why didn’t it stay shelved.At least unless it could have been re designed with similar stroke measurements of the Unic or Scania V8’s.
As for 5 any truck manufacturing firm is only as good as the products it’s designers can give it’s management and workforce to make.Leyland’s/AEC’s problems were simply a combination of some dodgy decision making on the part of supposedly highly ‘qualified’ design engineers,:roll: together with the even larger one of lack of cash.The latter of those problems affecting all of British industry at the time not just Leyland. 
It really is unfair to keep using a dead man,who can’t defend himself,as a scapegoat for all that.
The facts speak for themselves. Donald Stokes was the man in charge. Granted he had to deal with many factors outside his control, such as pressures applied by the Government of the day when BMC was forced on to Leyland, but ultimately he carries the can, and he directed company policy well before 1968, which was the period when wrong decisions were made.
gingerfold:
The facts speak for themselves. Donald Stokes was the man in charge. Granted he had to deal with many factors outside his control, such as pressures applied by the Government of the day when BMC was forced on to Leyland, but ultimately he carries the can, and he directed company policy well before 1968, which was the period when wrong decisions were made.
The ‘wrong decisions’ in question being those made by the thing’s designers not Stokes as proved beyond doubt within the article.IE let’s build a V8 truck engine based on ■■■■■■■■ erroneous thinking.Instead of that chosen by Scania amongst a few other successful examples. Then to add insult to injury,instead of ditching the project,when the dyno confirmed what the designers should have known from the start,they decided to resurrect the thing later after ( rightly ) shelving it.
While given the type of resources,in terms of investment cash,available to our European and Scandinavian competitors I’m sure that things would probably have turned out very differently.
The fact is it doesn’t matter who,or how good,the top management is there’s no way that they can make something work when those who are paid to do the designing aren’t doing their job properly.Let alone when the firm’s bankers aren’t onside to provide the required amounts of cash,either.From my point of view if I’d have been Stokes I’d have walked away from the whole thing and left it all to someone else to sort out.In which case you can bet that AEC and most,if not all,of the Leyland Group wouldn’t have even lasted into the 1970’s.Which is the only question I’ve got concerning his thinking.
IE the two ‘issues’ in this case being firstly/mostly the decision made by the engine’s designers as to the basic dimensions of it’s stroke measurement compounded by a lack of cash to provide the designers with more flexibility in terms of development and manufacturing budgets.Neither of which had anything whatsoever to do with Stokes.
It’s very apparent that you have no knowlege or experience of how management at a large company functions. The Chief Executive, or MD, or whatever title the top manager has makes the decisions which are then rubber stamped by the Board of Directors. That Chief Executive makes all the policy decisions. That Chief Executive approves all departmental spending budgets, whether it is for Sales and Marketing, Product Development and Reserarch, and so on. So for you to state that Donald Stokes had no say in reserach budgets and expenditure is utter nonsense.
I might add that I actually met Lord Stokes, in his retirement, and as he then was, to discuss the possibility of him collaborating with a book about British Leyland. He was very pleasant and charming and obviously a born salesman, which was how he made his career at Leyland Motors. I have no personal animosity towards him or his memory whatsover and I do happen to believe that he was handed a poisoned chalice when he took the top job at British Leyland. The book idea was a non-starter because Lord Stokes would not discuss in any great detail the last years of his tenure there. He was the wrong appointee to the top job at Leyland, I stand by my comment.
gingerfold:
It’s very apparent that you have no knowlege or experience of how management at a large company functions. The Chief Executive, or MD, or whatever title the top manager has makes the decisions which are then rubber stamped by the Board of Directors. That Chief Executive makes all the policy decisions. That Chief Executive approves all departmental spending budgets, whether it is for Sales and Marketing, Product Development and Reserarch, and so on. So for you to state that Donald Stokes had no say in reserach budgets and expenditure is utter nonsense.
I might add that I actually met Lord Stokes, in his retirement, and as he then was, to discuss the possibility of him collaborating with a book about British Leyland. He was very pleasant and charming and obviously a born salesman, which was how he made his career at Leyland Motors. I have no personal animosity towards him or his memory whatsover and I do happen to believe that he was handed a poisoned chalice when he took the top job at British Leyland.Lord Stokes would not discuss in any great detail the last years of his tenure there. He was the wrong appointee to the top job at Leyland,
Firstly my point is that there’s no way that Stokes could have ‘approved’ development and manufacturing budgets,which exceeded the relatively low amounts,which UK investment institutions were willing to provide and/or that didn’t reflect the level of return being called for on the meagre amounts of investment that was provided.As opposed to our Euro and Scandinavian competitors who were obviously working under a far more industry friendly investment regime.Which was the real problem being that there was obviously no incentive for Stokes to starve his own charge of the cash needed and in question.IE the cash crisis facing all of UK industry was a failing of the banking and investment sector not the unfortunate managers who were faced with having to compete against the might of the Germans and Scandinavians with one arm tied behind their back.
While the arguable statement made in your final sentence seems to contradict the statement that as you ( rightly ) say Stokes was handed a poisoned chalice in which some might say he did far better than could have been expected.Remembering that Scammell was also part of the same empire run by the same overall management and seemed to be able to do a far better job of getting by with the limited resources at it’s disposal,than it’s neighbour and Leyland Group partner down the road at AEC obviously did.Which obviously included the type of design engineer know how which led to the choice of using outside engine suppliers rather than rely on AEC’s obviously flawed and/or under developed offerings.IE the AEC V8 certainly doesn’t seem to have been an example of Stokes’ choice of having forced the design and use of such a flawed idea on the Leyland Group.While the evidence shows beyond doubt that the thing was a costly retrograde step erroneously designed and put into production by AEC’s own engineering designers and management with predictable results.With the added issue of obviously having used up much needed development and production budgets that could/should have been used to develop AEC’s 6 cylinder production in the form of the TL12.
As for Stokes the way I see it is that he seems to have been a good guvnor of the old school who left people to get on with their own jobs and trusted them to do them to the best of their expected level of ability.
While he got on with doing everything he could to keep a foundering ship afloat financially.Against all the odds of an unsympathetic UK banking and investment sector who took the meaning of ‘unsympathetic’ in this case to effectively treasonous levels in working against the interests of the country.
While ‘best of their ability’ in this case doesn’t mean designing a V8 truck engine,designed for the max weight truck sector,with a less than 5 inch stroke measurement.
More fascinating facts Graham , are these taken from the “Gazette” i think i must have lapsed my subscription i haven`t recieved the last issue? Do you have any information on what was going on between AEC and Scania mentioned in the first part of this excellent post?
Carryfast I’m not continuing this argument with you as it is pointless. You are so out of touch with reality from the drivel you write that it is frightening. All I will add, yes for once you are correct, Donald Stokes was a manager of the old school, but not as you infer. He was an autocrat who ordered his subordinates to do exactly what he said, or they were removed form their jobs, and that was very, very obvious from my meeting with him. Charming but ruthless and most definitely not a man to cross or get on the wrong side of.
As for Scammell, they were an important but relatively minor player in the overall British Leyland picture. a specialised producer whose annual chassis production numbers were the least of all the group truck marques.
ramone:
More fascinating facts Graham , are these taken from the “Gazette” i think i must have lapsed my subscription i haven`t recieved the last issue? Do you have any information on what was going on between AEC and Scania mentioned in the first part of this excellent post?
No, it is from Robert Harris’s AEC Gazette. As for AEC / Scania, it is just a passing reference.
gingerfold:
… Donald Stokes was a manager of the old school… He was an autocrat who ordered his subordinates to do exactly what he said, or they were removed form their jobs, and that was very, very obvious from my meeting with him. Charming but ruthless and most definitely not a man to cross or get on the wrong side of…
Nowt wrong with autocrats running things- they get things done but, if they do not understand what their subordinates are doing, they will be at risk of telling them to do the wrong thing. In Leyland’s case, it was an engineering company working in a time of rapid technological progress- the output of its design office was vital to its future. The last thing it needed was a man with a record of making profitable short-term decisions distributing the carrots and sticks. In the period your recent posts describe, Stokes had his engineers flitting from one project to the next, not giving them the chance to get any of them right, or learn anything from the bad test results. A design engineer would have viewed the failures of the 700 cu in prototypes as an opportunity to develop the knowledge needed to create the next generation of successful products. Another year of persistence with that project might have eventually given Leyland the tools to design a reliable 500 cu in engine.
Never put a salesman in charge.
gingerfold:
Carryfast I’m not continuing this argument with you as it is pointless. You are so out of touch with reality from the drivel you write that it is frightening. All I will add, yes for once you are correct, Donald Stokes was a manager of the old school, but not as you infer. He was an autocrat who ordered his subordinates to do exactly what he said, or they were removed form their jobs, and that was very, very obvious from my meeting with him. Charming but ruthless and most definitely not a man to cross or get on the wrong side of.
As for Scammell, they were an important but relatively minor player in the overall British Leyland picture. a specialised producer whose annual chassis production numbers were the least of all the group truck marques.
It’s up to you as to wether you wish to justify your views by continuing to provide some decent reasoning for them or not.Assuming the latter that can only mean that you’re jumping to conclusions with no real basis for them.
The fact is in this case,as regards to the topic at least,it’s obvious that Stokes wasn’t the person who was responsible for getting the basic architecture of the AEC V8 wrong from the start in terms of it’s stroke measurement.The blame for that sits solely with it’s designers and their immediate management.Bearing in mind that the link between an engine’s torque characteristics and stroke measurement would have been known from shop floor level to upper engineering design management.
As for Scammell the issue isn’t one of it’s placing within the group in terms of volumes.It’s all about basic engineering practice and choices and the obvious fact that those ‘choices’ were often different in the case of Scammell as opposed to AEC.Which,whatever the excuses provided concerning Stokes’ supposed one size fits all autocratic style of management,the inconvenient facts in the case of Scammell show the opposite was the case.IE the idea of using outside supplies of turbocharged 6 cylinder engines from Rolls doesn’t seem to fit the description of a management ‘forced’ into using under developed naturally aspirated engines by a regime led by an autocrat under threat of their jobs.
Let alone walking away from the obvious flaws contained in the design of the AEC V8 and finding an alternative supplier and staying well out of the Ergo project.Knowing Scammell’s ideas the only compromise in that case being the use of the naturally aspirated 8V71 instead of the turbocharged version let alone offering the Cat 3408 as an option in the Crusader.Those issues being all about the combination of lack of development and production cash and customer resistance to big power trucks in the domestic market.Those issues having nothing whatsoever to do with Stokes.
^^^FFS. Near-perfect stupidity.^^^
[zb]
anorak:
^^^FFS. Near-perfect stupidity.^^^
I’d suggest that description fits perfectly in the case of anyone who thinks that a short stroke V8 will work in the heavy truck application.