Just a couple of points of additional clarifications and thoughts:
where I do not agree with Carryfast is on the initial financial ability to develop the engines in question (I’m referring to Leyland here - I do not know that much about AEC, never a brand sold in any numbers in Israel). I believe the money was there during the 1950s, the workforce among the best and the engineering department was on par with the competition. As for the motive power, there were three different engine families:
the 350/375/400;
the 600/680; and the
All of the above had potential for development over a period spanning 20 years, in the same way ■■■■■■■ did with the NHB series which started having 150 hp and ended with 325 supercharged hp in the late 1950s from 743 c.i. (12.2 L). The Leyland engine families were newer designs and Leyland knew about turbocharging and indeed fitted a turbo to the 900 to provide 275 hp in the late 50s early 60s (that, not the 600/680 should have been Leyland’s big bruiser with something like 450 hp in 1973, again judging from what ■■■■■■■ did with the 855). This was only used on BR railcars but proper development should have seen it applied in lorries. However it seems that - as of on or about 1960 - 1962 when the 680 Superplus was released (which, with 200 hp was still competitive - just) - all development stopped, as a matter of fact there was only the half-hearted 690 (as it was called in Israel) in the early 1970s which was a turboed 680 with 250 advertised hp, not a particularly reliable unit. By that time of course it was too late. So something happened to make Leyland sit on its hands and - thinking about it further - the insane take-over obsession also must have had to do with it. However, the mind frame that allowed those delusions of grandeur started before the Standard-Triumph take over. Once that was completed it was more difficult for Stokes to resist stretching the empire too thin and/or succumbing to government pressure to amalgamate brands which were natural competitors, not affiliates. This to me a management failure. Compound that with the general arrogance with respect to the foreign markets mentioned earlier and you had the perfect storm. By 1970 it was really very late.
Leyland Ash:
Just a couple of points of additional clarifications and thoughts:
where I do not agree with Carryfast is on the initial financial ability to develop the engines in question (I’m referring to Leyland here - I do not know that much about AEC, never a brand sold in any numbers in Israel). I believe the money was there during the 1950s, the workforce among the best and the engineering department was on par with the competition. As for the motive power, there were three different engine families:
the 350/375/400;
the 600/680; and the
All of the above had potential for development over a period spanning 20 years, in the same way ■■■■■■■ did with the NHB series which started having 150 hp and ended with 325 supercharged hp in the late 1950s from 743 c.i. (12.2 L). The Leyland engine families were newer designs and Leyland knew about turbocharging and indeed fitted a turbo to the 900 to provide 275 hp in the late 50s early 60s (that, not the 600/680 should have been Leyland’s big bruiser with something like 450 hp in 1973, again judging from what ■■■■■■■ did with the 855). This was only used on BR railcars but proper development should have seen it applied in lorries. However it seems that - as of on or about 1960 - 1962 when the 680 Superplus was released (which, with 200 hp was still competitive - just) - all development stopped, as a matter of fact there was only the half-hearted 690 (as it was called in Israel) in the early 1970s which was a turboed 680 with 250 advertised hp, not a particularly reliable unit. By that time of course it was too late. So something happened to make Leyland sit on its hands and - thinking about it further - the insane take-over obsession also must have had to do with it. However, the mind frame that allowed those delusions of grandeur started before the Standard-Triumph take over. Once that was completed it was more difficult for Stokes to resist stretching the empire too thin and/or succumbing to government pressure to amalgamate brands which were natural competitors, not affiliates. This to me a management failure. Compound that with the general arrogance with respect to the foreign markets mentioned earlier and you had the perfect storm. By 1970 it was really very late.
Cheers
L
In regards to the question of outputs it seems obvious that ■■■■■■■■ designs were able to accept being pushed further than Leyland’s in regards to their tolerance of boost at the equivalent times in question.Which is why the Dutch development of the 680 seemed to involve a lot of development the original design all of which took time and obviously money.It’s also obvious that assuming that Leyland didin’t have the resources to develop the 680 to the required levels then the 900 would have been an even bigger problem.Although I’d agree that at least trying would probably have been a lot more worthwhile than spending money on the 500 and AEC V8 projects.However as we’ve seen the fixed head idea had a larger capacity 700 ci version competing for development funds with the smaller capacity 500 and no surprise it was the smaller and obviously cheaper version which won out.However as we’ve seen even ‘if’ Leyland had managed to develop engines with the required outputs it then would have been lumbered,at great cost assuming the money was there,with some reasonably powerful engines for the time but which it couldn’t sell in the domestic market in the numbers required.
As for the arguable financial position of Leyland there’s no reason to think that it was in any better shape than uk ltd/plc as a whole at the time.What might have been seen from outside as a takeover obsession was actually a desperate fight for economic survival based on the possibly flawed idea that there was security in grouping togther rather than letting nature take it’s course.Arguably though the idea of Leyland Group as opposed to leaving all the different firms that made it up as seperate entities was probably a good one and more of those firms would have sunk sooner than they eventually did.
The sad fact is that realistically America was where most of the post war money was and the rate of development of it’s products refelected that fact and that’s where all the British truck manufacturers needed to be looking for their componentry to stand the slightest chance of remaining competitive.Which still would have left those arguable financial issues and that glaring inconsistency between what the domestic market was demanding as opposed to what the export markets were looking for at the time when it mattered.By 1970 the British truck manufacturers already knew that the writing was on the wall owing to the issues of finance and/or the mis match between the demands of it’s domestic customers’ as opposed to it’s export ones.
Obviously many factors were in play, but I think the managers of engineering department must carry the majority of blame.
All engines on offer were old and to extract more power from any of them, they required strengthening.
Someone will correct me if I’m wrong but with the 600 grew the 680 and then the power plus 680 and then what we called the 690.(turbo 680)
In the 400 range I believe it started life as a 375 which then became the 400 then the 401 and again with a turbo, the 410.
I won’t start on the AEC range as my encounter with these was very short.
In all cases turbo charging was a real afterthought without air charge after cooling and only a token of engine upgrading, piston head oil squirters, larger intake valves and so on.
This must have been when management faced the decision to strengthen existing engines OR to go with their thought bubble the “headless wonder”.
History shows which way they went in the process getting completely lost meanwhile other designers looked to better cylinder head sealing, block strengthening etc.
A look at something like the Detroit DD15 shows an engine with massive block ribbing, excellent cylinder head sealing and so forth but it’s still basically a “conventional” engine, no need to go headless to handle the combustion pressures.
If a design team heads off in the wrong direction, customers will leave faster than you can say, “What went wrong”?
cargo:
Obviously many factors were in play, but I think the managers of engineering department must carry the majority of blame.
All engines on offer were old and to extract more power from any of them, they required strengthening.
Someone will correct me if I’m wrong but with the 600 grew the 680 and then the power plus 680 and then what we called the 690.(turbo 680)
In the 400 range I believe it started life as a 375 which then became the 400 then the 401 and again with a turbo, the 410.
I won’t start on the AEC range as my encounter with these was very short.
In all cases turbo charging was a real afterthought without air charge after cooling and only a token of engine upgrading, piston head oil squirters, larger intake valves and so on.
This must have been when management faced the decision to strengthen existing engines OR to go with their thought bubble the “headless wonder”.
History shows which way they went in the process getting completely lost meanwhile other designers looked to better cylinder head sealing, block strengthening etc.
A look at something like the Detroit DD15 shows an engine with massive block ribbing, excellent cylinder head sealing and so forth but it’s still basically a “conventional” engine, no need to go headless to handle the combustion pressures.
If a design team heads off in the wrong direction, customers will leave faster than you can say, “What went wrong”?
The issue of the fixed head failure could arguably have been more about the capacity chosen for it than that of any basic flaw in the idea itself at least for the time.In those early years of turbocharged engines it was mostly all about which previously naturally aspirated engine could realistically accept the most boost as a retro fit turbo installation to get the required compromise between development budgets and outputs while keeping stress levels within tolerable limits for the levels of engine and gasket design as they stood at the time.The idea of the fixed head engine would obviously seem attractive from those points of view.While the idea of doing whatever it takes to make a retro fit forced induction engine from a previously naturally aspirated design would obviously be the chosen option where development budget constraints didn’t apply so much.It’s no surprise in that case that the 14 Litre ■■■■■■■ and the DAF development of the 680 proved to be superior to everything which Leyland had in it’s arsenal.
While that DD15 wouldn’t have even got onto the drawing board if it hadn’t have been for the versatility and abilities of the old two stroke 71 and 92 series engines at the time in question keeping Detroit in the game being that the normal specific output/stress equation doesn’t apply in the same way with two strokes compared with four stroke motors because they share those stresses across twice as many power strokes.
As we’ve seen Leyland were able to provide 300 hp + ■■■■■■■ and Detroit options at the time in question without any need to bother with development budgets and development.The problem in that case being that they couldn’t have sold them in the domestic market when they’d done it anyway.
I think you’ll find the DD15 owes its design pedigree more to MTU’s input than the old screamers.
MTU have been squeezing massive HP from relatively small capacities for ages, reliability being the main issue.
This would seem to be resolved in the DD15.
cargo:
I think you’ll find the DD15 owes its design pedigree more to MTU’s input than the old screamers.
MTU have been squeezing massive HP from relatively small capacities for ages, reliability being the main issue.
This would seem to be resolved in the DD15.
I didn’t mean that there was any connection between the engines only that at the time in question referred to by Ash it was the two strokes which Detroit was ( rightly ) relying on to make it’s reputation in most of Leyland’s previous export markets.
Certainly here in Aus once the screamers scored a turbo, they became a great bus engine and there’s many in the Greyhound fleet still plying our roads. (silver series)
Jake brake, heaps of power, tandem drive older coaches in their fleet so they get the rough country routes.
The chassis as such was no longer a single organisation supply, it became a selection of proven axles, suspension, gearboxes and power plants which I think is an excellent outcome instead of the usual method where the lowest cost tender won the day.
cargo:
it became a selection of proven axles, suspension, gearboxes and power plants which I think is an excellent outcome instead of the usual method where the lowest cost tender won the day.
^ This.
In this case the logical conclusion of that natural selection process was that use of American componentry was obviously the best/only realistic way to go for the uk truck manufacturers.However as I’ve said that left the problem of numbers and resulting economies of scale in the sense of the domestic market which was still demanding trucks built using what was still effectively 1950’s/early 60’s componentry standards and output levels.In which case that left the US manufacturers able to just walk into those old etablished markets which the British manufacturers could no longer economically supply.
As for Detroits used in buses I think that was a case of the bus operators ( and fire truck manufacturers and customers ) having seen how they made heavy trucks go and deciding that the same motor could only make a relatively lighter bus,or fire truck,fly.
Some evidence of terrible decisions in the car side of Leyland:
They persevered with the outdated home-built product, while the Italian licensee was forging ahead with improvements, culminating in a completely new vehicle: engine and body. They took the Italian firm over- great business, now it’s just a case of putting another set of tools into Longbridge, to produce the Italian car, and everyone’s a winner. Not in British Leyland- force the Italians to use the outdated British engine, then close their firm down altogether, while persevering with the original, now even more behind-the-times Mini.
[zb]
anorak:
Some evidence of terrible decisions in the car side of Leyland: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jj5pqGuEqzM&t=161s
They persevered with the outdated home-built product, while the Italian licensee was forging ahead with improvements, culminating in a completely new vehicle: engine and body. They took the Italian firm over- great business, now it’s just a case of putting another set of tools into Longbridge, to produce the Italian car, and everyone’s a winner. Not in British Leyland- force the Italians to use the outdated British engine, then close their firm down altogether, while persevering with the original, now even more behind-the-times Mini.
If you really must have only 4 cylinders and all the complication of OHC multi valve aggro and aren’t totally poverty stricken go for a Dolomite Sprint.
But no I’ve never subscribed to the let’s trash the whole Brit motor industry and its products just because Issigonis was out of his depth overrated and should have been give his P45 before he did irreparable damage to the firm.
[zb]
anorak:
Some evidence of terrible decisions in the car side of Leyland: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jj5pqGuEqzM&t=161s
They persevered with the outdated home-built product, while the Italian licensee was forging ahead with improvements, culminating in a completely new vehicle: engine and body. They took the Italian firm over- great business, now it’s just a case of putting another set of tools into Longbridge, to produce the Italian car, and everyone’s a winner. Not in British Leyland- force the Italians to use the outdated British engine, then close their firm down altogether, while persevering with the original, now even more behind-the-times Mini.
What was the new engine Innocenti used? I always thought it was the classic A series. They did improve the Mini Cooper though. Their version was much better than the UK model.
OK, I can answer my own question (having now actually looked at the video…Doh!). So it was not an Innocenti engine-I was pretty certain none existed but one manufactured by the little known Welsh manufacturer Dai Harsu. It stll failed to take off though. Italy is Italy and the DeTomaso company had little hope of dislodging Fiat.
There is some discussion of the Leyland/DAF takeover on the engine thread which, I think, is better-suited to this thread.
What went wrong at DAF? they had taken Leyland over in 1987, the year of the launch of the 95 series, then embarked upon their 85 series project, which bankrupted the firm. Why did they not simply update the Leyland T45, to give them a competitive middle-ranking heavy lorry? I know they gave the cab a new front panel, but a more comprehensive reworking would have put off the need to do a completely new vehicle- you would have thought- until maybe 2000.
[zb]
anorak:
There is some discussion of the Leyland/DAF takeover on the engine thread which, I think, is better-suited to this thread.
What went wrong at DAF? they had taken Leyland over in 1987, the year of the launch of the 95 series, then embarked upon their 85 series project, which bankrupted the firm. Why did they not simply update the Leyland T45, to give them a competitive middle-ranking heavy lorry? I know they gave the cab a new front panel, but a more comprehensive reworking would have put off the need to do a completely new vehicle- you would have thought- until maybe 2000.
Take a look a the 7.5 ton upward cabs on the Daf rigids not the CF don’t you think they have a striking resemblence to the smaller T45 cabs
[zb]
anorak:
There is some discussion of the Leyland/DAF takeover on the engine thread which, I think, is better-suited to this thread.
What went wrong at DAF? they had taken Leyland over in 1987, the year of the launch of the 95 series, then embarked upon their 85 series project, which bankrupted the firm. Why did they not simply update the Leyland T45, to give them a competitive middle-ranking heavy lorry? I know they gave the cab a new front panel, but a more comprehensive reworking would have put off the need to do a completely new vehicle- you would have thought- until maybe 2000.
Take a look a the 7.5 ton upward cabs on the Daf rigids not the CF don’t you think they have a striking resemblence to the smaller T45 cabs
The Roadrunner had a different cab to the T45, although it used the same doors. The Roadrunner cab was used by DAF before the merger. I get the feeling that they made a better job of it, because DAF was happy to use it until the current LF came along.
Edit- it’s not hard to believe that the Roadrunner cab (C44) was a better job than the T45 one (C40). When Leyland did the C40, they had not put a new cab design into production since the Ergo in 1964. They knew what they were doing by 1980, so the 1984-launched C44 was the work of experts. Using the same logic, DAF had not done a cab since the F241 (2800) in 1973. The 1987 Cabtec one (95 Series, Troner) looked like it was more Pegaso than DAF. Why they didn’t get Leyland to develop the 85 series cab is a mystery- maybe something to do with the conditions of the merger/takeover. DAF was still Dutch-owned at the time- maybe the plan was to run Leyland down to nothing and bring all the work to Eindhoven?
[zb]
anorak:
There is some discussion of the Leyland/DAF takeover on the engine thread which, I think, is better-suited to this thread.
What went wrong at DAF? they had taken Leyland over in 1987, the year of the launch of the 95 series, then embarked upon their 85 series project, which bankrupted the firm. Why did they not simply update the Leyland T45, to give them a competitive middle-ranking heavy lorry? I know they gave the cab a new front panel, but a more comprehensive reworking would have put off the need to do a completely new vehicle- you would have thought- until maybe 2000.
Take a look a the 7.5 ton upward cabs on the Daf rigids not the CF don’t you think they have a striking resemblence to the smaller T45 cabs
The Roadrunner had a different cab to the T45, although it used the same doors. The Roadrunner cab was used by DAF before the merger. I get the feeling that they made a better job of it, because DAF was happy to use it until the current LF came along.
Edit- it’s not hard to believe that the Roadrunner cab (C44) was a better job than the T45 one (C40). When Leyland did the C40, they had not put a new cab design into production since the Ergo in 1964. They knew what they were doing by 1980, so the 1984-launched C44 was the work of experts. Using the same logic, DAF had not done a cab since the F241 (2800) in 1973. The 1987 Cabtec one (95 Series, Troner) looked like it was more Pegaso than DAF. Why they didn’t get Leyland to develop the 85 series cab is a mystery- maybe something to do with the conditions of the merger/takeover. DAF was still Dutch-owned at the time- maybe the plan was to run Leyland down to nothing and bring all the work to Eindhoven?
What im saying is dont you think the original Cruiser/ Freighter cab has more than a passing resemblence to the Daf 18 tonner cab ,
ramone:
What im saying is dont you think the original Cruiser/ Freighter cab has more than a passing resemblence to the Daf 18 tonner cab ,
Yes. The shape of the DAF/Volvo/Renault cab is similar to the narrow C40. I still think the C40 is a better-looking shed. I reckon that, if Paccar had taken over in 1987, the Leyland cabs would have been kept on much longer, possibly finding their way onto European-market DAFs. Paccar seems very averse to change for the sake of it- look at the old DAF XF cab- still in production, after 33 years!
I’ve got a great deal of respect for Paccar- they get things right, to the extent that they are holding onto their share of the US market, despite Mercedes and Volvo hoovering up all of the competing brands. Does anyone on here work at Leyland now? What is it like working there?
