Evening all,well Gentlemen we seem to be going a long way around the âWrekinâ, (big old Shropshire Volcanic hill),in considering Gardner Engines. Everyone is entitled to their views, and the delight, to me, of these sites are the great diversity of views and experiences of all contributors, whether I agree, or disagree with them.
Any consideration of Gardners , (or any other), products must be of rights, be compared with the market situation for âloose engineâ providers at that specific time. Likewise the weight of legislation that controlled the specification of products at that time, and dictated the âidealâ specification of any vehicle produced, to maximise its saleability. Too often, yesterdays ideal, ânewâ specification, is derided as being ârubbishâ, when purchased secondhand and given to a hapless driver to do a days work alongside vehicles perhaps 5or more years younger! It is not ârubbishâ, its just old and tired, and probably all the operator could viably afford!(As an illustration may I refer you to the thread on âold vehicles still workingâ, I expect some of those modern old vehicles are, in comparative terms, as bad, if not worse than a 70s ERF A Series , in the 80s).
There have been harsh words about Hugh Gardner, but on what basisâŚopinions formed on the back of an apparant âdislikeâ of his companys products, or his companys attitude towards its customers, the vehicle assemblers, and their ultimate customer, the vehicle operator. But may I ask you all to consider the total success of his company as Engine manufacturers, and all the markets that they were represented within, Marine, Passenger service vehicles, Industrial, and road haulage.
Maybe in terms of road vehicles, Gardners hayday was the 50s and 60s, or perhaps even earlier, I have no doubt that Gardner as a company did little to foster reciprocal trading agreements with its European Licencees, Bernard, and Kromhout in particular, (although Kromhouts absorbtion by Verhuil, and then AEC in 62, cut short this avenue). However the âarrogantâ attitude, demanding a âprice premiumâ, in a market place where other loose engine providers were gaining technological ground on Gardner, towards their ultimate customers in the 70s did little to win them friends. Yet their service, and spares side was second to none at that time. The managements slavish adherance to the contemporary Governments âPay and Income policyâ, and the intransigent Union attitude could only result in disaster, and of course it did! The resultant strike perhaps was the fatal blow to Gardners survival as an Independent loose engine supplier. Our previous contributor, a former employee, I hoped would contribute more âinsideâ views. Was it really such a stand off? Or could Gingerfold, from his excellent research on the company, enlighten us more?
Hawker Siddeley acquired Gardner, was it 4million they invested, new equipment in the Foundry, electric furnaces, new machine tools, but some of us can remember the high interest rates, and who was working there? The headcount was down to 2075, and many skilled artisans never returned.
Perhaps as comparison we should consider our âtrans Atlantic friendsâ at â â â â â â â â 79, they had placed a 21million investment in Shotts,across Shotts, Darlington and Daventry they employed 5000. Their loose engine sales accounted to10,000units into the road vehicle sector 28tons plus, 43% of that market, out of a total engine production of some 34000units in the UK. Road vehicle units in total accounting for 70% of this volume. Over four times the production of Rolls Royce, and utterly dwarfing Gardner. (But of course for this exercise I choose to ignore their lack of profitability per unit, and ultimately overall enormous corporate loss).
It is unfair of us to criticise Gardner for its designs, or even for their reluctance to turbo charge. At the period we consider that they started to fall behind, say the 60s, let us consider the turbo situation. Oil technology fell far below the demands of âblowersâ. A major contributor to the early reliability issues of âadding a turbochargerâ to a basic naturally aspirated design. UK operational legislation , with the total reluctance to raise gross weight, and the fact that Gardner sold its product almost exclusively into the UK vehicle assemblers, gave little incentive to change what was a world class design, in terms of light weight, and totally unmatched fuel efficiency. The managerial âblind sideâ, in failing to recognise that others in the same âloose engineâ market place were trying, and suceeding in coming close to Gardner criteria, was a major business failure. Totally unrecognised, and always ignored, was the looming threat of the âvertically integrated manufacturersâ (those producing all of their major components "in house, engine transmission, axle, cab), could deliver a price efficient, and operationally viable alternative to the âbespokeâ, UK assemblers product.
Our own legislators contributed to the demise of Gardner, and the âbespokeâ assemblers. In no particular order, The rise in gross weights, coupled to the âmarket regulating changeâ to Operator licencing, and the resultant massive surge in demand for vehicles. European markets were stagnant, and the UK was the only market that had demand, and what demand. The world and his wife arrived! And a new infrastructure sprang up to place these products into the market place. An infrastructure led, and staffed by people who knew what the operator needed⌠reliability in service, if it breaks, get it going again. They knew the shortcomings of the existing manufacturers backup, and devised new âoperator friendlyâ support packages, and employed Dealers staffed by people who lived this new wave! Then of course came the uncertainty of the Armitage report,for the manufacturer, what do we build? for the loose engine manufacturer, even more uncertainty, what nett weight, what bhp, what customer!!
But where did it leave Gardner? A change of ownership , new products, some with great potential, the 15.5litre 300hp, the potential of 400plus, in a light, and compact package, even before Volvos 16litre! It was too late, the market had changed, SSAP21, ( off balance sheet funding), created a new market,the emphasis changed to short term acquisition, and guaranteed cost of ownership. The old own it, and run it operator began to be less influential. New operational groupings, in both own account, and hire and reward sectors, gave rise to big volume orders. Low cost of acquisition, could only be supported by volume manufacturers who could reduce production cost, the industry had become, âmatureâ. (There aint no money left in it)!!!
Gardner, a fine product, but it became âtime expiredâ, but always a fine product. Cheerio for now.
but from 90 -93 we operated our scannie 111 (305hp) whit succes at 53 tn,s now we have a r 420 for 60tn,s
when there is 730hp
the pipe
