Carryfast:
gingerfold:
ramone:
The author has a few theoriesAnd not one of them will have any credibility or substance.
I generally go by if it looks,quacks,flies like a duck and the ancient Roman idea of who gains from this.
He mentions that the government of the time could have been involved and also there wasn’t much info coming from the AEC directors
ramone:
Carryfast:
gingerfold:
ramone:
The author has a few theoriesAnd not one of them will have any credibility or substance.
I generally go by if it looks,quacks,flies like a duck and the ancient Roman idea of who gains from this.
He mentions that the government of the time could have been involved and also there wasn’t much info coming from the AEC directors
To be fair I think we’re talking about a long term deliberate and planned rundown, to the advantage of our European competitors, which took place over more than one term of government and affected our whole automotive manufacturing sector not just AEC.Probably with US foreign policy interests being behind it.Ironically also obviously even sacrificing its own like GMC trucks division as part of the plan.With the Nationalisation of BL for example just being a Trojan Horse to provide a soft landing for the banks and investment institutions and as cover for the plan.
The suicidally stupid decisions being made, realistically just being too stupid to believe to not have been deliberate at the end of the day.That theory also ties in perfectly with what I was told by my older WW2 generation mentors in the industry in the day.
ramone:
Carryfast:
gingerfold:
ramone:
The author has a few theoriesAnd not one of them will have any credibility or substance.
I generally go by if it looks,quacks,flies like a duck and the ancient Roman idea of who gains from this.
He mentions that the government of the time could have been involved and also there wasn’t much info coming from the AEC directors
Of course the Government through the Board of Trade would have had to sign-off the deal. Both Leyland Motors (with its member companies) and AEC (ACV Group member companies) were massive War Office (as it was then) contractors. Both concerns touched every aspect of transport you can mention from passenger vehicles, lorries, rail-cars, marine auxiliary and main propulsion units, both were massive exporters bringing in foreign exchange. They were two of the major British commercial vehicle manufacturing companies. Bedford, American owned of course, and BMC being the third and fourth majors, albeit at the lighter end of the market.
If the author did some research he or she would know that at the time of the “merger” AEC had been looking for a partner for some time as it was concerned that it was over-exposed to London Transport, and whilst Routemaster orders wouldn’t be fulfilled until the late 1960s, AEC’s golden long term contract with LT was nearing the end.
gingerfold:
Of course the Government through the Board of Trade would have had to sign-off the deal. Both Leyland Motors (with its member companies) and AEC (ACV Group member companies) were massive War Office (as it was then) contractors. Both concerns touched every aspect of transport you can mention from passenger vehicles, lorries, rail-cars, marine auxiliary and main propulsion units, both were massive exporters bringing in foreign exchange. They were two of the major British commercial vehicle manufacturing companies. Bedford, American owned of course, and BMC being the third and fourth majors, albeit at the lighter end of the market.If the author did some research he or she would know that at the time of the “merger” AEC had been looking for a partner for some time as it was concerned that it was over-exposed to London Transport, and whilst Routemaster orders wouldn’t be fulfilled until the late 1960s, AEC’s golden long term contract with LT was nearing the end.
What did AEC have to offer Leyland which Leyland needed and vice versa ?.As opposed to the 680 engine design which DAF obviously needed and which Leyland was all to keen to give them.While crippling itself with the fixed head 500 and V8 debacles and the Ergo cab while DAF got on with the 2600-2800 ?.
Also wasn’t it said previously elsewhere that the AEC/Leyland ‘merger’ was a hostile takeover by Leyland in all but name ?.
gingerfold:
McGuffie Mercury with a nice load of tubes.Can’t decide if it’s loading or tipping!
Anyone care to tell us who made this cab?
That cab has some of the characteristics of a Duramin cab. Looking at the Safari cab it has the same door ■■
Will have a look through my AEC stuff and see if i can find anything.
Carryfast:
What did AEC have to offer Leyland which Leyland needed and vice versa ?
At the time of the merger AEC had the D197 gearbox to offer to Leyland who did not have a direct equivalent, nor although the AV505 was never taken up by Leyland, did they have an 8 litre engine. Leyland had a new Tilt cab to replace the outdated Park Royal cab and the Panther rear engine bus chassis.
cav551:
Carryfast:
What did AEC have to offer Leyland which Leyland needed and vice versa ?At the time of the merger AEC had the D197 gearbox to offer to Leyland who did not have a direct equivalent, nor although the AV505 was never taken up by Leyland, did they have an 8 litre engine.
All seems a bit tenuous with hindsight knowing what happened next.Hindsight in this case being very relevant in establishing what the true motivation in tying AEC to Leyland could have been.( Easier to cover and implement a plan to intentionally run both down into the ground ? ) as a group than as two independent entities.Unlike Leyland’s with AEC’s intent possibly being on its own survival up to that point.Which obviously would have been inconvenient assuming a deal in high places for DAF to be the ( eventual ) winner in a stitch up with Leyland.
cav551:
Carryfast:
What did AEC have to offer Leyland which Leyland needed and vice versa ?At the time of the merger AEC had the D197 gearbox to offer to Leyland who did not have a direct equivalent, nor although the AV505 was never taken up by Leyland, did they have an 8 litre engine. Leyland had a new Tilt cab to replace the outdated Park Royal cab and the Panther rear engine bus chassis.
The author questioned that the rrgo could have been AEC designed but for reasons way off the mark
Carryfast:
gingerfold:
Of course the Government through the Board of Trade would have had to sign-off the deal. Both Leyland Motors (with its member companies) and AEC (ACV Group member companies) were massive War Office (as it was then) contractors. Both concerns touched every aspect of transport you can mention from passenger vehicles, lorries, rail-cars, marine auxiliary and main propulsion units, both were massive exporters bringing in foreign exchange. They were two of the major British commercial vehicle manufacturing companies. Bedford, American owned of course, and BMC being the third and fourth majors, albeit at the lighter end of the market.If the author did some research he or she would know that at the time of the “merger” AEC had been looking for a partner for some time as it was concerned that it was over-exposed to London Transport, and whilst Routemaster orders wouldn’t be fulfilled until the late 1960s, AEC’s golden long term contract with LT was nearing the end.
What did AEC have to offer Leyland which Leyland needed and vice versa ?.As opposed to the 680 engine design which DAF obviously needed and which Leyland was all to keen to give them.While crippling itself with the fixed head 500 and V8 debacles and the Ergo cab while DAF got on with the 2600-2800 ?.
Also wasn’t it said previously elsewhere that the AEC/Leyland ‘merger’ was a hostile takeover by Leyland in all but name ?.
Leyland always was a predatory company having share holdings in its listed competitors whether large or small. AEC was Leyland’s largest competitor in all markets. By 1962 AEC was weak in the double deck bus markets outside of London because the future was the rear engine bus, and AEC hadn’t got a model to compete in that market because of its dependence on LT. Leyland was keen to get more business from LT once AEC’s golden supply contract expired. (From memory under the terms of the contract AEC was guaranteed 70% of LTs replacement and new chassis requirements). In municipal fleets where AEC was strong traditionally it had become vulnerable to rear engine designs from
Leyland, Daimler, Bristol and Guy. Leyland was eyeing-up AEC’s huge bus market. It’s easier to win new business if you’re employing people from a previous competitor.
Conversely by the early 1960s AEC had become stronger than Leyland in certain lorry markets. The AEC Mk.V Mammoth Major and Mandator were more modern designs than the Leyland Beaver, Hippo, and Octopus and the AECs were selling well. Both the Leyland and AEC ranges had outdated cabs as noted by CAV 551. The premium build medium weight lorry sector was massive in the early 1960s and the AEC Mercury range in Mk.1 and Mk.2 versions was battering the sales figures of the Leyland Comet and Super Comet. Mercurys had a more powerful engine than Comets and as a 22 tons gvw artic a Mercury was a profitable and popular lorry. Leyland was suffering in the medium weight sector.
Whilst there was opposition from senior AEC management and directors to the Leyland / AEC “merger” from what Harry Pick told me very few people in AEC were aware of the negotiations until the day the deal was announced. Things were done differently in those days and it would seem that the deal was negotiated by the respective company chairmen and their MDs in the gentlemen’s clubs of London, along with their merchant banking advisors. In other words it was the “establishment”.
gingerfold:
Carryfast:
gingerfold:
Of course the Government through the Board of Trade would have had to sign-off the deal. Both Leyland Motors (with its member companies) and AEC (ACV Group member companies) were massive War Office (as it was then) contractors. Both concerns touched every aspect of transport you can mention from passenger vehicles, lorries, rail-cars, marine auxiliary and main propulsion units, both were massive exporters bringing in foreign exchange. They were two of the major British commercial vehicle manufacturing companies. Bedford, American owned of course, and BMC being the third and fourth majors, albeit at the lighter end of the market.If the author did some research he or she would know that at the time of the “merger” AEC had been looking for a partner for some time as it was concerned that it was over-exposed to London Transport, and whilst Routemaster orders wouldn’t be fulfilled until the late 1960s, AEC’s golden long term contract with LT was nearing the end.
What did AEC have to offer Leyland which Leyland needed and vice versa ?.As opposed to the 680 engine design which DAF obviously needed and which Leyland was all to keen to give them.While crippling itself with the fixed head 500 and V8 debacles and the Ergo cab while DAF got on with the 2600-2800 ?.
Also wasn’t it said previously elsewhere that the AEC/Leyland ‘merger’ was a hostile takeover by Leyland in all but name ?.
Leyland always was a predatory company having share holdings in its listed competitors whether large or small. AEC was Leyland’s largest competitor in all markets. By 1962 AEC was weak in the double deck bus markets outside of London because the future was the rear engine bus, and AEC hadn’t got a model to compete in that market because of its dependence on LT. Leyland was keen to get more business from LT once AEC’s golden supply contract expired. (From memory under the terms of the contract AEC was guaranteed 70% of LTs replacement and new chassis requirements). In municipal fleets where AEC was strong traditionally it had become vulnerable to rear engine designs from
Leyland, Daimler, Bristol and Guy. Leyland was eyeing-up AEC’s huge bus market. It’s easier to win new business if you’re employing people from a previous competitor.Conversely by the early 1960s AEC had become stronger than Leyland in certain lorry markets. The AEC Mk.V Mammoth Major and Mandator were more modern designs than the Leyland Beaver, Hippo, and Octopus and the AECs were selling well. Both the Leyland and AEC ranges had outdated cabs as noted by CAV 551. The premium build medium weight lorry sector was massive in the early 1960s and the AEC Mercury range in Mk.1 and Mk.2 versions was battering the sales figures of the Leyland Comet and Super Comet. Mercurys had a more powerful engine than Comets and as a 22 tons gvw artic a Mercury was a profitable and popular lorry. Leyland was suffering in the medium weight sector.
Whilst there was opposition from senior AEC management and directors to the Leyland / AEC “merger” from what Harry Pick told me very few people in AEC were aware of the negotiations until the day the deal was announced. Things were done differently in those days and it would seem that the deal was negotiated by the respective company chairmen and their MDs in the gentlemen’s clubs of London, along with their merchant banking advisors. In other words it was the “establishment”.
Sorry to be pedantic, gf, but the Mercury in the 1960s was rarely used as a 22-ton gross artic (in my experience!). If you chucked a tandem axle trailer (or even a 4-in-line, God forbid!) behind it, you were entitled to the full 24 tons- the same gross weight as a Mandator, but a lot more payload, A favourite trick was to send Mercury artics into the South Wales steelworks to load, then swap it for a Mandator back at the depot. “And you’ll want to be away early in the morning!” If you’re lucky enough to have acquired the book, “Road Transport, The Read Story” you will find my old ■■■■■■■ pages 46-47 doing exactly that!
gingerfold:
Leyland always was a predatory company having share holdings in its listed competitors whether large or small. AEC was Leyland’s largest competitor in all markets. By 1962 AEC was weak in the double deck bus markets outside of London because the future was the rear engine bus, and AEC hadn’t got a model to compete in that market because of its dependence on LT. Leyland was keen to get more business from LT once AEC’s golden supply contract expired. (From memory under the terms of the contract AEC was guaranteed 70% of LTs replacement and new chassis requirements). In municipal fleets where AEC was strong traditionally it had become vulnerable to rear engine designs from
Leyland, Daimler, Bristol and Guy. Leyland was eyeing-up AEC’s huge bus market. It’s easier to win new business if you’re employing people from a previous competitor.Conversely by the early 1960s AEC had become stronger than Leyland in certain lorry markets. The AEC Mk.V Mammoth Major and Mandator were more modern designs than the Leyland Beaver, Hippo, and Octopus and the AECs were selling well. Both the Leyland and AEC ranges had outdated cabs as noted by CAV 551. The premium build medium weight lorry sector was massive in the early 1960s and the AEC Mercury range in Mk.1 and Mk.2 versions was battering the sales figures of the Leyland Comet and Super Comet. Mercurys had a more powerful engine than Comets and as a 22 tons gvw artic a Mercury was a profitable and popular lorry. Leyland was suffering in the medium weight sector.
Whilst there was opposition from senior AEC management and directors to the Leyland / AEC “merger” from what Harry Pick told me very few people in AEC were aware of the negotiations until the day the deal was announced. Things were done differently in those days and it would seem that the deal was negotiated by the respective company chairmen and their MDs in the gentlemen’s clubs of London, along with their merchant banking advisors. In other words it was the “establishment”.
So reading that we can conclude that, with the exception of needless access to the provincial bus market, AEC had nothing much if anything to gain from this stitch up.
We’ve already discussed elsewhere that there are some massive questions over the end of Routemaster production.( Passengers didn’t want it to end then,engineering didn’t want it to end then,bus crews didn’t want it to end then ) so who really did want it to end and why.
Senior AEC management were against the ‘merger’.
The deal was then closed behind closed doors among the usual shady interests as I’ve said the bankers being in there.
In this case hindsight tells us that DAF was always going/meant to be the eventual winner in all this ( and possibly Volvo’s bus division ? ).
Which as I’ve said answers the question as to why we didn’t see a stroked TL13 development put under the Pete knock off cab.
Followed by an SA 400 MP type knock off cab to put with would have been a TL13 powered Fuller 13 speed AEC badged ‘T45’ ready for around 1977 at the latest.
The rest is history. 
Retired Old ■■■■:
gingerfold:
Carryfast:
gingerfold:
Of course the Government through the Board of Trade would have had to sign-off the deal. Both Leyland Motors (with its member companies) and AEC (ACV Group member companies) were massive War Office (as it was then) contractors. Both concerns touched every aspect of transport you can mention from passenger vehicles, lorries, rail-cars, marine auxiliary and main propulsion units, both were massive exporters bringing in foreign exchange. They were two of the major British commercial vehicle manufacturing companies. Bedford, American owned of course, and BMC being the third and fourth majors, albeit at the lighter end of the market.If the author did some research he or she would know that at the time of the “merger” AEC had been looking for a partner for some time as it was concerned that it was over-exposed to London Transport, and whilst Routemaster orders wouldn’t be fulfilled until the late 1960s, AEC’s golden long term contract with LT was nearing the end.
What did AEC have to offer Leyland which Leyland needed and vice versa ?.As opposed to the 680 engine design which DAF obviously needed and which Leyland was all to keen to give them.While crippling itself with the fixed head 500 and V8 debacles and the Ergo cab while DAF got on with the 2600-2800 ?.
Also wasn’t it said previously elsewhere that the AEC/Leyland ‘merger’ was a hostile takeover by Leyland in all but name ?.
Leyland always was a predatory company having share holdings in its listed competitors whether large or small. AEC was Leyland’s largest competitor in all markets. By 1962 AEC was weak in the double deck bus markets outside of London because the future was the rear engine bus, and AEC hadn’t got a model to compete in that market because of its dependence on LT. Leyland was keen to get more business from LT once AEC’s golden supply contract expired. (From memory under the terms of the contract AEC was guaranteed 70% of LTs replacement and new chassis requirements). In municipal fleets where AEC was strong traditionally it had become vulnerable to rear engine designs from
Leyland, Daimler, Bristol and Guy. Leyland was eyeing-up AEC’s huge bus market. It’s easier to win new business if you’re employing people from a previous competitor.Conversely by the early 1960s AEC had become stronger than Leyland in certain lorry markets. The AEC Mk.V Mammoth Major and Mandator were more modern designs than the Leyland Beaver, Hippo, and Octopus and the AECs were selling well. Both the Leyland and AEC ranges had outdated cabs as noted by CAV 551. The premium build medium weight lorry sector was massive in the early 1960s and the AEC Mercury range in Mk.1 and Mk.2 versions was battering the sales figures of the Leyland Comet and Super Comet. Mercurys had a more powerful engine than Comets and as a 22 tons gvw artic a Mercury was a profitable and popular lorry. Leyland was suffering in the medium weight sector.
Whilst there was opposition from senior AEC management and directors to the Leyland / AEC “merger” from what Harry Pick told me very few people in AEC were aware of the negotiations until the day the deal was announced. Things were done differently in those days and it would seem that the deal was negotiated by the respective company chairmen and their MDs in the gentlemen’s clubs of London, along with their merchant banking advisors. In other words it was the “establishment”.
Sorry to be pedantic, gf, but the Mercury in the 1960s was rarely used as a 22-ton gross artic (in my experience!). If you chucked a tandem axle trailer (or even a 4-in-line, God forbid!) behind it, you were entitled to the full 24 tons- the same gross weight as a Mandator, but a lot more payload, A favourite trick was to send Mercury artics into the South Wales steelworks to load, then swap it for a Mandator back at the depot. “And you’ll want to be away early in the morning!” If you’re lucky enough to have acquired the book, “Road Transport, The Read Story” you will find my old ■■■■■■■ pages 46-47 doing exactly that!
Quite correct ROF, the Mercury artic came in three gross train weight categories, 18, 22, and 24 tons. I had put the 22 tons gtw version as an example rather than confuse matters by stating all the categories. It was used by many hauliers as a 24 tonner irrespective of what its rating was. At 22 tons it was good for a legal 15 tons payload (depending on trailer) which should have been enough for anyone, but we all know that it wasn’t enough for many hauliers back in the day…
AEC already had access to the provincial bus market with numerous operators around the country, including a few in Leyland’s back yard, what it lacked was a chassis with the engine at the rear; the Leyland Panther chassis provided this, with AEC running gear installed the Swift was made to work by provincial operators - it was just LT who were not up to the task. The Swift has ended up in some quarters with a bad name, however it is equally true that many operators were keen to get rid of the Leyland Panther as soon as possible.
The cessation of Routemaster production for London has been done to death in discussion, the reality is that provincial operators simply didn’t want it, front entrance RMF 1254 did a tour of the country in an attempt to drum up sales, only Northern General placed an order. The bus was seen as outdated in layout and too technically complicated: automatic transmission was a novel feature, as were automatic slack adjusters outside London, and power hydraulic brakes were very much mistrusted. To this day two of these features cause the most trouble in the workshop, requiring dedicated test and maintenance equipment. In London service it was always the AC charging equipment, initially with separate regulator and ‘toast rack’ rectifier, which was the most frequent cause of breakdowns. The buses ordered by Northern were to their own specification, deleting the gearbox automatic control equipment and substituting Leyland power and a trusted Leyland worm drive rear axle for the rather more fragile spiral bevel unit. The RM series was also handicapped by its semi integral constuction which was available in highbridge format only. Just as the UK haulage industry didn’t want the Detroit engine the UK bus operators didn’t want the RM. You cannot make people buy what they don’t want. Significantly vehicle purchasers and especially bus operators are conservative in their attitude towards what is seen as new technology, there is a very large element of wait and see what is wrong with it, let someone else lash out to find out and if it is any good then we’ll buy the Mark 2.
AEC did have other offerings for the Provincial market. The Reliance was a popular single deck chassis, lasting almost until the end of AEC itself. The Regent V double deck chassis produced only one order in London but was popular provincially in long and short wheelbase versions, with front or rear entrance and high or lowbridge bodywork and a choice of engine - even making Gardner an option. For the Lowbridge market AEC offered the Bridgemaster - an integral construction incorporating some RM features, this was superseded by the Renown with chassis, both designs seen as too novel- air suspension. Both sold poorly, significantly since the Bristol Lodekka and Dennis Loline clone had captured the market.
cav551:
AEC already had access to the provincial bus market with numerous operators around the country, including a few in Leyland’s back yard, what it lacked was a chassis with the engine at the rear; the Leyland Panther chassis provided this, with AEC running gear installed the Swift was made to work by provincial operators - it was just LT who were not up to the task. The Swift has ended up in some quarters with a bad name, however it is equally true that many operators were keen to get rid of the Leyland Panther as soon as possible.The cessation of Routemaster production for London has been done to death in discussion, the reality is that provincial operators simply didn’t want it, front entrance RMF 1254 did a tour of the country in an attempt to drum up sales, only Northern General placed an order. The bus was seen as outdated in layout and too technically complicated: automatic transmission was a novel feature, as were automatic slack adjusters outside London, and power hydraulic brakes were very much mistrusted. To this day two of these features cause the most trouble in the workshop, requiring dedicated test and maintenance equipment. In London service it was always the AC charging equipment, initially with separate regulator and ‘toast rack’ rectifier, which was the most frequent cause of breakdowns. The buses ordered by Northern were to their own specification, deleting the gearbox automatic control equipment and substituting Leyland power and a trusted Leyland worm drive rear axle for the rather more fragile spiral bevel unit. The RM series was also handicapped by its semi integral constuction which was available in highbridge format only. Just as the UK haulage industry didn’t want the Detroit engine the UK bus operators didn’t want the RM. You cannot make people buy what they don’t want. Significantly vehicle purchasers and especially bus operators are conservative in their attitude towards what is seen as new technology, there is a very large element of wait and see what is wrong with it, let someone else lash out to find out and if it is any good then we’ll buy the Mark 2.
AEC did have other offerings for the Provincial market. The Reliance was a popular single deck chassis, lasting almost until the end of AEC itself. The Regent V double deck chassis produced only one order in London but was popular provincially in long and short wheelbase versions, with front or rear entrance and high or lowbridge bodywork and a choice of engine - even making Gardner an option. For the Lowbridge market AEC offered the Bridgemaster - an integral construction incorporating some RM features, this was superseded by the Renown with chassis, both designs seen as too novel- air suspension. Both sold poorly, significantly since the Bristol Lodekka and Dennis Loline clone had captured the market.
No one is saying that the Routemaster was perfect.Anything made by humans rarely is.Notwithstanding that remind us how long the Routemaster was in service ( in AEC powered form ) ?.As opposed to the date it was taken out of production.As I remember it that doesn’t suggest a product which ‘no one wanted’ as of 1968 more like exactly the opposite.With passengers rightly being against one man operation as much as crews and the RM being second to none regards passenger comfort and acceptance and obviously ease of maintenance for workshop staff.While we know that whatever Leyland supposedly had to offer AEC it wasn’t enough to keep AEC’s factory busy.Nor was it obviously meant to.
Carryfast:
cav551:
AEC already had access to the provincial bus market with numerous operators around the country, including a few in Leyland’s back yard, what it lacked was a chassis with the engine at the rear; the Leyland Panther chassis provided this, with AEC running gear installed the Swift was made to work by provincial operators - it was just LT who were not up to the task. The Swift has ended up in some quarters with a bad name, however it is equally true that many operators were keen to get rid of the Leyland Panther as soon as possible.The cessation of Routemaster production for London has been done to death in discussion, the reality is that provincial operators simply didn’t want it, front entrance RMF 1254 did a tour of the country in an attempt to drum up sales, only Northern General placed an order. The bus was seen as outdated in layout and too technically complicated: automatic transmission was a novel feature, as were automatic slack adjusters outside London, and power hydraulic brakes were very much mistrusted. To this day two of these features cause the most trouble in the workshop, requiring dedicated test and maintenance equipment. In London service it was always the AC charging equipment, initially with separate regulator and ‘toast rack’ rectifier, which was the most frequent cause of breakdowns. The buses ordered by Northern were to their own specification, deleting the gearbox automatic control equipment and substituting Leyland power and a trusted Leyland worm drive rear axle for the rather more fragile spiral bevel unit. The RM series was also handicapped by its semi integral constuction which was available in highbridge format only. Just as the UK haulage industry didn’t want the Detroit engine the UK bus operators didn’t want the RM. You cannot make people buy what they don’t want. Significantly vehicle purchasers and especially bus operators are conservative in their attitude towards what is seen as new technology, there is a very large element of wait and see what is wrong with it, let someone else lash out to find out and if it is any good then we’ll buy the Mark 2.
AEC did have other offerings for the Provincial market. The Reliance was a popular single deck chassis, lasting almost until the end of AEC itself. The Regent V double deck chassis produced only one order in London but was popular provincially in long and short wheelbase versions, with front or rear entrance and high or lowbridge bodywork and a choice of engine - even making Gardner an option. For the Lowbridge market AEC offered the Bridgemaster - an integral construction incorporating some RM features, this was superseded by the Renown with chassis, both designs seen as too novel- air suspension. Both sold poorly, significantly since the Bristol Lodekka and Dennis Loline clone had captured the market.
No one is saying that the Routemaster was perfect.Anything made by humans rarely is.Notwithstanding that remind us how long the Routemaster was in service ( in AEC powered form ) ?.As opposed to the date it was taken out of production.As I remember it that doesn’t suggest a product which ‘no one wanted’ as of 1968 more like exactly the opposite.With passengers rightly being against one man operation as much as crews and the RM being second to none regards passenger comfort and acceptance and obviously ease of maintenance for workshop staff.While we know that whatever Leyland supposedly had to offer AEC it wasn’t enough to keep AEC’s factory busy.Nor was it obviously meant to.
The RM was a superbly engineered bus (especially for its time) but it was so horrendously expensive only LT could afford it. It was way out of the price range for municipal operators of that time. Whilst AEC were coming out with this Leyland were working on the Atlantean and demonstrated the prototype at the 1956 show two years after the RM entered service.
Dennis Javelin:
The RM was a superbly engineered bus (especially for its time) but it was so horrendously expensive only LT could afford it. It was way out of the price range for municipal operators of that time. Whilst AEC were coming out with this Leyland were working on the Atlantean and demonstrated the prototype at the 1956 show two years after the RM entered service.
The fact that LT was rightly replacing RT’s with very welcome RM’s in the mid-late 1970’s and scrounging them from wherever they could get them after that, with the RM having gone out of production in 1968 ?.Suggests that 1 no one, passengers or operators, rightly wanted dodgy unreliable one man operated rear engined heaps whoever was making them at any price AEC or Leyland and the fact that Leyland might have been making the things didn’t mean that Leyland was going to hand its bus making capacity over to AEC even if they did.
The idea that the Routemaster was taken out of production at least 10 years too early stands.The result in large part crippling AEC’s business model at that point.While ironically AEC didn’t really need a large provincial bus market and LT obviously didn’t need unreliable,difficult to fix and slow one man operated rear engined heaps.At least until well into the 1980’s.In addition to Leyland also deliberately crippling AEC’s truck product development and market placement.All obviously with hindsight to the benefit of DAF trucks and possibly Volvo bus division.
Dennis Javelin:
Carryfast:
cav551:
AEC already had access to the provincial bus market with numerous operators around the country, including a few in Leyland’s back yard, what it lacked was a chassis with the engine at the rear; the Leyland Panther chassis provided this, with AEC running gear installed the Swift was made to work by provincial operators - it was just LT who were not up to the task. The Swift has ended up in some quarters with a bad name, however it is equally true that many operators were keen to get rid of the Leyland Panther as soon as possible.The cessation of Routemaster production for London has been done to death in discussion, the reality is that provincial operators simply didn’t want it, front entrance RMF 1254 did a tour of the country in an attempt to drum up sales, only Northern General placed an order. The bus was seen as outdated in layout and too technically complicated: automatic transmission was a novel feature, as were automatic slack adjusters outside London, and power hydraulic brakes were very much mistrusted. To this day two of these features cause the most trouble in the workshop, requiring dedicated test and maintenance equipment. In London service it was always the AC charging equipment, initially with separate regulator and ‘toast rack’ rectifier, which was the most frequent cause of breakdowns. The buses ordered by Northern were to their own specification, deleting the gearbox automatic control equipment and substituting Leyland power and a trusted Leyland worm drive rear axle for the rather more fragile spiral bevel unit. The RM series was also handicapped by its semi integral constuction which was available in highbridge format only. Just as the UK haulage industry didn’t want the Detroit engine the UK bus operators didn’t want the RM. You cannot make people buy what they don’t want. Significantly vehicle purchasers and especially bus operators are conservative in their attitude towards what is seen as new technology, there is a very large element of wait and see what is wrong with it, let someone else lash out to find out and if it is any good then we’ll buy the Mark 2.
AEC did have other offerings for the Provincial market. The Reliance was a popular single deck chassis, lasting almost until the end of AEC itself. The Regent V double deck chassis produced only one order in London but was popular provincially in long and short wheelbase versions, with front or rear entrance and high or lowbridge bodywork and a choice of engine - even making Gardner an option. For the Lowbridge market AEC offered the Bridgemaster - an integral construction incorporating some RM features, this was superseded by the Renown with chassis, both designs seen as too novel- air suspension. Both sold poorly, significantly since the Bristol Lodekka and Dennis Loline clone had captured the market.
No one is saying that the Routemaster was perfect.Anything made by humans rarely is.Notwithstanding that remind us how long the Routemaster was in service ( in AEC powered form ) ?.As opposed to the date it was taken out of production.As I remember it that doesn’t suggest a product which ‘no one wanted’ as of 1968 more like exactly the opposite.With passengers rightly being against one man operation as much as crews and the RM being second to none regards passenger comfort and acceptance and obviously ease of maintenance for workshop staff.While we know that whatever Leyland supposedly had to offer AEC it wasn’t enough to keep AEC’s factory busy.Nor was it obviously meant to.
The RM was a superbly engineered bus (especially for its time) but it was so horrendously expensive only LT could afford it. It was way out of the price range for municipal operators of that time. Whilst AEC were coming out with this Leyland were working on the Atlantean and demonstrated the prototype at the 1956 show two years after the RM entered service.
The RM was AEC’s guaranteed profit earner for the duration of its production run. It was also popular with the assembly line workers who were very familiar with assembling the sub=sections, they could build them blind-folded. Assembly line workers at Southall were on a bonus scheme, so the RM was usually assembled on Fridays, so the workers could earn a good bonus and boost their weekly earnings.
So why did AEC bother building a rear engined Routemaster if money was tight and it was never going to be used?
ramone:
So why did AEC bother building a rear engined Routemaster if money was tight and it was never going to be used?
Probably to prove that it could build a rear engine bus, but it was never going to be a seller because by the time it was built the Leyland Atlantean was the market leader and Leyland owned, or would own soon, Daimler, Bristol and Guy.
gingerfold:
ramone:
So why did AEC bother building a rear engined Routemaster if money was tight and it was never going to be used?Probably to prove that it could build a rear engine bus, but it was never going to be a seller because by the time it was built the Leyland Atlantean was the market leader and Leyland owned, or would own soon, Daimler, Bristol and Guy.
Also to be fair LT was obviously scrounging for whatever remained of the existing RM fleet it could find to replace RT’s.It wasn’t running around the country trying to replace RT’s with rear engined one man operation anything.With it’s rear engined aspirations having rightly been rejected by all concerned from passengers to maintenance staff.From experience routes 281 and 285 were turned into a slow unreliable farce by the introduction of DMS and SMS types.While 65 made the leap forward from RT to RM.All this long after the end on RM production.
