Solly:
[zb]
anorak:Carryfast:
it was the domestic customer base that was a large contributor to the downfall of the British truck manufacturing industry.No it wasn’t.
L. GARDNER AND SONS LIMITED: THE HISTORY OF A BRITISH INDUSTRIAL FIRM. A STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MARKETS,
WORKPLACE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, AND MANUFACTURING ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY, 1955 — 1986Analysed from the perspective of markets and workplace industrial relations, it was found that the Gardner family managers coped reasonably well with most of the macroenvironmental shifts that occurred between 1955 and 1975. However, two serious errors were made: the first, which caused a short-term loss of revenue and a long-term loss of market leadership, was a result of negligence, the second stemmed from an outdated authoritarian approach to industrial relations that resulted in intense discord in the workplace, alleviated only after the management was replaced by a more astute and enlightened regime.
A third error occurred after Gardner was sold to Hawker Siddeley, a large British industrial group, in 1977. Based on a perception that Gardner’s plant was outdated, the new owners invested in expensive computer controlled manufacturing systems, and increased the volume of subcontracted components, strategies that caused disruptions to production schedules, eroded quality standards, and failed to improve output. As a result, Gardner’s superlative reputation for reliability and service became tarnished and its market share plummeted. In 1986, when mounting trading losses became unacceptable, the firm was sold-on to a competitor and production effectively
ceased.
This thesis asserts that, as a family firm, Gardner traded profitably and provided incomes for thousands of employees for more than a century. Moreover, the sale to Hawker Siddeley conferred wealth on the family shareholders and financial security on their descendents. Gardner was not therefore, a failure either between 1898 and 1955, or before 1978.Sorry CF, but the history books do not support your assertion that it was the “Customers” that contributed to the downfall of L Gardner & Sons.
I think the actual failure date of 1978 is about right although the seeds were planted long before that and there’s not much point in having all the gear and no idea.CNC machinery is used to date up to the levels of F1 engineering so there’s no way that anyone could possibly say that CNC lathes or mills etc would turn out sub standard components compared to manually controlled ones and the same applies in regards to the British sub contract engineering base which has always been some of the best in the world which is how our aircraft industry beat the Germans in WW2.
I think it was more the fact that those machines and subbies were still employed on turning out Gardner 240/265 engines in the late 1970’s/early 1980’s because that was what the British customer base was still stuck in the mindset of using. 
In a world where things like the DAF 2800/3300/Volvo F10/12/Mercs and 6 and 8 cylinder Scanias were already roaming the rest of the continent and scandinavia in large numbers and just waiting to take over here as soon as the British customers got their act together and caught up with the thinking of the engineers,as opposed to the British truck buyers/operators.It’s that bit that doesn’t seem to have been factored into that report.
